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THE N.D.P. AND FRENCH CANADA

1961 - 1965

by

David H. Sherwood

**THE BACKGROUND FOR DISPUTE
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC
(The Fall of 1961 to Summer 1962)**

| | |
|---|-----|
| The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council Operations | 77 |
| Theological Differences within the Provisional Council . . . | 80 |
| Meetings of Federal N.D.P. Representatives for Quebec . . . | 90 |
| Synopsis of the 1962 N.D.P. Election Campaign in Quebec . . . | 95 |
| Summary | 101 |

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>PAGE</u> |
|---|-------------|
| INTRODUCTION | i |
| <u>CHAPTER</u> | |
| I THE LEGACY OF THE C.C.F. IN QUEBEC | |
| The C.C.F. Background | 1 |
| The C.C.F. and the Catholic Church . . | 4 |
| The Party in Quebec | 8 |
| Summary | 22 |
| II THE NEW PARTY | |
| The Beginnings | 25 |
| The Work of the National Committee . . | 28 |
| The Issues | 33 |
| Summary | 35 |
| III THE NEW PARTY IN QUEBEC | |
| The Quebec Committee (1960-1961) . . . | 37 |
| Summary | 58 |
| IV THE NEW PARTY FOUNDING CONVENTION OTTAWA, JULY 31 - AUGUST 4, 1961 | |
| The Mood of the Delegates | 61 |
| Convention Business | 65 |
| Reaction in Montreal | 70 |
| The Founding Convention Aftermath . . | 74 |
| Summary | 75 |
| V THE BACKGROUND FOR DISPUTE THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC (The fall of 1961 to Summer 1962) | |
| The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council Operations | 77 |
| Ideological Differences within the Provisional Council. | 80 |
| Reactions of Federal N.D.P. Spokesmen for Quebec | 90 |
| Synopsis of the 1962 N.D.P. Election Campaign in Quebec | 95 |
| Summary | 101 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

I THE LEGACY OF THE Q.C.F. IN QUEBEC

The Q.C.F. Background 1
The Q.C.F. and the Catholic Church 4
The Party in Quebec 8
Summary 22

II THE NEW PARTY

The Beginnings 27
The Work of the National Committee 28
The Issues 32
Summary 35

III THE NEW PARTY IN QUEBEC

The Quebec Committee (1960-1961) 37
Summary 39

IV THE NEW PARTY FOUNDING CONVENTION OTTAWA, JULY 31 - AUGUST 1, 1961

The Mood of the Delegates 41
Convention Business 42
Reaction in Montreal 49
The Founding Convention Aftermath 52
Summary 53

V THE BACKGROUND FOR DISPUTE THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC (The Fall of 1961 to Summer 1962)

The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional
Council Operations 57
Ideological Differences within
the Provisional Council 60
Reactions of Federal N.D.P.
Spokesmen for Quebec 69
Synopsis of the 1962 N.D.P.
Election Campaign in Quebec 72
Summary 101

| | | |
|------|--|-----|
| VI | THE LINES OF DIVISION HARDEN -- THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC (1962-1963) | |
| | Operations of the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council | 102 |
| | Ideological Division within the Provisional N.D.P. Council (1962-1963) | 108 |
| | The Federalists | 110 |
| | The Nationalists | 115 |
| | Criticism of the N.D.P. in Montreal (1962-1963) | 120 |
| | Synopsis of the N.D.P. 1963 Federal Election Campaign | 124 |
| | Summary | 130 |
| VII | THE SPLIT OF QUEBEC N.D.P. AT THE ORIENTATION CONVENTION | |
| | Preparations and Papers | 131 |
| | 'Nationalist Journalists' and the Orientation Convention | 140 |
| | The Split at the Orientation Convention, June 29th-30th, 1963 | 145 |
| | Aftermath of the Orientation Convention | 155 |
| | Summary | 157 |
| VIII | THE SECOND N.D.P. CONVENTION IN REGINA August 6th - August 9th, 1963 | |
| | Background to the Convention | 158 |
| | The Convention | 166 |
| | Summary | 175 |
| IX | PERSPECTIVES: FALL 1963 - SPRING 1965 | |
| | The PSQ: Decline to a Discussion Group | 177 |
| | The Federal N.D.P.: Operations, 1963-1965 | 180 |
| | The Quebec N.D.P.: The Slow Recovery, 1963-1965 | 185 |
| X | CONCLUSION | 189 |

| | | |
|--------------|--|-----|
| APPENDIX A | Chronology | 200 |
| APPENDIX B | N.D.P. Parliamentary Caucus . | 206 |
| APPENDIX C | Synopsis of N.D.P. Bilingual and Bicultural Policies . . . | 207 |
| APPENDIX D | Extracts from the N.D.P., 1961 and 1963 Programmes, on Federalism and Biculturalism. | 212 |
| <hr/> | | |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | | 225 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| <u>FIGURE</u> | | <u>PAGE</u> |
|---------------|---|-------------|
| I | The National Committee for the New Party. 1958 - July 1961 | 30 |
| II | The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council, Fall 1961 | 78 |
| III | The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council. The Ideological Position of the Major Participants | 109 |

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INTRODUCTION

In the early sixties two seemingly unconnected developments were taking place in the Canadian political system. On the one hand the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) was attempting to build up a broad level of support as a new force in federal politics. On the other hand, the province of Quebec was generally experiencing a profound social transformation.

In the late fifties, on the initiative of the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.), a joint committee with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) was set up to undertake the prodigious task of forming a new party. It was not long before this Joint C.L.C. -- C.C.F. Committee became known as the National Committee for the New Party. The efforts of the National Committee were paralleled in French Canada by the Quebec Committee for the New Party. Delegates from Quebec participated in the Founding Convention of the N.D.P. held in Ottawa during the summer of 1961, then set to work to put their own party on a firm footing. However, the Quebec N.D.P., from 1961 to 1963, was gradually divided by a deepening ideological rift. French Canadian nationalist members tried to form a separate socialist party while federalist members sought to restrain them. As a result of the struggles within the Quebec N.D.P., certain federal spokesmen developed a series of policies designed to improve English-French relations. However, after two

demoralising federal elections in 1962 and 1963, the Quebec N.D.P. split and the Parti Socialiste du Quebec (PSQ) was formed. The Quebec N.D.P. slowly recovered from the split and was able to hold finally its founding convention in March, 1965.

During this time, from 1959 to 1965, federal politics, and particularly relations between the province of Quebec and the federal government, entered a period of re-adjustment. In Quebec itself a transformation was underway involving rapid economic and social development. French Canadian nationalist movements spread and the more radical, like the Front de la Libération du Québec (FLQ), indulged in terrorist activities. However, the formation of separatist movements was but one important manifestation of a more profound social revolution. On the federal level it was not always appreciated that behind the demands by Quebec spokesmen on the federal government lay the complex requirements of rapid industrialization, urbanization and the expansion of both educational and welfare facilities in Quebec. Consequently, demands by the province for a greater share of total Canadian tax revenues, as well as demands for complete provincial control over education and welfare services were inseparable from French-Canadian nationalism. The growth of national pride and militancy, general in French Canada, led to a desire for the recognition of a

special status for Quebec in Confederation.

Not surprisingly, Quebec's claim for a special position has had a marked effect on the Canadian federal party system. Neither of the two major parties -- the Liberals nor the Progressive Conservatives -- have remained unaffected, while the minor parties, the Social Credit and the N.D.P., have both suffered splits in their Quebec organization.

The nature of the response of the N.D.P., as an ideological, social democratic third party, in a federal-parliamentary system, to the nationalist challenge from Quebec constitutes the general focus of the study. The operations of the N.D.P. in Quebec itself, as it attempted to build support in a province undergoing a pervasive social revolution, represents the particular focus. The disputes between English and French Canadians within the Quebec N.D.P., and their final split over Quebec's place in the Confederation constitute the hard core of the study.

Each of these perspectives, the behaviour of the N.D.P. as a minor ideological party in a federal-parliamentary system, the difficulties encountered by the N.D.P. in attempting to build a broad base of support in the 'new' Quebec and the relations between the activists within the Quebec N.D.P., requires introductory amplification.

There are certain features of the Canadian federal-parliamentary system which favour the minor party. Canada's broad regional and cultural differences and what has been termed the 'fragmented outlook'¹ of Canadian voters has helped pave the way for the minor party in a system of representation that is far from comprehensive. Economic and local grievances as well as movements of protest and reform have all found outlets in minor parties. The capture of one or more of the ten provinces gives the minor party a reasonably stable organizational base from which to operate. Once seats have been secured in parliament, the institution of cabinet government holds out the opportunity for increased participation. The minor party might well hold the balance of power in the House of Commons thus enhancing its chances of participation and coalition.

The three western movements of political protest, the Progressives, the Social Credit and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.), certainly benefitted as third parties from these favourable characteristics of the Canadian federal-parliamentary system. The C.C.F., particularly, played an important role in parliament as a mouth-piece for social reform and suffered the frustration

¹ Meisel, J. "The Stalled Omnibus: Canadian Parties in the 1960's". Social Research. Volume 30, No. 3, Autumn 1963.

of seeing reforms that it had advocated implemented by the major parties. Professor J.R. Mallory writes:

Then when the time is ripe, the old parties calmly adopt the more durable reforms of the third parties and carry them into law. This has been true of almost every significant reform of the last thirty years.¹

This function, performed by the C.C.F., has also been a characteristic of the N.D.P. where it was specially evident in relation to the formulation of bilingual and federal policies.

In enlarging on the position of the N.D.P. as a social democratic party it is necessary to list out those characteristics, apart from ideology, which were important in affecting its relations with French Canada. Generally speaking, the most obvious characteristics of social democratic parties are their extra-parliamentary origins, their relations with trade unions and working men's associations, the role of intellectuals in the movement, the stress on democratic organization and the place of the parliamentary caucus in a complementary rather than a dictatorial relationship with the rest of the party. Other

¹ Mallory, J.R. "The Structure of Canadian Politics", in Hugh G. Thorburn (Edit.) Party Politics in Canada, Prentice Hall, Toronto, 1963. P. 25.

characteristics of social democratic parties are their semi-decentralized structures and the emphasis placed on mass membership within the movement both to raise funds and provide party workers.

The N.D.P. conforms to many of these characteristics while the pattern of its formation had a certain ritualistic similiarity with the formation of the British Labour Party. In 1899, as a result of the decision of the Trade Union Congress to create a parliamentary and electoral organization, the Independent Labour Party led by Keir Hardie, and the Fabian Society, co-operated in the formation of the British Labour Party. While the comparison might be tenuous, the N.D.P. as well was formed by the union of three forces when the C.C.F., the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.) and the New Party Clubs came together. Further similarities to the British Labour Party are seen when the link with the Trade Unions is compared. Writing about the relation between organized Labour and socialist parties, Professor Duverger commented:

The activity of the Trade Unions is best known; many socialist parties have been directly created by them and have moreover retained for varying periods the character of "secular arm" of the Trade Unions in electoral and parliamentary matters.¹

¹ Duverger, M. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity, Science Editions, New York 1963. P. 285.

It was no small accident that the old Canadian Congress of Labour referred to the C.C.F. as its 'political arm'¹. It was the Canadian Labour Congress which took the initiative in the formation of the N.D.P., forging more closely the links between politics and labour.

The importance of the social democratic characteristics of the N.D.P. become more apparent when the attempts of the party to establish itself in Quebec are examined in detail. This story is a complex one. Suffice it to say at this stage, that the doctrinaire Socialism preached by the C.C.F. in the thirties and early forties was anathema to both the established church and political circles in Quebec. The C.C.F.'s image was an inheritance that the N.D.P. could not avoid. However, the radical, alien stigma was as difficult to remove as it was to translate the name 'Cooperative Commonwealth Federation' into French. With the coming of the social revolution in Quebec it was thought that doors would now be open to the N.D.P. which had previously been barred to the C.C.F./Parti Social Démocratique (PSD).

Dramatic successes were not expected in the federal general elections of 1962 and 1963. Total electoral failure in Quebec came as a surprise and was largely the result of the growing internal division within the party in that

¹ At the 1943 Canadian Congress of Labour Convention held in Montreal, the C.C.L. endorsed the C.C.F. as the 'political arm of labour'.

province. It is the evolution of this ideological division and the relations between both English and French-speaking activists within the Quebec N.D.P. which will be examined in depth.

However, it was from the struggles between the French Canadian nationalist and the federalist groups within the Quebec N.D.P. that an acute awareness of the problems of French Canada in transition was developed by those concerned. In a sense the split between the N.D.P. and the PSQ lies at the heart of the matter not only because it embroiled the N.D.P. in the nationalist question at a critical time but because from these struggles there developed a relationship with the federal party that led to the formulation of a series of remedial policies. Moreover, it was the N.D.P.'s social democratic character, its autonomous but democratic structure in Quebec that provided such a ready platform for the endless discussion and nationalist dispute. The federal N.D.P.'s position as a third party, the value it placed on new ideas, and its distance from the constraints of government, then allowed the articulation of a flow of policies dealing with French Canada.

The framework that best permits the exploration of the relationships between the N.D.P., as a third party in a federal-parliamentary system, and the evolving nationalist

society of Quebec is bound to be part chronicle, part analysis. The principal events and major episodes in the development of the N.D.P. from 1961 to 1965 naturally divide its history into chapters.

The analysis of the N.D.P.'s experience with French Canada necessarily opens with the legacy of the C.C.F. in Quebec. A survey of the New Party movement follows with special attention devoted to its organization in Quebec. The founding convention of the N.D.P. in 1961, the general elections of 1962 and 1963, the Quebec N.D.P.'s Orientation Convention of June 1963 and the second Federal Convention in Regina in August 1963, comprise the major events in the N.D.P.'s experience. A detailed examination is made of the party's operations in Quebec, the evolution of the ideological division and the sequence of events leading up to the split with the PSQ. The slow recuperation of the Quebec N.D.P. and its founding in March 1965 are covered briefly.

It is the intention of this study to examine the fortunes of the N.D.P. in Quebec, to concentrate on action within the Quebec N.D.P. and interaction with the federal party, so that the network of relationships arising from the N.D.P.'s experience with French Canada from 1961 to 1965 might be more fully revealed.

CHAPTER I

THE LEGACY OF THE C.C.F. IN QUEBEC

The C.C.F. Background

The C.C.F. was born in the Canadian prairies in the summer of 1932 when several socialist parties¹, farmers and union representatives discussed plans for joint political action at the Western Labour Conference in Calgary. Subsequently, the C.C.F. was organized as a political party, holding its first convention in Regina in 1933. From this convention emerged the famous 'Regina Manifesto' -- a declaration of socialist principles dedicated to the elimination of the then pressing inadequacies of capitalism. To the outside observer the C.C.F. seemed to be a western farm party with some union support and containing a number of intellectuals from the East. The party also appeared to have strong Christian 'social gospel' undertones², the political style of those clergy and ex-clergy in the C.C.F. contributing to this image.

¹ These included the Socialist Party of B.C., the Canadian Labour Party, the Dominion Labour Party of Alberta, the Independent Labour Party of Saskatchewan and the Independent Labour Party of Manitoba.

² A C.C.F. pamphlet entitled, 'C.C.F. Principles Agree with Christian Ideals', provides a detailed synthesis of fundamental Christian ideals with the C.C.F. programme.

In the east the presence of the C.C.F. was complemented by the Fabian-oriented professors¹ from McGill and Toronto who were members of the League for Social Reconstruction. When it came to setting up the C.C.F. in Ontario, where support for the party was largely concentrated in and around Toronto, the process was greatly assisted by the early co-operation of three bodies; the Ontario Labour Conference, the Associated C.C.F. Clubs and the once strong United Farmers of Ontario. This, coupled with the fact that in the industrial areas of Ontario there already existed a certain level of working class consciousness and acceptance of socialism, provided the necessary base for the establishment of a viable C.C.F. party.

In the Quebec of the thirties no similar base existed. Furthermore, the image of the C.C.F. as a radical, western farm party, with some union support and topped by a bevy of thinkers was accentuated by the fact that there had been no interested groups from French Canada associated with the formation of the C.C.F. As J.S. Woodsworth acknowledged, the debt of the C.C.F. to

¹ These included: F.R. Scott, F.H. Underhill, Eugene Forsey, J. King Gordon and others.

British Socialism was prodigious and the stamp of the British Labour Party was upon them.¹ Therefore it was the English C.C.F. that came to French Canada seeking acceptance in an essentially conservative political environment, hoping to establish itself in a rigid Catholic society in which paternalism and orthodoxy had proved themselves as bulwarks of French Canadian nationalism and cultural survival. It was not surprising that the C.C.F. should be largely received in Quebec as an alien and suspect group preaching a social gospel and advocating a centralism that was contrary to the whole experience of French Canada.

The history of the C.C.F. in Quebec must then be seen in terms of a small, mainly ideological party existing on the edge of the province's political life, consistently failing to establish itself widely and for a long while marked with the taint of heresy.

¹ McNaught, K. A Prophet in Politics. A Biography J.S. Woodsworth, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1959. Pp. 92-6, 126-8, 134-5, 316-17.

The C.C.F. and the Catholic Church

The reaction of Canada's Catholics to the 'social gospel' advocated by the C.C.F. was mixed. The fact that the party's programme was condemned in Quebec, by the then Archbishop of Montreal, was obviously of vital importance to the Quebec C.C.F.

Catholics generally were unsure of the status of the C.C.F. in the eyes of the Church. The early C.C.F., for psychological reasons alone, was suspected of harbouring communists. The choice of the word 'manifesto' to describe the C.C.F. programme, the practice of addressing fellow members as 'comrades' and the activities of recognized communist elements attempting to infiltrate the C.C.F., contributed to these suspicions.

In 1934, Archbishop Gauthier of Montreal issued a pastoral letter in which he condemned the C.C.F. programme on three grounds; - first, that it denied the rights of private property; - second that it supported class antagonism; - and third that its philosophy was inevitably materialistic.¹ The letter placed Catholics in the rest of Canada on the defensive vis-à-vis the C.C.F.,

¹ Cardinal Villeneuve repeated these warnings in a speech in Montreal.

while to Catholics in the Archdiocese of Montreal it gave a specific warning. Not surprisingly these warnings were used for political purposes. Evelyn Dumas, writing on this question, comments:

En 1934, Mgr Gauthier, archevêque de Montréal, exprima des mises en garde. Plusieurs évêques firent leurs mises en garde, et par la suite, les paroles de la hiérarchie furent largement utilisées à des fins politiques.¹

It was to take nine years before the rise of the C.C.F. in the rest of Canada brought the Catholic Church in Quebec to reconsider what in fact amounted to a ban on the C.C.F. In the interim the good French Canadian Catholic, particularly in Montreal, found himself somewhat constrained by the warnings of the Church.

This rather depressing state of affairs for the Quebec C.C.F. was partially remedied in 1943. The previous year Murray Ballantyne, Editor of the Canadian Register, realized that:

... the existing situation gave the Church the worst of both worlds. She was suffering all the hostility that a clear and binding condemnation would have cost her, without achieving the good that might have been

¹ Dumas, E. 'Socialisme et Conscience', Cité Libre No 30, Jan-Feb 1960. P. 26.

expected had such a condemnation been found necessary and issued. ¹

Accordingly, Mr. Ballantyne, who was not a member of the C.C.F. and who was working solely for the good of the Church, re-examined the C.C.F. programme and now finding it acceptable sent his conclusions to Archbishop Charbonneau, the successor to Msgr. Gauthier.

A little later when a small committee was established to examine the C.C.F. situation Mr. Ballantyne was the only English Canadian serving on it. In his own words Mr. Ballantyne describes the first failure of the Committee:

... which quickly reached an impasse when it became apparent that at least some of those present were convinced that the spirit and programme of the C.C.F. was incompatible with French-Canadian 'survivance'. ²

¹ Ballantyne, M.G. 'The Catholic Church and the C.C.F.' Canadian Catholic Historical Association Annual Report, 1963. P. 35. In this article Mr. Ballantyne explains his role in obtaining a reconsideration of the C.C.F. question by the Catholic Church.

² Ibid. P. 36. Murray Ballantyne also points out that 'these men' on the committee knew of the plans to launch the Bloc Populaire; -- a new political party, symbolizing French Canadian unity, opposed to the war and conscription and pledged to enhance provincial autonomy. Led by Maxime Raymond, the party failed to dislodge Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale. André Laurendeau was provincial leader but the party's main focus was federal politics. The men on the committee did not want to prejudice the new venture by suddenly liberating the C.C.F.

The political implications of these views immediately raise interesting points. First, the C.C.F. had ostensibly been condemned on doctrinal grounds alone. Second, the party had not been condemned by the Church outside Quebec. Third, the objectives of the committee were prompted not merely by religious reasoning but by nationalistic and political considerations. It might almost be said that just as in the United States 'un-American activities' serve to cover a wide gamut of subversive phobias so too, it seemed, this committee was objecting to the C.C.F. primarily on the grounds that it was 'un-French Canadian'. The net result was to reaffirm the Catholic Church's historic role in Quebec as the retaining wall of French Canadian cultural survival.

What particularly concerned Mr. Ballantyne was that the unequal treatment of political parties in Quebec would give the appearance that the Church was meddling in politics, an appearance that was also extremely dangerous for the Church to display. However, after the failure of the Montreal Committee, events gathered momentum. Letters were exchanged between Catholic Bishops outside Quebec and a friendly meeting was held between Mr. M.J. Coldwell, Leader of the C.C.F., Professor F.R. Scott and Msgr. Charbonneau. Subsequently, at the Plenary

Meeting of the Bishops of Canada in Montreal, in October 1943, a declaration was issued allowing Catholics to support any political party except the Communists.

Unfortunately the declaration did not mention the C.C.F. by name. Again it was Mr. Ballantyne, in his capacity as Editor of the Canadian Register, who acquired permission for both his paper and L'Action Catholique, edited by Eugène L'Heureux, to carry editorial comment explaining that the declaration was meant to clear the C.C.F. Le Devoir, for October 20th, 1943, also carried similar editorial comment but this was by no means the practice elsewhere.

The reactions to the Bishop's Declaration were mixed but it seemed that even had an explicit declaration been made the stigma surrounding the C.C.F. in Quebec could hardly have been erased with one stroke.

The Party in Quebec.

The C.C.F. in Quebec was set up under the shadow of the disapproval of the Church, necessarily by English Canadians with socialist leanings. Virtually confined to the metropolitan area of Montreal with a little organization in Quebec city, the party opened a provincial office, elected its executive committee and

then settled down to exist. The party was staffed mainly by trade unionists, McGill University professors and other interested English-speaking socialists, with French Canadians in a minority.¹

The C.C.F. Quebec Provincial Council, in the late thirties and forties, conducted most of its business in English with minutes taken in the same language. The Provincial Council itself was composed of the leaders of C.C.F. Clubs in the Montreal ridings of N.D.G., Westmount, St. Lawrence - St. George and Outremont with other members drawn from trade unions and such organizations as the Y.M.C.A. While Professor Frank Scott was the doyen of the C.C.F. Provincial Council, both William Dodge and Thérèse Casgrain became leading members in the forties.

It was in the war years that the C.C.F. outside Quebec suddenly started coming to life. Leo Zakuta optimistically terms the period 1942 to 1945 that of 'Major Party: Ascent', when from the end of 1941 'the C.C.F. ceased to be a lost cause'.² Whatever the position of the C.C.F. in Canada at large, the party in Quebec

¹ Prominent among this group were Guy-Merrill Desaulniers, a labour lawyer, and such trade unionists as Roger Provost and Gérard Picard.

² Zakuta, L. A Protest Movement Becalmed. A Study of Change in the C.C.F., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1964. P. 58.

did not share in this upsurge. However, perceptible changes were taking place in the Quebec C.C.F. in the forties. Although the party had started to contest federal elections in 1935 and had always fielded a respectable number of candidates, it had not won a single Quebec seat, while it had only been able to register a single provincial victory by securing the Rouyn seat in the 1944 election. Gradual changes were then wrought in the provincial party mainly as a result of a growing awareness of the untenable nature of the C.C.F.'s position in Quebec.

In the mid-forties the use of French in the Provincial Council's minutes¹ became more marked. English was still the dominant language and the C.C.F. youth was mainly drawn from the English and Jewish communities in Montreal. But the war had quickened the tempo of industrialization and diversification in Quebec and both union activity and interest in the C.C.F. increased.

With the lifting of the religious obstacle in late 1943, the Quebec C.C.F. set about reducing another barrier -- that of the increasing charges that the party was the chief advocate of centralization. Here the question was not as straight forward as that of obtaining

¹ These minutes were made available by Professors F.R. Scott and M.K. Oliver.

the sanction of the Church. A simple reading of the C.C.F. programme was enough to satisfy the interested French Canadian that though the party was undeniably for social reform it placed its faith in a strong central government.

Success for the C.C.F. in Quebec depended largely on convincing the voters that the party was as committed to French Canadian cultural survival and the principle of provincial autonomy as any other party. In the late forties and early fifties through the media of the radio broadcast¹, the pamphlet and the political meeting, the C.C.F. cautiously moved in this direction.

However, the C.C.F. party was still beyond the pale of ultra-conservative Quebec politics until enlightened French Canadians began to question the ethos of a society governed by Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale.

In the early 1950's the founding of Cité Libre, a moderate, but in the terms of Quebec society a leftist publication, provided a rallying point for democratic groups within the less politically inhibited environment of metropolitan Montreal. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, one of the directors, was trained in law and economics at Harvard

¹ Both F.R. Scott and W. Dodge gave radio broadcasts, while typical of the pamphlets was one entitled, 'Le C.C.F. et la Centralisation'. A heading proclaimed 'Un pays -- deux cultures'.

and the London School of Economics as well as Paris, and was able to bring to the journal a high level of technical competence. Cité Libre occupied itself mainly with Quebec's economic and social problems but above all was concerned with the reform of French Canadian society. The orientation of the équipe behind Cité Libre was both socialist and mildly nationalist. Most significant of all, Cité Libre provided a forum for indigenous left wing discussion, something that had largely been relegated to the milieu of the University of Montreal and to the Social Science Faculty of Laval University.

As far as the Quebec C.C.F. was concerned, it became apparent that, failing the direct support of the new Cité Libre group, acceptance by this circle would provide a useful mouth piece for future expansion. However, attitudes towards the C.C.F. were affected not only by the record of the C.C.F. party but by the realization that French Canada was yet unable to put forward its own socialist party. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau explains the dilemma in this way:

Le C.C.F. n'existe pas au Québec parce qu'il n'y existe pas de radicalisme canadien-français. Y a-t-il ici des forces disponibles, dont la jonction pourrait engendrer un parti radical (peu importe son nom) qui au Parlement se situerait tout près des socialistes anglais?¹

¹ Trudeau, P.E. 'L'élection fédérale du 10 août'. Cité Libre, November, 1953. P. 9.

Whatever the criticism, the C.C.F. still existed as a political party, with its operations largely concentrated in the Montreal area. However, it was the C.C.F.'s link with labour coupled with increasing opposition to the government of the province by Duplessis, especially the indignation caused by the handling of the asbestos strike of 1949 and the corrupt electoral practices of the Union Nationale, which led the C.C.F. to participate in a movement for new political action at Champigny in May 1954. At the annual convention of the Fédération des Unions Industrielles (FUIQ) a Political Action Committee was directed to prepare a manifesto. Under the chairmanship of Roméo Mathieu, the Committee also included William Dodge (President of the Quebec C.C.F.), Charles Devlin, Jacques-Victor Morin and Philippe Vaillancourt, all trade unionists who were later to be involved in the New Party.

The work of the Political Action Committee was a departure for the FUIQ¹ whose political activities

¹ It should be pointed out the FUIQ was an affiliate of the old Canadian Congress of Labour. The FUIQ also included the Quebec locals of C.I.O. affiliates, as did the CMTC (Congrès des Métiers et du Travail du Canada) itself affiliated to the old Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (T.L.C.). The Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC) was totally independent and now exists as the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN). Although the old Canadian Congress of Labour had officially recognized the C.C.F. as its 'political arm' at its annual convention in Montreal in 1943, the FUIQ had not similarly endorsed the C.C.F. in Quebec. Cf. Morin, J.-V. 'Le syndicalisme et la question nationale', Parti Pris, February 1965.

usually did not extend further than considering whether to endorse officially the C.C.F. in Quebec, an endorsation that was never made.

During that year the Committee prepared a manifesto addressed to the people of Quebec which was discussed at the next FUIQ convention at Joliette in May 1955. The manifesto, after amendments, was submitted to the convention causing some controversy.

The content of the manifesto, incorporating sections on civil liberties, Confederation, social security, public utilities, labour relations etc... was phrased as a direct appeal to the people of Quebec for a new political realignment. Several members of the Committee contemplated either a widely based para-political movement or at best a new political party supported by the FUIQ.

Both Thérèse Casgrain and William Dodge, leaders of the Quebec C.C.F., viewed the attempt to form a new movement which excluded the C.C.F. with disfavour¹ at the Joliette convention and opposed it until it was amended. On the other hand, the decision of the C.C.F. to oppose the manifesto while it meant exclusion of the party was

¹ Evidence for this section is based on interviews with Mr. Dodge, now Vice-President of the C.L.C., and the collection of papers he kindly made available; Ottawa, February, 1965.

viewed as a kind of test¹ by the small group² of Left-wing French Canadians. The issue as they saw it was whether the Quebec C.C.F. was more concerned with reform in Quebec on the widest possible basis or continued allegiance to their external party in Ottawa. As far as the leaders of the Quebec C.C.F. were concerned the question of a new political realignment of the Left without the C.C.F. was meaningless. William Dodge personally insisted on an amendment to the manifesto and with the convention behind him the C.C.F. was included as part of the project.

After the Joliette convention the small group of French Canadian socialists, who found their leadership in the dissatisfied members of the Manifesto Committee, planned alternative action. They felt that the C.C.F., because of its record in Quebec as a 'centralist, sectarian, radical, English-speaking party', could not accomplish the reforms that were required in French Canada. Instead they advocated that a protest group should be formed to constitute an ideological steering committee, always ready to

¹ Morin, J.-V. 'Quelques notes sur l'ancienne Ligue d'Action Socialiste (LAS)'. Unpublished. Compiled in February, 1965.

² These included Roméo Mathieu, Jacques-Victor Morin, Jean Philip, Fernand Daoust, Philippe Vaillancourt and Huguette Plamondon. All these persons were trade unionists and were later associated with the Quebec N.D.P.

rally leftist forces. For a while they still remained members of the C.C.F., waiting for the right moment to launch the new endeavour.

After the experience of the Champigny and Joliette conventions, the Quebec Section of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation could hardly avoid the charges that it was an alien organization, charges that were painfully symbolized by the untranslatable nature of its name. Distinct efforts had already been made in the C.C.F. to rethink policies and actions in the Quebec setting. Particular attention was paid by the Quebec C.C.F. executive from 1954 to 1956 to the disputes between Duplessis and the Louis St. Laurent governments regarding tax issues. The C.C.F., far from adopting a centralist position, partly supported Duplessis' stand regarding the collection of taxes. P.E. Trudeau, in particular did much to help develop the C.C.F. policy on this issue. Unfortunately, what political capital that might have been gained in the form of support was dissipated by thoughtless statements by members¹ of the C.C.F. parliamentary caucus in Ottawa.

¹ The Globe and Mail. Toronto, February 3rd, 1956. The article cited Erhart Regier (Burnaby-Coquitlam), Angus MacInnis (Vancouver-Kingsway) and Hazen Argue (Assinboia) for remarks in the Commons, and Harold Winch (Vancouver East) for remarks outside the house.

The derogatory remarks concerned the vulnerability of Quebec to Communism, federal-provincial tax agreements, the use of French in the Commons, and French-language schools in Ontario. Both Thérèse Casgrain and William Dodge threatened to resign from the Quebec C.C.F. if an official apology was not made. David Lewis, the National C.C.F. Chairman, made the apology and was reported as saying that the remarks by the four members of the C.C.F. parliamentary caucus did 'deep violence to Canada's past, present and future'.¹

These incidents provided just the impulse that Roméo Mathieu, Jacques-Victor Morin, Jean Philip, Fernand Daoust, Philippe Vaillancourt and Huguette Plamondon had been waiting for. Mathieu demanded the public repudiation or expulsion of the offending caucus members from the C.C.F. and when this was not immediately forthcoming both he and his sympathisers resigned from the Quebec section of the C.C.F.

Subsequently, the Ligue d'Action Socialiste came into being. Although it was the intention of the LAS to remain independent of the C.C.F. it was unavoidably tied to the narrow leftist orbit in Quebec, revolving

¹ Ibid.

around the locals of the same international unions in which the C.C.F. had supporters. The LAS set up a headquarters in Montreal and issued a few press releases, always hoping to establish itself as the official mouthpiece of socialist thought. In terms of direct action the group accomplished little and gradually withered on the vine.

The Quebec C.C.F. leaders were naturally disturbed by the split but they did not consider the LAS either a threat or take it particularly seriously. Instead they continued to attempt to clear away those problems that had caused dissent. In 1956, the name of the Quebec C.C.F. was changed to the Parti Social Démocratique (PSD). This was a measure too long delayed which really did not offset the party's previous image.

Meanwhile, in the same year, an attempt at forming a wide political movement in French Canada was initiated by the moderate socialists in the équipe behind Cité Libre and among interested members of the Social Science Faculties of the universities of Laval and Montreal. The forming of this new political movement was actually a result of the decision of the PSD to convene a conference of intellectuals to gain support in the forthcoming Quebec elections of June 20th, 1956. The meeting was held in the hall of the Société St-Jean Baptiste and was attended by members of the LAS, the PSD and many university people.

Instead of a declaration of support for the PSD, a dispute again developed with members of the LAS and the meeting ended with the setting up of a committee to study the situation.

This Committee expanded and calling itself Le Rassemblement set up sections across Quebec. It included such people¹ as Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Pierre Dansereau, Jacques Perrault and Jean-Paul Lefebvre. The object of Le Rassemblement was to develop a quasi-political group which would be 'of politics but not in it'. It was hoped that through a membership and educational drive, moderates and intellectuals could be drawn into an electoral alliance around the centre-left axis of the political spectrum. The movement attracted members of the virtually defunct Ligue d'Action Socialiste as well as those French Canadian moderates who were anxious to see the province reformed.

Most of the members of the C.C.F./PSD individually joined Le Rassemblement, although the party remained independent, preferring to be 'of Le Rassemblement but not in it'. This independent stand caused some exasperation in the circle around Cité Libre, which by 1958 was growing

¹ Pierre-Elliott Trudeau was editor of Cité Libre. Pierre Dansereau was Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Montreal. Jacques Perreault was also on the faculty of the same university as well as being a member of the executive of the PSD. Jean-Paul Lefebvre was active with the trade unions at this time.

increasingly concerned with the diffusion of the opposition to Duplessis. Pierre-Elliott Trudeau wrote in October of that year:

Un parti qui se refonde sans cesse sur des néophytes risque d'être doctrinaire. Je ne puis m'expliquer autrement que le PSD provincial, qui avait un nombre insignifiant d'électeurs encore moins d'adhérents, et aucune existence parlementaire ait refusé si obstinément toute formule de Rassemblement qui ne fut pas la réplique exacte du PSD. ¹

He went on to remark that perhaps the isolationism of the PSD might disappear but it was still symptomatic of those social-democratic forces which could have so effectively combined to oppose the Union Nationale. Regarding the diffusion of these forces, Pierre Elliott Trudeau almost wistfully added:

Par exemple, Jean-Louis Gagnon, Gérard Picard et Jacques Hébert ont à peu près les mêmes idées sur la démocratie sociale; mais le premier est militant libéral, le second membre en vue du PSD, et le troisième dirige le journal de la Ligue d'Action Civique. ²

At the same time Pierre-Elliott Trudeau put forward another formula for a Union des forces démocratiques for the express purpose of defeating Duplessis. However, the single most cohesive impulse was provided by the death

¹ Trudeau, P.-E. 'Un Manifesto Démocratique'. Cité Libre, October, 1958. P. 4.

² Ibid. P. 25.

of Duplessis in 1959. At that time democratic forces rallied behind the Liberal Party which provided both the machinery and professional organizers that Le Rassemblement could not supply. The prospect of a provincial election in June 1960 further intensified interest in the Liberals; in a sense the Liberals captured Le Rassemblement and as the influence of Lesage and his party spread, so the interest in democratic electoral alliances and other social democratic groups declined. In this process the conception of political action which advocated a series of formulas both to educate and rally anti-Duplessis support was no substitute for the tight-knit political party.

The fate of Le Rassemblement was, in a way, a vindication of the decision of the C.C.F./PSD to remain operating independently as a political party. Both the LAS and Le Rassemblement as indigenous para-political groups in French Canada came to nothing. However, the C.C.F./PSD by not participating officially in the last venture failed to bind itself to what remained of the Left in Quebec. At the same time the C.C.F. could not live up to the concept of the political party with money to spend, favours to bestow and professional organizers to deploy. Needless to say these were the traditional methods of political action which, until then, the Union Nationale had so skillfully monopolized.

Summary

In English Canada, during the late fifties and very early sixties, the New Party was still being formed. In French Canada, the Union Nationale was still in the process of being defeated. The legacy of the C.C.F./PSD in Quebec was one that did much to deter interaction between these two developments.

Had the experience of the C.C.F. in Quebec been more favourable the possibilities for the New Party might have been far reaching. As it was, the C.C.F. was initially received in Quebec as an English-speaking extension of a western, radical, farm party. Disapproved of by the Church, viewed with suspicion as both subversive and heretical, the C.C.F. was confined to Montreal.

The Second World War, a universal catalyst for change, quickened the tempo of economic and political activity in Quebec. The C.C.F. enjoyed a significant growth outside the province while inside it perceptibly changed. After being cleared by the Church, the Quebec party attempted to soften its line on centralization and widen its appeal.

However, in the early fifties, those enlightened French Canadians who sensed the need for reform began to organize independently. The narrow base of indigenous

Left-wing opinion was diffused. While Cité Libre provided a forum for discussion, the impetus for new political action came from trade unionists at the FUIQ conventions at Champigny and Joliette in 1954 and 1955. Members of the Political Action Committee, themselves C.C.F. members, tried to exclude the party; later they formed the Ligue d'Action Socialiste in the hope of providing a suitable vehicle for Socialism in Quebec. The attempt failed and was a lesson for the future since it demonstrated that the Left-wing in Quebec was too narrow to support divisions within itself.

For the C.C.F. the implications were clear and the party soon became the C.C.F./PSD. However, the hope that it might have gained a greater following by carefully rethinking policies affecting relations between Quebec and the federal government was largely invalidated by irresponsible statements regarding French Canada by members of the C.C.F. parliamentary caucus. These statements provided the necessary impulse for the forming of the LAS.

In the mid-fifties the formation of Le Rassemblement provided the opportunity for an alliance between socialist and moderate forces in a union to oppose Duplessis. Although individual members of the PSD joined, the party did not officially support Le Rassemblement. This decision,

while maintaining the integrity of the PSD, was one that did nothing to bind the PSD to the independent Left in Quebec. In fact, it reaffirmed long held feelings among those French Canadians concerned, that the PSD was as sectarian as ever.

When French Canadian moderates and leftists contemplated political innovation and reform, they could not agree that the PSD constituted a suitable vehicle. Without the support of these social democratic forces, the New Party could not hope to succeed in French Canada.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW PARTY

The Beginnings.

In English Canada, in the mid-fifties, a series of events occurred which cleared the way for the formation of the New Party.¹

In 1956 the stage was set when the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.). In the same year at the C.C.F. National Convention, the Winnipeg Declaration was issued; this policy statement revised the party's policy, tempering the emphasis on public ownership.

In late February 1958, the Executive Council of the C.L.C. decided that a resolution should be prepared for submission to their approaching convention. The purpose of the resolution² was to empower the Executive Council to establish a consultative committee with the

¹ Cf. Knowles, S.H. The New Party, McClelland and Stuart, Toronto, 1961. Mr. Knowles points out in the early chapters of his book that the seeds for the New Party had been germinating for some time.

² The idea was not new, the old Trades and Labour Congress, before it was split in 1938, had on its books a resolution passed in the early 1900's and another in 1917 proposing the establishment of a party in which the Trade Unions would directly participate.

Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in order to establish an effective political instrument patterned along the lines of the British Labour Party.

Subsequently, at the C.L.C. Convention in Winnipeg held on April 21st to 25th, 1958, a resolution was passed. It proposed the formation of:

... a broadly based people's party, which embraces the C.C.F., the labour movement farm organizations, professional people and other liberally-minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through our parliamentary system of government.¹

This move was welcomed at the C.C.F. National Convention held in Montreal on July 23rd to 25th, 1958, and soon after a Joint C.C.F. -- C.L.C. Committee was set up to undertake the prodigious task of forming a new party. It was not long before this Joint C.C.F. -- C.L.C. Committee became known as the National Committee for the New Party.

From the fall of 1958 until the Founding Convention of the New Party in July 1961, a multitude of tasks was undertaken by the National Committee. Discussion and study groups were organized within the C.C.F. and the C.L.C. at most levels. During 1959 the National Committee

¹ C.L.C. pamphlet. 1961 -- The Historical Year for Canadian Politics'. Compiled by the C.L.C. Political Education Department.

arranged numerous schools and seminars in order to channel the suggestions and proposals into an organized form.

In the original C.L.C. resolution made in April 1958, stress had been laid on attracting fresh support from reform conscious Canadians. Implicit in the New Party idea was the fact the new venture should be more than just a Labour party or an expanded version of the C.C.F. The task of engendering a third wing that would attract the liberally-minded was really the key to success or failure for the New Party. Although this fact was largely recognized, the organization of the New Party Clubs was still slow in taking shape.

A year went by after the C.L.C. Convention in 1958 and the holding of a National Seminar in Winnipeg from August 28th to 30th, 1959. At that time, David Lewis, National President of the C.C.F., emphasized the rationale behind the third wing. He said:

... the progress of a party such as the one we are about to found, depends entirely on the voluntary work and devotion of numberless people. If they agree that what we are doing¹ is right and necessary, let them lend a hand.¹

¹ Address to the New Party Seminar, Winnipeg, Friday, August 28th, 1959, by David Lewis, C.C.F. National President. Published in pamphlet form by the Ontario Federation of Labour, Toronto.

The Seminar was attended by some 300 delegates and the ensuing discussions resulted in the preparation and publication of two study papers by the National Committee. The first paper discussed the constitution, the second the New Party programme.

In the fall of 1959, Desmond Sparham was appointed as Director of the New Party Clubs. It was his task to co-ordinate and direct the setting up of clubs across the country. This work was important for the success of the party everywhere but especially critical in Quebec.

From these beginnings a political movement of social enlightenment and reform was launched. Supported one one hand by Labour and on the other by the C.C.F., the New Party movement made a specific appeal both to intellectuals and the 'liberally-minded' at large to participate in the founding of the New Party.

The Work of the National Committee

The body that was responsible for directing, co-ordinating and administrating the New Party movement until the founding convention became known as the National Committee for the New Party.

From its inception in 1958 until the New Party Founding Convention in 1961, Stanley Knowles acted as chairman of the National Committee. During this time the National Committee grew to include representatives of the National Council of the New Party Clubs. However, the third wing was still not given equal attention and Desmond Sparham, as organizer, had to struggle to gain recognition for it¹.

The following chart shows the composition and structure of the National Committee for the New Party and its major sub-committees as they had developed in 1961. The list of names shows the representatives from the three wings as well as those members from Quebec. The bracketed numbers indicate some of those who served on more than one sub-committee. Woodrow Lloyd, Donald C. MacDonald and Michael Oliver acted as alternates to the National Committee before being elected full members in early 1961.

Perhaps the prime task undertaken by the National Committee, apart from organizational work, was the preparation of a draft programme and constitution.

¹ Interview with Desmond Sparham, Toronto, July, 1965. It often seemed that the other wings did not expect to meet the third until the founding convention itself.

FIGURE I

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE NEW PARTY (1958 - July 1961)

Stanley Knowles - Chairman *
Carl Hamilton - Executive Secretary

SUB-COMMITTEES

| <u>ADMINISTRATION</u> ¹ | <u>PROGRAM</u> ² | <u>CONSTITUTION</u> ³ | <u>LIBERALLY-MINDED</u> ⁴ | <u>CONVENTION</u> ⁵ | <u>PRINCIPLES</u> ⁶ <u>OBJECTIVES</u> |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| William Dodge | David Lewis | Donald MacDonald | Donald MacDonald Andrew Brewin | W. Mahoney | |
| | | | | | CONVENTION ARRANGEMENTS |
| | | | | George Home | PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANT |
| | | | | Lucien Parizeau | |
| <u>PERSONNEL</u> | | | | | |
| <u>C.L.C. REPRESENTATIVES</u> | | <u>C.C.F. REPRESENTATIVES</u> | | <u>NEW PARTY CLUBS</u> | |
| Claude Jodoin (P.Q.) | | M.J. Coldwell | | Walter Pitman | |
| Donald MacDonald (2) | | David Lewis (3) (6) | | Walter Kontak (3) | |
| William Dodge (P.Q.) (3) (6) | | Hazen Argue (6) | | Walter Young | |
| Stanley Knowles * (3) (6) | | Thérèse Casgrain (P.Q.) (5) | | Leo McIsaac | |
| George Burt | | Andrew Brewin (5) | | Rev. Edgar Mullen | |
| Frank Hall | | Carl Hamilton | | Sam Bowman | |
| William Mahoney (6) | | Ken Bryden (6) | | Len Laventure | |
| Joe Morris | | T.C. Douglas | | J.P. Robillard (P.Q.) | |
| Roger Provost (P.Q.) | | Frank Scott (P.Q.) (5) | | | |
| William Smith | | Gérard Picard (P.Q.) (4) | | | |
| | | Harold Winch | | | |
| | | Woodrow S. Lloyd | | | |
| | | Donald C. MacDonald (5) | | | |
| | | Michael Oliver (P.Q.) (3) | | | |

The system of study groups and national seminars, set up in 1959 and 1960, represented the first phase in the development of the programme, initiating and accelerating the rounds of discussion and debate. Apart from the study papers published in January 1960, little concerted work was done by the programme sub-committee in this first period.

The second phase in the development of the draft programme began in the fall of 1960 when there was a tendency for university professors to enter the discussions more fully. On October 15th, 1960, a weekend seminar was held at the King Edward Hotel in Toronto. This conference was referred to as the 'Professors Conference'¹ simply because of the number of academics who dominated the proceedings. From the point of view of the draft programme, the presence of several trained economists was particularly

¹ At this time a fortunate confluence of forces for social reform took place. The Trustees of the Boag Foundation had, in 1958, become interested in the plan for Social Purpose for Canada. The contributors to this work included Michael Oliver, Frank Scott, J.C. Weldon, Keith Gallard, P.E. Trudeau, John Porter, George Grant, H. Scott Gordon and Kenneth McNaught. The majority of this group was present at the 'Professors Conference' held in Toronto on October 15th, 1960. Perhaps even more remarkable than the paralleling of the New Party Movement by the book Social Purpose for Canada was the sense of historical continuity that it imparted. For, in the 1930's, the McGill based 'League for Social Reconstruction' had produced the book, Social Planning for Canada. The sense of history and shared objectives that Social Purpose for Canada brought with it, was heightened by the presence of Professor F.R. Scott, who participated in both ventures.

significant, as was the time allotted to a discussion of economic planning. The rounds of constructive criticism and comment that characterized the second phase were closed by two seminars in December of 1960; - one held in Montreal from December 3rd to 4th, the other in Calgary from December 10th to 11th.

The third phase of the National Committee's work could be said to have started shortly after these seminars and lasted until the founding convention. This involved the preparation of the draft programme and constitution and the making of arrangements for the founding convention.

During the early months of 1961, the major task of co-ordinating and writing the draft programme was carried out at the Toronto offices of David Lewis, chairman of the programme sub-committee. By April 1961, the National Committee was able to approve and proceed with the publication of the draft programme. From then on the planning and organization for the founding convention to be held on July 31st to August 4th assumed central importance.

The Issues.

Until May 1961, when the National Committee published the draft programme those involved had been remarkably free from major dissensions. Their attention was then focussed on reactions to the draft programme which was the basic document that groups across the country would be criticizing, studying and seeking to amend in the months leading up to the founding convention.

In general the differing views of the groups that came together to form the New Party (i.e. the C.L.C., the C.C.F. and the 'liberally-minded' from the New Party Clubs) were modified and reached common agreement in the draft programme. Moreover, it was understood that the committees which were now directing the New Party movements in the provinces would funnel the proposals and resolutions of the groups within their particular regions back to the National Committee for later submission to the founding convention.

The main policy measures included in the draft programme¹ were:- a stress on full employment through economic planning with a priority on providing social

¹ 'The Draft Programme for the New Party.' Pamphlet published by the National Committee for the New Party. May 1961.

capital; subsidized job retraining and re-location; a new ministry to direct economic and social planning and a national investment board to stimulate economic growth; greater Canadian control over foreign investments; progressive taxes to redistribute wealth (the National Income) on a more equitable basis; non-discriminatory immigration policies; protection of the family farm; aid to fisheries; protection of the consumer; a comprehensive social security programme; a national labour code with minimum standards; town and community planning; free education and the encouraging of Canadian culture. Nationalization was not stressed, centralization was purposely tempered while a strong emphasis was placed on the democratic introduction of welfare measures.

A significant development in the draft programme was the inclusion of a section on 'Co-operative Federalism'. This itself was a departure for a federal party to advocate explicitly economic and social planning at all levels of government with extensive consultation between governments. The position of French Canada was also given attention in a section of the draft programme entitled 'Canada as a Nation'. It was this section that called for the 'equal recognition and respect' for the 'two great languages and cultures'¹ from which Canada had developed.

¹ Ibid. P. 24.

At this time the question of special recognition for French Canada in the draft programme was not an issue. It was understood that the Quebec Committee for the New Party would want to draft further programme suggestions relating to French Canada. The National Committee, itself, was confident that it had taken the important first steps in this regard.

The major issues encountered by the programme sub-committee were in the field of foreign policy. In particular, the question of Canada's relation to NATO occupied much time and discussion. There were certain groups of old C.C.F.'ers joined by others arguing on moral grounds who pushed strongly for Canada's withdrawal from NATO. This issue was not resolved until the founding convention when the policy was adopted that Canada should terminate the NORAD agreements at once, but should remain in NATO as long as its nuclear capability was not expanded.

Summary.

While the C.C.F. was born in the West, the beginnings of the New Party found their roots in English Canada at large.

The National Committee, which directed the New Party movement, organized study groups, seminars and

conferences across the country in 1959 and 1960. Its programme sub-committee, which compiled the draft programme in early 1961, did not explicitly discuss a special status for Quebec in the party policy or constitution at this time.

It was not until the Quebec Committee for the New Party submitted its resolutions to the respective founding convention committees, late in July 1961, that the demand for special measures for French Canada became a major issue.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW PARTY IN QUEBEC

The Quebec Committee. (1960-1961)

Just as the New Party in English Canada drew on three groups (the C.L.C., the C.C.F. and the New Party Clubs), so too the Quebec New Party followed the same pattern, drawing representatives from the New Party Clubs that were set up in Quebec, the Parti Social Démocratique (the Quebec wing of the C.C.F.) and the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (composed of Quebec unions affiliated to the C.L.C.). While the outward pattern of activity was similar to New Party formations elsewhere, the inner relations between the founding groups and their place in Quebec society were profoundly different. The legacy of the PSD in French Canada and the narrow base of the Left wing were two basic factors that contributed to this difference.

In early 1960, Harry Hope, an ex-army officer, was elected president of the PSD, while Michel Chartrand¹ was re-elected leader of the party. The PSD, at this time, did not contest the Quebec elections in June 1960,

¹ Michel Chartrand had been in the PSD for several years. A printer by trade, he runs a small business south of Montreal.

partly because of financial difficulties¹, partly because it wished to concentrate its efforts behind the Quebec Committee for the New Party.

At one of the first meetings of the Quebec Committee, held at the FTQ offices in Montreal in July 1960, future operations were planned. With Roger Provost, President of the FTQ, Harry Pope, now directing the Quebec Committee, Michel Chartrand, Jacques-Victor Morin and others attending, plans for seminars later in the fall were discussed as well as the operations of New Party Clubs in Quebec. Jean-Claude Lebel was enlisted as a professional organizer whose first assigned task was to launch a financial drive.

The success of the Quebec Committee rested on securing support in three major sectors. The first consisted in consolidating basic strength in the traditional sector of the Labour movement, that is to say within the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec and the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux. Secondly, the Quebec Committee sought to acquire both the interest and participation of French Canadian intellectuals in drawing up the programme

¹ The National Committee for the New Party made funds available to help the PSD and also underwrote the efforts of the Quebec Committee by providing the salary of the professional organizer and giving other financial assistance.

and constitution of the Quebec party in order to root the party in French Canada. Thirdly, the Quebec Committee was concerned with rallying support on a much broader level to attract those French Canadians of the 'Centre-Left' who had already shown an inclination to support the Liberal party in their victory over the Union Nationale in the June election.

The Quebec Committee only partially succeeded in its attempt to acquire the official support of the Quebec Labour movement, that is to say the FTQ openly supported the New Party while the CSN refused to commit itself. In the second area initial interest was shown by a considerable number of French Canadian intellectuals but their involvement was not sustained. On the third, much broader level of popular political support, the Quebec Committee proved itself unable to attract any great number of 'liberally-minded' French Canadians. It was evident that the Quebec Liberal party was already viewed as an adequate vehicle for the realization of French Canadian aspirations.

Closer examination of the operations of the Quebec Committee on these three fronts, namely the labour movement, the involvement of French Canadian intellectuals and the attraction of popular support, supplies a clearer

indication of the nature and effectiveness of the Quebec Committee's activities.

On the weekend of November 20th, 1960, the FTQ held its annual convention in Montreal. Various officers, who were to be involved in the formation of the New Party, were re-elected. Roger Provost was re-elected president of the FTQ, Jean Gérin-Lajoie, vice-president, and John Purdie, treasurer. André Thibodeau and René Rondou were elected vice-presidents of the Gatineau and Laurentians regional grouping of the FTQ.¹ Perhaps the most significant aspect of this FTQ convention was the passage of a resolution officially announcing the intention of the FTQ to take part in the founding of the New Party.

The declaration, coupled with the direct participation of a goodly number of FTQ officials in the New Party, raised hope in the Quebec Committee that both membership and financial support could be mustered among the 250,000 affiliated members. Later events in 1962 and 1963 were to show that this support was mainly to be vocal but at the time this was not readily apparent. The Quebec

¹ Fernand Daoust another unionist who was to play an important part in the Quebec N.D.P., was also present at this convention as vice-president of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union.

Committee was now more concerned in acquiring the official support of the CSN and the some 110,000 members affiliated to it. Although able to count on the support of a handful of officials¹ within the CSN, the Quebec Committee was unable to gain its official support. Careful and sustained attempts were made throughout the next three years to acquire this official link with the CSN, either directly through representations to the president Jean Marchand, or indirectly through the efforts of Gérard Picard and others. All these attempts were unsuccessful. The fact that the New Party was unable to build on the united base of Quebec Labour, unable to draw on the funds that unqualified support would realize, was a significant limitation on the future activities of the party.

To help gain the participation of the French Canadian intelligentsia a special conference² on the New Party was held at the Mount Royal Hotel on November 26th, 1960. The meeting was presided over by Marcel Rioux, then a professor at Carleton and later at the University of Montreal, -- with some hundred intellectuals, union leaders,

¹ Among these were Gérard Picard, President of the Montreal Labour Council, Pierre Vadboncoeur, a technical adviser, and Jean Robert Ouellet, an organizer.

² Held under the auspices of the Quebec New Party Clubs.

professors and students attending. Gérard Filion, Director of Le Devoir, André Laurendeau, Chief Editor of the same paper, as well as Pierre Vadboncoeur, Technical Advisor to the CSN, gave speeches on the theme, 'The New Party and French Canada'.

A guarded note of non-commitment pervaded Gérard Filion's entire speech¹, an address concentrating on the role of unions in politics. The position taken by Filion was one of cautious advice intermingled with a 'wait and see attitude'.

In contrast to Filion's address, Pierre Vadboncoeur sharply and clearly defined the position that the New Party should take to avoid confusion and ambiguities with the Liberal Party in Quebec. Vadboncoeur, at the time one of the few French Canadian socialist thinkers, advocated a position clearly to the Left. He said:

La gauche ne doit pas participer à l'oeuvre du parti libéral mais se constituer elle-même politiquement et idéologiquement. Elle doit travailler à ses critiques fondamentales, préciser sa pensée, intégrer les courants qui ne lui sont pas incompatibles, s'intégrer elle-même au milieu national dans lequel elle doit agir, tout en élaborant ses moyens politiques.²

¹ Gérard Filion. Text of a speech submitted at the 'Conférence des Intellectuels canadiens-français sur le Nouveau Parti'. Mount Royal Hotel. November 26th, 1960.

² Le Devoir, November 30, 1960. P. 1.

Vadboncoeur's call for clear, concerted action on the Left, was a position from which he did not shift in his association with the Quebec N.D.P. It was a position that provided the greatest differentiation from the Quebec Liberal party whose upsurge was now well marked. Not only this but it provided a subtle rationalization for recent developments in 'Left-Right' reasoning, cutting across the ambiguity caused by a widely based anti-Union Nationale movement. Of the Rassemblement, Pierre Vadboncoeur amusingly conjectured:

Le Rassemblement suivi de sa séquelle, l'Union des forces démocratiques, qui devait amener des hommes du centre au groupe de gauche, a eu pour résultat d'amener des hommes de gauche au groupe de droite.¹

With equal facility a man like André Laurendeau became 'un rare accoucheur de modérés' and the fate of the Cité Libre group was, 'd'avoir fini par culbuter dans le parti libéral ou par le favoriser indirectement'.² The importance of Vadboncoeur's address was the radical stand he advocated and this was to have important repercussions later. It was also significant because it further alienated Trudeau and the Cité Libre équipe.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

In December, the National Committee assisted the Quebec Committee in extending its influence in the province. On December 3rd and 4th, 1960, a policy seminar on the constitution and programme of the New Party, jointly sponsored by the two Committees, was held at the Mount Royal Hotel.

In contrast to the smaller conference of French Canadian intellectuals held a week earlier, this seminar was a larger affair drawing representatives from across Canada. The seminar was notable for the truly diverse parade of academics, politicians, writers, trade unionists and economists who served as speakers and on panels, the entire company¹ drawn by the prospect of a grand debate on the form and direction that the New Party should take. Topics under discussion by the panels ranged from 'A new realism in Canadian politics' to an examination of federal and provincial structures for the party. There is little doubt that few parties could have boasted such a galaxy of

¹ At this time Stanley Knowles, Chairman of the National Committee, David Lewis, National President of the C.C.F., T.C. Douglas, Premier of Saskatchewan, Claude Jodoin, President of the C.L.C., Hazen Argue, Leader of the C.C.F. Caucus, Gérard Picard and Thérèse Casgrain, members of the National Committee, represented the federal element. Roger Provost, President of the FTQ, Michel Chartrand, Leader of the PSD, Jean-Claude Lebel, Provincial Organizer, Michel Forest, Secretary to the Quebec Committee and Philippe Vaillancourt, Regional Director of Education for the C.L.C., represented the Quebec Committee.

first class minds assembled to take part in its planning stage, although later events were to show that most of the French Canadian intellectuals were there only as interested observers.¹

After the policy seminar and in the early months of 1961, the Quebec Committee attempted to maintain public interest in the preparation of a special programme for the New Party in Quebec. The Committee had planned a provincial Seminar in June and it was intended that the efforts of sub-committees in the fields of fund raising, membership drives and general publicity should culminate in this seminar.

Unfortunately, as with many best laid plans, the Quebec Committee suffered from organizational problems which reduced the effectiveness of its operations. The Committee was presided over by Harry Pope, while Michel Forest acted as secretary and Jean-Claude Lebel as professional organizer. The smallness of this administrative

¹ Among the impressive array of intellectuals who attended were Pierre Harvey (Hautes Etudes Commerciales), Léon Dion (Laval), Guy Rocher (University of Montreal), André Laurendeau (Editor, Le Devoir), Marcel Dubé (writer), Jack Weldon (McGill), Michael Oliver (McGill), Scott Gordon (Carleton University), Kenneth McNaught (University of Toronto), Eugene Forsey (Director of Research C.L.C.), and Russell Bell (Assistant Director of Research C.L.C.).

staff, necessitated by limited funds, again reduced the scale of the financial and membership drives that could be launched. The whole rationale of the New Party idea rested on a kind of 'multiplier' principle in which it was hoped that after a preliminary period of campaigning more and more voluntary helpers would take part continually increasing the area of the party's influence. This pattern of expansion was placed in jeopardy through an initial effort that was too weak to really set things in motion.

However, it was not only the small size of the administrative staff which was to blame but the manner in which the limited resources were deployed. The emphasis placed on gaining the participation of as many people as possible in working out a programme for the New Party, although an important preliminary step in securing voluntary workers, also tended to produce a proliferation of advisors and policy makers and a dearth of organizers.

This had a threefold result. First, organization was further neglected. Second, the overabundance of policy makers laid the groundwork for future ideological controversies. Third, the Quebec Committee, by emphasizing the participation of thinking French Canadians, made the support of certain key newspapers and reviews which these

members were likely to read not merely an asset but a requirement.¹

Le Devoir and Cité Libre were the two principal publications whose support, either tacit or overt, would have been invaluable to the New Party movement in Quebec. As it was, editorials in both publications initially displayed every willingness to discuss the objectives of the New Party within the Quebec setting, then later included an increasing element of independent criticism.

The exact nature of these criticisms require closer examination since they were ones that would recur later. Editorials in Le Devoir by André Laurendeau and Paul Sauriol centred on both the objectives of the New Party in Quebec and Premier Douglas' educational policies in Saskatchewan. Editorials in Cité Libre, on the other hand, contained scattered comments referring to the intransigence of the PSD towards Le Rassemblement.

¹ Evidence for this section is partly based on conversations with Harry Pope, Ottawa, March, 1965, and the files he kindly made available. The emphasis in gaining the interest of intellectuals is also shown by an entry in the minutes of a meeting of the Quebec Committee for the New Party, held on January 3rd, 1961. It reads, 'Le Bureau est chargé de mettre sur pied un comité pour la préparation du programme provincial et de faire appel au plus grand nombre possible d'intellectuels et que priorité soit donnée à une prise de position sur les relations fédérales-provinciales.'

There is little doubt that, in this early period, certain members of the editorial board of Le Devoir did not view the close liaison between the New Party and the FTQ favourably. On January 3rd, an editorial by André Laurendeau entitled, 'Dans le Québec, une fausse fenêtre?' appeared in Le Devoir. The object of the editorial was a broad attempt to discredit the efforts of the Quebec Committee based on two main points; the first, the tacit support of the Duplessis regime by the FTQ, the second the attempts made by the New Party through policy seminars and other activities to root the movement in Quebec. Citing a recent article in Cité Libre, André Laurendeau wrote regarding the first point:

P.E. Trudeau, dénonce plus loin, 'ces chefs ouvriers, de la FTQ, notamment, qui depuis longtemps avaient passé alliance avec l'Union Nationale' et qui aujourd'hui réveillés, trouvent que le parti libéral est trop conservateur. ¹

Then referring to the second area, Laurendeau continued:

Le Nouveau Parti dans le Québec a l'air d'une fausse fenêtre, plaquée là pour répondre à un besoin de symétrie. Il n'a trouvé chez nous ni son langage ni ses portes paroles. Vu de l'extérieur, il apparaît comme la réplique politique d'un office fédéral de traduction. ²

¹ Le Devoir, Tuesday, January 3rd, 1961. P. 4.

² Ibid.

These were hostile words indeed, striking at everything the Quebec Committee was anxious to avoid. However, it was a taste of what was to come when, on the occasion of the visit of Premier Douglas to Montreal, Paul Sauriol seized upon the state of educational services for the French Canadian Catholic minority in Saskatchewan. In a lecturing style, referring to the Saskatchewan 1944 'Larger School Units Act' as a 'triomphe de la technocratie sur la démocratie', Paul Sauriol addressed his comments specifically to the Quebec Committee.

Le comité provincial du Nouveau Parti du Québec devrait examiner le dossier scolaire du candidat Douglas, lui donner quelques bons conseils, et exiger certaines garanties, avant de lui accorder sa confiance. ¹

Again on June 9th, Paul Sauriol dealt with the same question. This time he addressed his remarks to the electorate at large, also reminding the New Party that the seventeen year record of its leader, Mr. Douglas, while he was premier of Saskatchewan, would be carefully scrutinized in French Canada.

Le Nouveau Parti voudra présenter des candidats dans le Québec, et l'électorat canadien-français sera fort mal impressionné par un chef de parti qui traite si injustement la minorité canadienne-française qu'il gouverne depuis dix-sept ans. ²

¹ Le Devoir, February 7th, 1961. P. 4.

² Le Devoir, June 9th, 1961. P. 4.

This issue was to be something of a permanent thorn in the side of the New Party in Quebec and party members were frequently directed in editorials to question the credentials of the prospective leader of the federal party. Those 'thinking' elements of the Montreal press whose interest the New Party was most anxious to secure, did in fact respond. Unfortunately for the Quebec New Party the response was one that involved pointed criticism.

In the case of the Saskatchewan school question, federal spokesmen associated with the Quebec party intervened to help counter the criticism; in this a liaison role was played by Michael Oliver via the Quebec and National Committees. Remedial action¹ was necessary not only to counter charges detrimental to the New Party movement but also to ensure that members of the New Party in Quebec received an accurate explanation. The significance of this issue, like several to come, was that the critics of the New Party in Quebec employed the record of the party outside the province as ammunition. Spokesmen from the federal party would then come forward not only to counter the criticism but to ensure that members of the Quebec party received some explanation.

¹ To counter the frequent references to this question in French language papers, an open invitation was extended in the fall of 1961 to members of the press by Mr. Douglas, to visit Saskatchewan to examine the system of education themselves.

Editorial comment in Cité Libre during the early months of 1961, affected the New Party movement on the narrower but nonetheless crucial front of French Canadian intellectual support. The fact that intellectuals like Marcel Rioux, Pierre Vadboncoeur and Michael Oliver were regular contributors to Cité Libre guaranteed representation of the New Party in this circle.

However, this did not absolve the New Party from the criticisms which appeared in Cité Libre in the early months of 1961. In the January edition, an unsigned editorial probably written by Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, made reference to the rather pietistic attitude of the PSD in remaining independent from Le Rassemblement -- Union des Forces Démocratiques. The editorial, entitled 'La Restauration' expressed bewilderment at the apparently sudden willingness of the PSD to enter into a wider movement of the Left¹.

Replying to these charges, Michael Oliver defended the recent actions of the PSD which had preferred to

¹ It will be remembered that while individual PSD members joined Le Rassemblement, the PSD did not officially support it. This caused some resentment among the Cité Libre équipe.

remain a tight-knit party rather than a quasi-political movement. He wrote:

J'ai respecté leur jugement sur cette question de la meilleure tactique de faire avancer la gauche; dans le cas du Rassemblement, je l'ai partagé largement. Mais j'ai aussi respecté le jugement de ceux qui ont décidé de ne pas participer à une action quasi-politique; qui ont préféré concentrer leur activité dans un parti, le PSD même s'ils avaient au commencement penché du côté de la formule Rassemblement - Union des forces Démocratiques.¹

However, it seemed that the critics of the New Party movement in Quebec had not failed to find listeners among the intelligentsia. A special meeting of the Quebec Committee was held on Saturday, February 4th, 1961 at the offices of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees. A fairly wide invitation had been circulated to French Canadian intellectuals to gather together to discuss the topic 'La gauche et Le Nouveau Parti'. Several key people who had been invited did not attend and thereafter, for the most part, had little to do with the New Party in Quebec.²

¹ Oliver, M.K. 'Réponse à la Restauration'. Cité Libre. No. 34. February, 1961. P. 14.

² Among those absent were Jean-Paul Lefebvre, André Laurendeau, Jean Philip, Jean Marchand, Fernand Jolicoeur, Léon Dion and Jacques-Yvan Morin. However, apart from the members of the Quebec Committee, the meeting was attended by Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Pierre Vadboncoeur, Marcel Rioux, Michael Oliver and Jack Weldon. Minutes of the Quebec Committee for the New Party meeting, February 4th, 1961.

This meeting was perhaps the earliest of the full discussions of the appropriate policies and structures that should be adopted by the New Party in Quebec. In a way it was a quiet prelude to the endless ideological discussions which were to occupy the party in Quebec throughout the later period. At this time any separatist hypothesis was rejected unanimously but it was pointed out that the New Party should be able to respond effectively to French Canadian aspirations¹. As for the ideological position that the party should adopt, there was a fairly general understanding, at that time, that it should follow a broad social democratic line, although there were some who supported a more radical position.

Pierre Vadboncoeur had, at the intellectuals' conference the previous November, already advocated a stand clearly to the left. Marcel Rioux in addition supported this line, providing the ideological nucleus of a group which was to cause such doctrinal controversies later. In the January, 1961, edition of Cité Libre,

¹ Michel Forest. Compte-rendu confidentiel de la réunion tenue le samedi 4 février, à la Fraternité Canadienne des Employés de chemin de fer, sur le thème: 'La gauche et le Nouveau Parti'.

Marcel Rioux wrote, referring to the November 1960 conference:

Une autre contestation qui me semble se dégager de ce colloque, c'est que le Nouveau Parti devra être radical s'il veut réussir à se tailler une place au soleil et jouer un rôle dans la communauté canadienne.¹

It can be appreciated that this position would strongly appeal to the members of the PSD involved in the New Party movement who already enjoyed a radical reputation. Nonetheless, it was not until later, when this radicalism became more closely associated with French Canadian nationalism that any form of open division became apparent. It was Pierre Vadboncoeur particularly, and also Marcel Rioux, who were later responsible for linking the two currents of socialism and French Canadian nationalism on the intellectual plane. Then it was the past members² of the PSD in the New Party movement, spurred by a younger element, who later provided the emotional drive that split the Quebec New Democratic Party in two.

¹ Marcel Rioux. 'Socialisme, cléricalisme et nouveau parti'. Cité Libre No. 33. January 1961. P. 6.

² These included Michel Chartrand, Jacques-Victor Morin, Philippe Vaillancourt and others. The younger element included Jean-Claude Lebel, Gilles Rochette and later André L'Heureux.

Symptoms of dissent began to show themselves in the summer months of 1961 as the Quebec Committee organized for its own provincial seminar which was to precede the New Party Founding Convention by a few weeks.

Just before the provincial seminar, an open letter addressed to the press, radio and television media had been printed in Le Devoir. The letter, protesting an editorial in the official FTQ organ, Le Monde Ouvrier, was intended to correct the impression given by the editor, Noël Perusse, that the union leaders were diametrically opposed to separatism. The open letter contained the statement:

Nous croyons donc que le Canada est formé de deux nations: la nation canadienne française et la nation canadienne anglaise. L'Acte de l'Amérique Britannique du Nord implique le respect de leurs droits respectifs: c'est le résultat d'un pacte entre les deux nations qui constitue le Canada. ¹

Since most of the signatories² were members of the New Party movement it was hardly surprising that a similar resolution, demanding that the New Party accept the two nation thesis, was prepared for consideration at the

¹ Le Devoir. June 6th, 1961. P. 1.

² The following were among the signatories:- Michel Chartrand, Jacques-Victor Morin, Michel Forest and Roméo Mathieu. The latter was an official with the United Packing House, Food and Allied Workers Union. (AFL - CIO).

provincial seminar held at the University of Montreal Social Centre on the weekend of June 17th-18th, 1961.

It had been decided by the Quebec Committee, in advance of the seminar, that no resolutions would be passed, rather proposals would be submitted for later consideration by the Committee. Nonetheless, Jean-Claude Lebel who chaired the session still permitted the tabling of the following motion which had to be reluctantly withdrawn.

La Confédération canadienne doit être
considérée non seulement comme un pacte entre
des provinces -- mais aussi comme un pacte
entre deux nations; la nation canadienne
française et la nation canadienne anglaise.¹

Following the seminar, in what remained of June and into early July, the Quebec Committee began to prepare its resolutions for submission to the founding convention of the New Party, scheduled for July 31st - August 4th in Ottawa. It was now clear that some statement recognizing French Canada as a nation was fast becoming a minimum requirement. Nationalist sentiment, although vocal, was by no means articulate and the Quebec Committee experienced difficulty in coming to a consensus. Delays followed.

¹ Le Devoir. June 19th, 1961. P. 1. The article describes the withdrawing of the motion.

Meanwhile, in Ottawa, the National Committee for the New Party was completing a revised draft of the programme while its various sub-committees were busy at work making arrangements for the convention. The intention of the National Committee was to incorporate the Quebec resolutions in the official draft before the convention. By mid-July the Quebec resolutions had not yet arrived and since they were expected to be controversial the National Committee appointed a special delegation to meet with the Quebec group and discuss the difficulties.

By July 13th, when the delegation¹ from Ottawa met with the Quebec Committee in Montreal, several sheets of resolutions had been prepared which involved extensive amendments to both the proposed constitution and the draft programme. Among the more pertinent were:

Attendu que selon l'esprit de la Confédération le Canada est un pays bi-national. Qu'il soit résolu d'utiliser, dans tous les documents officiels du Nouveau Parti, le terme 'fédéral' ou 'Canadien' au lieu de 'national' et le terme 'pays' ou 'Canada' au lieu de 'nation'.²

¹ The delegation consisted of Michael Oliver, Frank Scott, Donald C. MacDonald, Ken Bryden, and Walter Pitman.

² Draft of the Quebec Resolutions for submission to the founding convention.

Le Nouveau Parti proclame formellement sa foi en un fédéralisme renoué, qu'il considère comme le seul système capable d'assurer l'épanouissement, dans un état bi-national, des deux nations qui constituent le Canada, leur pleine égalité en droit, l'autonomie des provinces en même temps que le développement vigoureux et équilibré de tout le Canada.¹

The discussion with the Ottawa delegation did not check what had already been set in motion and the Quebec resolutions were finally submitted to the National Committee just before the convention, provoking a stormy debate.

This was a prelude to what was to come at the Founding Convention itself, when delegates from the Quebec New Party became acutely aware that they were also representing French Canada. Events were to show that the New Party formation in Quebec had become deeply involved in the ideological issues accelerated by the rising tide of nationalism in French Canada.

Summary

From 1960-1961, the Quebec Committee for the New Party attempted to deploy its limited organizational forces in three areas; namely, in gaining the unified support and participation of Quebec Labour, Quebec

¹ Ibid.

intellectuals and the Quebec public.

On the balance sheet, the CSN had refused to commit itself, while the FTQ gave little more than vocal support. At the same time the character of the New Party movement was such that the appeal was made largely to 'thinking' French Canadians. The emphasis on ideas and policy making produced a preponderance of ideologues at the expense of organization -- yet without really capturing the full support of the French Canadian intelligentsia. Criticism of the New Party had come from editorials in Le Devoir and Cité Libre where support, tacit or overt, was necessary.

In the formulation of policy and resolutions for the New Party in Quebec, both Marcel Rioux and Pierre Vadboncoeur had advocated a position clearly to the Left. This line of thinking was calculated to appeal to many of the past members of the PSD, members who had participated in the abortive Ligue d'Action Socialiste of 1956. However, an ideological synthesis between Socialism and French Canadian Nationalism had not yet been developed.

More significant was the growing importance of the nationalist question itself which resulted in a wider call for full recognition of French Canada both in the

New Party programme and constitution. It was these demands of the nationalists that were particularly felt at the Founding Convention and which really marked the beginning of the New Democratic Party's struggles in Quebec.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW PARTY FOUNDING CONVENTION

OTTAWA, JULY 31 - AUGUST 4, 1961.

The Mood of the Delegates.

The New Party was launched in style at its Founding Convention held in Ottawa's Lansdowne Park. A crowd of over two thousand people¹ thronged the Coliseum and batteries of reporters and television cameras were much in evidence during the five day spectacle. Along with the carnival spirit there was work to be done and delegates from all parts of the country were there to hammer out a constitution and a programme, select a leader and choose a name for the party.

Arrangements for the convention had been carefully made and the way had been paved for the sympathetic

¹ Of the 2,038 persons who attended the founding convention, held at the Ottawa Coliseum, 1801 were actually voting delegates. The convention apart from adopting the constitution and programme was required to elect the Officers, Council and Executive of the Party. These bodies consisted of:- Officers; a leader, a president, an associate president (one of the two presidents English-speaking the other French), five vice-presidents, a treasurer, a secretary and associate secretary (one of the two English-speaking the other French); the Council, consisting of the officers, fifteen members elected by the convention, two members elected by the parliamentary caucus, the leader, president and secretary of each provincial party, two additional members from each provincial party elected by the provincial convention, five members representing the Young People's Section of the Party; the Executive of the federal party, consisting of the Officers plus ten other members elected from and by the Council.

reception of the Quebec delegates.¹ All the convention committees had both English and French-speaking co-chairmen, while the various printed convention circulars and pamphlets were in two languages. In addition, the Arrangements Committee had gone to no small expense and trouble by providing simultaneous translation facilities.

In spite of these arrangements most of the English-speaking delegates at the convention were not prepared for the impact made by the demands of the delegation from Quebec. The few people who had had an opportunity to read and discuss the Quebec resolutions were largely members of the National Committee. However, this did not mean that the greater part of the English-Canadian delegates were not ready, when the time came, to go along with policy measures that would help the party in Quebec.

The English-Canadian delegates were conscious that the policies of the New Party involved a further shift from a rigid socialist position on matters like the nationalizing of banks and utilities. The view that innovations could well be made within the context of a mixed economy rendered the position of the party more flexible and brought with it an added emphasis on democratic

¹ There were about 190 delegates from Quebec.

freedoms. The recent papal encyclical Mater et Magistra, which saw no harm in 'socialization' as long as it respected individual rights and was within the moral order, was an encouraging adjunct.

Particularly important for most of the delegates from outside Quebec, was the structure envisaged for provincial parties in the draft constitution. Article X stated:

Each province of Canada shall have a Provincial Party, fully autonomous as to its provincial constitution and programme, provided that the said constitution and programme are not in conflict with the principles of the National Party, or this constitution. ¹

To the minds of most English-speaking delegates this amounted to a carte blanche as far as the structures of provincial parties were concerned. Not only did this mean that references to the Quebec 'wing' or Quebec 'section' of the New Party would be dispensed with but autonomous provincial parties would have freedom to organize themselves to take into account regional differences. These facts did not receive adequate emphasis at the Founding Convention mainly because the general enthusiasm generated by the event and the pressure of business tended

¹ The Draft Constitution published by the National Committee for the New Party, March, 1961.

to cloud structural details. Members of the National Committee, and later federal officers, regarded the understanding of the structure of provincial parties as implicit, comprehensible to anyone who could read either language. In this they unwittingly misjudged both the mood and character of the French Canadian delegation.

An assessment of the mood and outlook of the Quebec delegates helps explain this point. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 190 or so delegates from Quebec approached the Founding Convention with a sense of mission. As a group, vocal, cohesive and zealous, it was their mission to obtain full recognition of the French Canadian fact in the New Party movement. The trade unionists and past members of the PSD who made up the delegation were principally concerned with reversing the legacy of the C.C.F. in Quebec -- if possible with one stroke. Mundane concerns such as political organization, party administration and the enrolling of new members were secondary considerations. The Quebec delegates believed that once the right formula had been obtained, electoral success would be achieved as surely as night follows day. This was not a conception of political action produced entirely by the opportunities presented by the social revolution in Quebec, rather it was one that had existed before -- both in La Ligue d'Action Socialiste and Le Rassemblement.

The outlook of the Quebec delegates, although ethnocentric, included a full appreciation of the fresh start offered by the New Party. The official link with the C.L.C., the promise of a happy marriage with the C.C.F., and the involvement of intellectuals were all developments favourably viewed by the French Canadians present. The C.C.F. heritage, the past image of centralism, even the continued presence of the 'Regier, Winch and Fisher'¹ element could be overlooked. All that was important was that the New Party should believe in French Canada and adopt the right formulas. This goal was nominally achieved and the French Canadian delegation experienced a moment of triumph.

Convention Business.

As mentioned, the pressure of work on the convention was formidable. Not only were there elections of the party leader and officers² to be conducted but

¹ See page 16.

² Michael Oliver was elected Federal President and Gérard Picard, past president of the CSN, was elected Associate-President. Roméo Mathieu who was with the United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, broke the unofficial slate of candidates being circulated and was elected one of the five vice-presidents. Subsequently, he became president of the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council.

speeches to be made with Claude Jodoin, President of the C.L.C., and Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the British Labour Party, as key-note speakers.

The bulk of the business at the convention involved the passage of the draft constitution and the draft programme prepared by the National Committee together with consideration of quantities of resolutions, most of which had been carefully sorted. Of particular interest to the delegates were the plans for a federal investment board, a Canadian development fund, direction in the location of industry, protection of the consumer, co-operative federalism, Canada's relations with NATO as well as the implementation of a National Health Plan.

The leadership question produced some surprises. Hazen Argue, who counted on the support of seasoned C.C.F. members and also certain delegates from Quebec, by speaking out against the party's alleged swing to the Right in domestic and foreign policy, did not stand much chance against Tommy Douglas. Confusing the issue was the fact that Argue had himself nominated by two people whose views were not exactly concurrent, namely, Douglas Fisher and Michel Chartrand. That Argue lost the leadership to Tommy Douglas, by a vote of 1391 to 380, was not so surprising to most delegates as the apparent existence among some Quebec delegates of support for a move to the Left in party policy.

It was in this atmosphere of intense activity that the demands of the Quebec delegation were to burst upon the delegates at large. Early in the week, on the night of July 31st, the Quebec delegates held a private caucus to discuss resolutions regarding French Canada.

The Programme Committee had already made certain changes to its draft. The word 'nation' and 'national', referring to Canada as a whole, had been eliminated from the programme in several places to help pave the way for theoretical acceptance of the two nation concept. Furthermore, the section of the programme entitled, 'Canada as a Nation' had been altered to contain this statement:

Our pride in Canada as a nation is enhanced by our consciousness of the two national cultures which form the basis of Canadian life. We are indeed aware that those who have their roots in the French-speaking community frequently and legitimately use the word 'nation' to describe French Canada itself.¹

However, similar efforts had not yet been made by the Constitution Committee. Therefore, the private caucus of French Canadians, in a heated meeting, decided to bring the fact clearly home to the convention that a constitution

¹ The New Democratic Party Programme, adopted by its Founding Convention, Ottawa, July 31 - August 4, 1961. P. 22. See Appendix D.

reflecting a strong pan-Canadian philosophy was not acceptable to either themselves or Quebec. On the following day, August 1st, Michel Chartrand, objecting to the report of the Constitution Committee, placed before the convention a motion couched in these terms:

Considérant que les Canadiens d'origine française constituent une nation distincte, et que de leur point de vue le terme 'national' ne peut s'expliquer à l'ensemble de la population canadienne ni à un parti ou un organisme aspirant à représenter l'ensemble de cette population. Considérant que le terme 'national' appliqué au Nouveau Parti apparaîtrait à bon droit à l'immense majorité des Canadiens français comme l'expression d'une mentalité incompréhensive sinon assimilatrice à l'endroit de la nation canadienne-française ...¹

The motion was supported by Hazen Argue and applauded by the Quebec delegates. The demand that the terms 'nation' or 'national' be deleted everywhere in the constitution took the bulk of the delegates by surprise. The only person ready to oppose it, and this most eloquently, was Dr. Eugene Forsey.² His impassioned speech pointing out that he would not support a party advocating a two nation theory did little to influence the majority of

¹ Convention Motions.

² Dr. Eugene Forsey later resigned from the party, objecting both to the two nation concept and also to some provisions of the Full Employment Act. Cf. Correspondence in Canadian Forum, September, 1961.

delegates who were generally unaware of the political and constitutional implications of Chartrand's motion. Forsey's speech, however, made most people realize that it was necessary to take a stand and they accordingly made use of the vote to demonstrate their support for the party in French Canada per se.

Although the Quebec delegation hailed the convention's approval of the amended constitution as a major victory, real advances had already been made by the Programme Committee. Most significant of these was the formal adoption by the convention of 'Co-operative Federalism' as a broad policy advocating economic and social planning at all levels of government and calling for extensive consultation between federal and provincial governments.

A declaration accepting the notion of Confederation as a partnership between two nations was also reformulated but the term 'nation', when applied to French Canada, was generally construed to denote a historic, ethnic community. The delegates were not asked to recognize the existence of a separate English Canadian nation. Furthermore, although the words 'federal' and 'Canada' were used to replace the term 'nation', in the constitution, the New Democratic Party programme still retained the word in several places.

However, as far as the conduct of convention business was concerned, the concerted action by Quebec delegates hardly cut across the rising enthusiasm and interest generated by the founding of the New Democratic Party. In addition, the NATO-NORAD debate, perhaps the most controversial convention issue, as well as discussion of the party's welfare policies, caused questions relating to French Canada to recede into the background.

A sense of widespread optimism prevailed which included a strong belief that the party was about to make a very firm mark on the political scene. There was a genuine hope that a strong party could be built in Quebec, instead of just a label for a party, and the groundwork had at least been laid for this by agreement with the Quebec Party on an acceptable minimum in the constitution and programme.

Reaction in Montreal

Any form of publicity was welcomed by the Quebec party in Montreal if it would help gain support. The ambiance of the Quebec New Democratic Party, attempting to grow through exchange of ideas and discussion of its programme, made any printed commentaries especially important. The reaction of Le Devoir, which hailed the

measures secured by the Quebec delegates as a complete victory for French Canada was viewed as a signal advance.

A typical article title, summed up the work of the Quebec delegates like this:

Vigilante, aggressive, la délégation du Québec a accompli du bon travail au Congrès du Nouveau Parti. ¹

Nonetheless, editorial writers were not above giving their special interpretation of events and issuing detailed advice to the members of the Quebec party. Jean-Marc Léger, a French Canadian nationalist, wrote, 'il y a deux nations, il doit y avoir deux partis, coopérant dans un conseil fédéral'.² This certainly had not been intended.

The convention had approved a declaration expressing its belief in French Canada as a nation, as a historic ethnic community, and in this regard stressed the autonomy of provincial parties so that they could adjust to regional and cultural differences. The federal party programme and constitution envisaged ten autonomous parties linked by a common social purpose. The concept of two parties, one for English Canada and one for French

¹ Le Devoir, August 8th, 1961.

² Le Devoir, August 5th, 1961.

Canada co-operating under a federal council, was neither in the spirit nor in the letter of the New Party idea. The Quebec delegates had accepted both the programme and the constitution of the federal party and within those broad limits were committed to establish a compatible party in Quebec.

Gérard Pelletier, while prepared to accept developments at the Founding Convention at face value, was still concerned that the views of the 'Regier-Winch' element might still exist. He wrote:

Quant aux bêtises évitées par le Nouveau Parti, je veux parler d'abord de son attitude face au Canada français. La C.C.F. pour son malheur, a toujours fait preuve en cette matière d'un penchant invincible vers le faux-pas. M. Winch, par exemple, se déclarait favorable au bilinguisme pourvu que tout le monde parle anglais et M. Regier manifestait pour le Québec une sympathie d'éléphant qui mignarde. Le NDP au contraire, semble prendre un départ meilleur. A plusieurs reprises, au cours du Congrès, la délégation québécoise a crié victoire. Elle l'a même crié un peu haut à mon gré: je n'arrive pas à mourir d'aise pour quelques mots modifiés dans une constitution. Il reste tout de même significatif qu'une majorité, jusqu'ici assez rigide en pareille matière, ait voulu signifier qu'elle prenait conscience de notre existence.¹

Several days later, André Laurendeau, writing in Le Devoir, also commented on the activities of the Quebec delegates.

¹ Gérard Pelletier. 'Un Appui et de l'Instinct'.
(Editorial) La Presse, August 5th, 1961.

A mon sens, les canadiens-français du NPD ont marqué une victoire moins spectaculaire mais plus certaine: ils ont commencé d'enraciner leur parti dans le milieu québécois. Ceci deviendra sans doute plus net quand un parti provincial autonome aura commencé à prendre devant l'opinion, sa physionomie propre.¹

It is worth noting that the articles in these Montreal papers relating to the New Democratic Party insisted on referring to the Quebec Party as the 'l'aile Québécoise' or the Quebec 'Section' of the N.D.P. It is a curious fact that neither the federal nor the Quebec party bothered to produce a press release or an explicit statement on nomenclature. The explanation lay in the fact that the provisional Quebec party experienced considerable difficulty in ever holding its founding convention and settling its name. In the interim the two phrases that Montreal papers used helped perpetuate past centralist images.

On the whole, the tenor of the reaction in Montreal to events at the N.D.P. Founding Convention was cautious but generally favourable to the party in Quebec. However, the practice of journalists addressing their opinions directly to the party members was to have far reaching implications.

¹ André Laurendeau. 'Le NPD et les Canadiens français' (Editorial) Le Devoir, August 10th, 1961.

The Founding Convention Aftermath.

Although there were to be some provincial founding conventions in the fall of 1961, the high level of morale that had existed at the Founding Convention could not be maintained. In Quebec, as in the federal party, the administrative work involved in organizing and setting the party on its feet was dull routine compared with the enthusiastic endorsement of principles and policies. The question of a hiatus in party activity was accentuated by a series of problems in the fall of 1961, to which the federal N.D.P. could not make speedy or effective adjustments.

The National Committee for the New Party had been automatically disbanded at the convention and a slate of federal officers and executives elected. Although the National Committee had made budgetary arrangements to carry the party through the month of August, there was a lag during which time the party struggled to operate as an effective political instrument. It was generally felt that the party lost ground¹ in the fall of 1961 and the dispersal of leaders did not help matters. At this time, Tommy Douglas was in Regina, David Lewis in Toronto and Michael Oliver in Montreal.

¹ Evidence for this section is partly based on conversations with Terry Grier, Secretary of the N.D.P., Ottawa, March, 1965 -- and the documents he kindly made available.

While problems arising from difficulties in organization and political inexperience troubled other provincial parties, the effect on the provisional party in Quebec was to have more serious implications. It has already been seen that many in the New Party in Quebec placed their faith in a kind of bandwagon effect where it was believed that once the right political formula had been found enough adherents would be attracted to make success at the polls a reality. The 'let down' after the Founding Convention resulted in a particularly low ebb of initial activity in the Quebec party. The provincial founding convention was postponed and the continued provisional status of the party set the stage for future difficulties.

Summary

At the Founding Convention the widespread enthusiasm for the New Party among the delegates reached its peak. The Quebec delegates were satisfied with what had been secured. They felt that now the right formula had only to be applied to the Quebec situation, and with the founding of the party in that province, electoral success would follow.

However, the high level of morale generated by the recent Convention could not be maintained. In Quebec, the problems involved in transforming an ideological movement into a tight-knit political party were to involve the N.D.P. in a seemingly endless debate.

CHAPTER V

THE BACKGROUND FOR DISPUTE --

THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC (From the Fall of 1961 to Summer 1962)

The Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council Operations. (1961-1962)

This council was in effect the successor to the Quebec Committee for the New Party, which like the National Committee, gave way to the elected party officers and executives. Roméo Mathieu, one of five federal vice-presidents, and also Gérard Picard, who was federal Associate-President, chaired the early meetings of the Quebec Council, Roméo Mathieu becoming president of this body in September 1961.

It was the function of the Provisional Council to organize the founding convention of the Quebec N.D.P. and to formulate a programme and constitution which would fall within the broad limits of the federal programme and constitution. The Council met in August and September to discuss organizational plans and to elect its temporary officers. The thirty members of the Provisional Council came from the groups that had originally associated to form the party; that is to say from the New Party Clubs, the PSD, the FTQ and some, individually, from the CSN. The following figure shows the organization of the Provisional Council, the groups represented and the composition of the Committees.

FIGURE II

THE QUEBEC N.D.P. PROVISIONAL COUNCIL, FALL 1961.Executive Committee

Roméo Mathieu (FTQ) - President
 Michel Chartrand (PSD) - Vice-President
 Gilles Duguay (N.P.C.) - Vice-President
 Michel Forest (PSD) - Secretary
 Jean-Claude Lebel - Organizer
 Roger Provost (FTQ)
 Réginald Boisvert (N.P.C.)
 Emile Boudreau (PSD)
 Jean Dufresne (N.P.C.)
 Jean V. Morin (PSD)
 Philippe Vaillancourt (FTQ)

Programme Sub-Committee

Fernand Daoust (FTQ)
 Jean Gérin-Lajoie (FTQ)
 René Rondou (FTQ)
 Michael Oliver (Federal-
 President)
 Michel Forest * (PSD)
 Pierre Vadboncoeur (CSN)
 Jack Weldon (N.P.C.)
 Marcel Rioux (N.P.C.)
 Jacques R. Mackay (N.P.C.)

Organization Sub-Committee

Roméo Mathieu * (CSN)
 Jean Philip (FTQ)
 Roger Provost * (FTQ)
 Harry Pope (PSD)
 Michel Chartrand * (PSD)
 Thérèse Casgrain (PSD)
 Claude Rondeau (N.P.C.)
 Jean-Claude Lebel (Organizer)

Financial Sub-Committee

Ivan A. Legault (FTQ)
 Aldo Calouri (FTQ)
 Emile Boudreau * (PSD)
 Gérard Picard (Federal
 Associate-President)
 Gilles Duguay * (N.P.C.)
 Gilles Rochette (N.P.C.)
 Jean-Claude Lebel *

Constitution Sub-Committee

Philippe Vaillancourt * (PSD)
 Jacques V. Morin * (PSD)
 Réginald Boisvert * (N.P.C.)

Public Relations Sub-Committee

Noel Perusse (FTQ)
 Jean-Pierre Fournier (PSD)
 Jean V. Dufresne (N.P.C.)

NOTES:-

- * - Members of the Provisional Council Executive Committee.
- PSD - Associated through the Parti Social Démocratique.
- N.P.C.- Associated through the New Party Clubs.
- FTQ - Associated through the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec.
- CSN - Individual association from the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux.

At a meeting held on September 14th, 1961, the Provisional Council elected its executive committee and, as shown by the previous figure, appointed a number of sub-committees on the programme, on organization, on finances and on the constitution. It was the intention¹ of the Council to prepare for a provincial founding convention to be held in mid-February 1962.

From the fall of 1961 until the end of the year the sub-committees went to work examining and questioning the appropriate programme, constitution and structure for the Quebec party. Again the emphasis was placed on orientation and policy, rather than on organization and recruitment. Plans for the Quebec founding convention, which was to be the fruition of the Council's work were postponed because of the approach of the federal election in June 1962. Because of the party's limited resources these events were mutually exclusive. Instead of the convention, campaign meetings were arranged, instead of setting up a fairly broadly based fees and dues paying membership, a search for candidates was instigated and the scant finances of the party were committed to the election campaign.

¹ Minutes of the N.D.P. Provisional Council Meeting.
September 14th, 1961.

The fact that the Quebec Provisional Council failed to establish itself formally in convention, and was to constantly postpone this event, produced a chain reaction. The failure left the door open to endless discussion and debate and rendered the Quebec N.D.P. vulnerable to division by nationalistic pressures. As more time passed it became increasingly difficult to hold a founding convention, growing differences within the Quebec council providing a more permanent obstacle than the 1962 federal election.

Ideological Differences within the Provisional Council

From the fall of 1961 to the summer of 1962, the Provisional Council was to divide slowly into two camps:- on the one hand a radical nationalist group gradually formed, advocating a special party for Quebec;- on the other hand a more orthodox group tried to resist this and attempted to secure the founding of a party consistent with the federal N.D.P.

Initially, the lines of division were not clearly cut and in early 1962 the onset of the federal election campaign tended to make ideological questions recede into the background, although it did not prevent occasional disputes.

It has already been pointed out that under the Quebec Committee for the New Party two French Canadian Socialist intellectuals, Marcel Rioux and Pierre Vadboncoeur, had advocated a position for the party clearly to the Left. Both were members of the Quebec Provisional Council's programme sub-committee, but the postponement of the provincial founding convention tended to suspend their influence as did also the presence of Michael Oliver, Jack Weldon and later Charles Taylor, who served on the same sub-committee. All these English-speaking McGill professors, advocated a more moderate position.

Previously, at the Founding Convention of the N.D.P. in Ottawa, Roméo Mathieu and Michel Chartrand had emerged as spokesmen for the Quebec delegates. Joined by Philippe Vaillancourt, Jacques-Victor Morin and Emile Boudreau, these people, mainly trade unionists, supported a nationalist position for the party in Quebec. Their line of thinking was not initially a separatist one. That is to say that at the outset they were not for a separate State of Quebec and for a separate socialist party completely independent from the N.D.P. Their primary objective was to obtain full recognition for the French Canadian fact within the N.D.P. It was when this objective had been achieved that the nationalists moved further. During the period, nationalist ideas, encouraged by some quarters of

the Montreal press and nourished by suspicions of the Federal N.D.P., increasingly found a sounding board within the Quebec party. The 1962 election campaign and its demoralizing aftermath was to see a considerable shifting of positions.

Three issues in particular helped shape the attitudes of the nationalists; - namely, the Saskatchewan School situation, certain remarks by Mr. Douglas Fisher and a speech made by Tommy Douglas.

Criticism of the alleged unfair treatment of the French Canadian minority in the Saskatchewan Schools had been met by Premier Douglas through the expedient of an open invitation to French Canadian journalists to inspect the system themselves. A front page article which appeared in Le Devoir in November published the results of the 'investigation'. The headline declared, 'Les accusations contre le premier ministre Douglas étaient méritées'.¹

The article went on to describe how the legislation that had produced the Saskatchewan School System had been drawn up by a C.C.F. government. It stated that the rights of the French Canadian minority had been infringed by legislation which had been introduced by a socialist

¹ Le Devoir, November 15th, 1961.

government without adequate protection for minorities. The conclusion was that French Canadians in general would have to safeguard their rights when dealing with the N.D.P.

If most of the nationalists within the Quebec party were prepared to let this issue go they could not accept open insults from a member of their own party. Of the many speakers at the Congrès des Affaires Canadiennes at Laval University, on November 15-18th, 1961, none was to establish such a firm reputation as a bête noire to French Canadians as Douglas Fisher. Called upon to deliver the average English-Canadian view of French Canada, Mr. Fisher confused candour with bad manner and inflicted his opinions on both a sensitive and intelligent audience. Through the agencies of the press what he said became a byword in French Canada overnight.

I suppose for us the greatest impact of French-Canadian culture has been made by Maurice Richard and Lili St-Cyr... I wonder whether we are to be fascinated by your marvellous police tradition, the magnificence of your telegraphers ... ¹

¹ Douglas Fisher. Text of a speech delivered at the Congress on Canadian Affairs, Laval University, November 15-18th, 1961.
Le Canada, Expérience Ratée ... ou Réussi?
 Laval University Press. 1962. P. 156.
 The enduring effects of this incident cannot be over-estimated. Nearly five years later at the Quebec N.D.P. Constitutional Convention, held from March 16-17th, 1965, the introduction of Mr. Fisher was heralded by sundry manifestations of disapprobation; eyewitness.

What Mr. Fisher said produced an outcry of indignation in Quebec and although a more mature society might have shrugged its shoulders this was impossible for one still finding itself. An article title appeared in Le Devoir on November 23rd entitled, 'Fisher sera-t-il expulsé du N.P.D.?'

The losers in this question were to be the members of the Quebec Provisional Council who asked the federal executive for either an official apology or Fisher's expulsion from the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus. For many in the Quebec party the disturbing incident revived the 'Regier and Winch' episodes of the past. It seemed that for all the official changes in the N.D.P. party policy towards French Canada nothing had really changed. It was, therefore, not surprising that future statements emanating from the federal party should receive careful examination by dissatisfied members of the Quebec party.

On January 15th, 1962, Tommy Douglas gave an address to the Osgoode Hall Legal and Literary Society. Both Michael Oliver and David Lewis assisted in the preparation of the text entitled, 'Canadian Unity and the Constitution'. The object of the address was to outline constitutional reforms cast in the overall frame of the

N.D.P.'s policy of co-operative federalism. Douglas, while referring to Canada's 'two nations or people of different language, culture and outlook brought together in a single state',¹ outlined measures which would re-adjust the federal role in Canadian politics. Referring to Social Security measures, Douglas said:

Obviously, in a federal state like Canada's, provincial administration and a broad area of provincial responsibility are necessary and, indeed desirable. But this must not be an excuse for perpetuating inequalities. Nor can it be permitted to obstruct those constitutional adjustments which the welfare of Canada may demand. ²

In effect, Douglas was advocating policies that a N.D.P. federal government would pursue in respect to the ten provinces that comprised the country.

To the minds of some of the members of the Quebec party it appeared that the special respect secured for French Canada in the N.D.P. programme at the founding convention had been forgotten. Jean-Claude Lebel felt this particularly strongly and his position as organizer in the Quebec party was one that carried influence. He was the

¹ T.C. Douglas. Text of a speech addressed to the Osgoode Hall Legal and Literary Society, January 15th, 1962, at the King Edward Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, P. 2.

² Ibid. P. 5.

first to voice publicly dissatisfaction. His reaction, followed by a heated meeting of the Quebec Council and coupled with pointed editorial comment on the dispute, was to divide the party openly.

The details of the rift were as follows. On Sunday, January 21st, Lebel expressed his feelings at a public meeting in Mont-Joli, Quebec, concerning the recent speech by Mr. Douglas. What he said was reported in the press, Mr. Douglas first being made aware of the incident when his attention was drawn to an article that appeared in the Leader-Post. Lebel was reported as saying:

There is no question of secession at this moment but I am among the dissatisfied members of the Quebec wing. ¹

Lebel particularly objected to the fact that Douglas allegedly viewed the opinion of the majority as identical to the will of the country in questions of constitutional amendment.² This view would then condone the imposition of Constitutional Amendments without special

¹ The Leader-Post, January 23rd, 1962.

² Douglas did not discuss amendment procedures explicitly in his speech given in Toronto on January 15th. However, he did mention that any amending procedures which were adopted should receive the approval of a 'cross section' of the Canadian people.

consideration for Quebec. Consequently, Lebel stated that:

Mr. Douglas considers the province of Quebec as being like other provinces which is false.¹

The public repudiation of the leader of the N.D.P. resulted in a special meeting of the executive committee of the Quebec party on Monday, January 22nd. Perhaps spurred by Lebel's lead, Michel Chartrand showed no reserve in allowing the press to latch on to his criticisms. By this time the allegations against Mr. Douglas included a charge that he had referred to the 'Canadian nation' while the official line of the party ostensibly recognized two nations.² Pointing out that the N.D.P. in Quebec had not officially been formed, Chartrand was reported as saying:

Nous avons posé à Ottawa les jalons de notre politique et nous sommes actuellement à élaborer nos positions sur les problèmes intéressant particulièrement la province de Québec. Tant que notre politique et nos positions n'auront pas suffisamment développées, pourquoi certains songeraient-ils à fonder un autre parti? Nous avons actuellement notre nouveau parti et nous travaillons à le rendre conforme aux aspirations de la province du Québec.³

¹ Op. Cit.

² This was not exactly correct. Mr. Douglas referred to 'Canada'.

³ Le Devoir, Monday, January 22nd, 1962.

The object of the special meeting was to quieten those voices which had begun to advocate the formation of another party. The day after the meeting Roméo Mathieu was able to make a statement to the press. Mathieu, although a nationalist was strongly against a divided party and he was quoted as saying that the whole issue was a 'tempête dans un verre d'eau' and that the speech of Mr. Douglas, 'a été mal interprété'.¹ It seemed that for the present the matter had been settled. The pressure of the approaching federal election campaign then temporarily eased the dispute.

If the party cadre was willing to forget differences and join together in the campaign, a certain quarter of the press was not of the same mind. Jean-Marc Léger, an editorial writer for Le Devoir, was to have that all important last word in this particular issue. In an editorial in Le Devoir on January 25th, Léger appraised the situation of the provisional N.D.P. in Quebec. With a razor sharp critique he performed a particularly painful dissection which a body as sensitive as the Quebec N.D.P. could not ignore. He said everything that Chartrand, Lebel, Morin, Vaillancourt and Vadboncoeur had left unsaid. He castigated the federal N.D.P. for lack of faith and revived

¹ Le Devoir, Tuesday, January 23rd, 1962.

past issues, while laying the foundations for a future separate, socialist party in Quebec. He wrote:

Tout le monde admet aujourd'hui que l'échec persistant du défunt C.C.F. dans le Québec tenait à la fois à son attitude 'centralisatrice' et au sentiment qu'avait la masse des canadiens français de se trouver devant un parti étranger, sans racine dans leur milieu et indifférent à leurs problèmes propres. Le N.P.D. a voulu lors de sa création éviter cet écueil. Et il faut rendre cet hommage à l'élément québécois au congrès de fondation qu'ils ont lutté avec courage et habileté pour faire admettre existence de deux nations, le bilinguisme intégral, une relative autonomie des sections provinciales. Il était trop évident cependant que la majorité n'avait bien souvent consenti ces concessions qu'à contre-cœur et que le groupe canadien-français aurait à mener une lutte de tous les instants pour faire respecter dans les faits ces engagements et ces textes officiels. Cet espoir n'est évidemment plus possible aujourd'hui.¹

Regarding the likelihood of a split in the Quebec N.D.P., Léger obligingly elaborated:

Déjà il existait parmi le groupe québécois du N.P.D. une tendance favorable à la création d'un parti de gauche strictement canadien-français, encore que très proche idéologiquement du N.P.D. et coopérant étroitement avec lui sur le plan fédéral. On peut supposer que le propos de M. Douglas, le choc salutaire qui en est résulté, vont donner une impulsion nouvelle à cette tendance.²

The importance of Léger's critique cannot be over-estimated. Here in print was the palpable encouragement

¹ Le Devoir, January 25th, 1962.

² Ibid.

and recognition that the nationalists both valued and sought. These comments were not lost on the group within the Quebec N.D.P. which now regarded itself as the 'nationalist tendency', the vanguard that was responsible for maintaining and extending the position taken at the founding convention.

Reactions of Federal N.D.P.
Spokesmen for Quebec

Michael Oliver, Gérard Picard, Roméo Mathieu and later Charles Taylor were all members of the Quebec party who used their influence to try and help clear away misunderstandings caused by the Lebel affair which had left many in the N.D.P. outside Quebec perplexed¹ and some within the provincial party still disgruntled. These spokesmen for Quebec were also in positions² that enabled them to explain the recent incident to the federal N.D.P. Council.

The significance of the whole issue was that it both marked the beginning of the split in the Quebec party

¹ A common view expressed by those federal N.D.P. members interviewed, was that news of dissatisfaction in the Quebec party came as a complete surprise when most reports indicated all was going well and that the provincial founding convention could be expected to take place at any time.

² Their positions were Federal President, Associate-President, Vice-President and later federal N.D.P. Council member, respectively.

and at the same time ushered in a fresh approach towards English-French relations by the federal N.D.P. The Quebec spokesmen mentioned above were largely instrumental in bringing about this new approach, aware that what was happening was perhaps a microcosm of the general deterioration in relations between the Diefenbaker government and Quebec. For the N.D.P. the point of departure for remedial action, on the part of federal spokesmen from Quebec, was to ascertain how the misunderstandings originated.

In a letter to Tommy Douglas and David Lewis explaining the Lebel incident, Michael Oliver suggested guide lines for what was in fact to become the official N.D.P. policy towards problems of bilingualism and biculturalism. He wrote:

We moved heaven and earth at the founding convention to clear away misunderstandings and lay the foundations for a valid mode of co-operation, but we have not gained as much public credit for this as I think we are entitled to ... We are confident that the programme adopted at our founding convention, with its pioneering conception of co-operative federalism, has mapped out the lines which must be followed.¹

Professor Oliver then went on to point out that Prime Minister Diefenbaker's curt refusal in the House to

¹ M.K. Oliver. Private correspondence -- letter dated January 23rd, 1962, addressed to Tommy Douglas and David Lewis.

a question by Mr. Herridge¹ regarding the feasibility of a Royal Commission on Bilingualism, originally suggested by André Laurendeau, provided an excellent opportunity for the N.D.P. to turn the whole question of the treatment of English-French relations to its advantage. He suggested that the N.D.P. should wholeheartedly endorse the idea, enlarging the scope to a Royal Commission on Federalism and Biculturalism.

However, apart from explanations among leaders, an understanding of the situation in the Quebec party was not general in the N.D.P. What in fact had happened was this.

At the founding convention the French-Canadian delegation had secured certain recognition for French Canada in party policy. At that time French Canada was recognized as a 'nation' but it was generally accepted then that the term 'nation' was used in a secondary meaning. The primary meaning of the term nation, synonymous with the word 'state', was not intended to apply to French Canada since Quebec was never viewed as a sovereign state. A secondary meaning denoting a historic ethnic community with a strong sense of cultural identity was accepted at that time. It was also considered at the founding convention that no slight would be cast on either language group if

¹ N.D.P. member for Kootenay West.

'nation', and its derivative 'national' were used to denote both Canada as a whole, and French Canada and English Canada within it. But the Quebec delegation at that time went farther calling for the removal of the word 'nation' and 'national' from the N.D.P. constitution and programme. In this regard they were largely successful and, from then on, N.D.P. federal spokesmen took care to refer to 'Canada', or 'this country', instead of the Canadian nation. The obvious intent of this measure was to try to change the attitude that regarded French Canadians as an irritating minority in an Anglo-Celtic dominated country.

In Quebec, already deeply involved in a social revolution, such terminology was freely interpreted. For those involved in the rising nationalism in Quebec and for nationalistic journalists, the word 'nation' referring to French Canada was taken in its primary sense, namely that of a state. Jean-Marc Léger, particularly, emphasized this viewpoint which cast subsequent federal N.D.P. utterances in the frame of centralist decrees. In the Quebec party, those inclined to the nationalist tendency increasingly were drawn to this position with its separatist overtones. This interpretation of federal N.D.P. policy was one which was found difficult to counter.

Nonetheless, federal spokesmen from Quebec regarded a re-emphasis of co-operative federalism as appropriate remedial action while extending the policy to include a proposal for a public study of problems in the area of English-French relations. At a meeting of the N.D.P. Federal Executive on February 4th, 1962, the plans for a Commission received discussion. It was decided¹ that the party should formally recommend a Federal-Provincial Commission of Enquiry on Canadian Federalism and Biculturalism. The suggested list of Commissioners provided an interesting forecast.² However, the public announcement of this project was delayed for a little, appearing as an early election campaign speech by Tommy Douglas.

¹ Minutes of the Federal N.D.P. Executive Meeting, held on February 4th, 1962.

² Ibid. These included André Laurendeau, Editor-in-Chief of Le Devoir; W.L. Morton, Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Manitoba; Gérard Pelletier, editor of La Presse; Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Professor of Public Law at the University of Montreal; Kurt Swinton, President of the Encyclopedia Britannica of Canada; Jean Marchand, President of the CSN; Frank Scott, Dean of Law, McGill University; and Jean-Louis Gagnon, Editor of Le Nouveau Journal.

Synopsis of the 1962 N.D.P. Election
Campaign in Quebec

In early 1962 the federal N.D.P. began to organize as the likelihood of a June election increased. André L'Heureux was appointed Associate-Secretary while Stephen Lewis was appointed Director of Organization. By February Tommy Douglas had already started campaigning and, particularly appropriately, at a nominating convention in Montreal, he made public the N.D.P. proposal for a Federal-Provincial Commission on Canadian Federalism and Biculturalism. Tommy Douglas was not slow to point out the enlightened N.D.P. attitude to this subject as well as the general need for a new approach to the problem of Canada's unity. He said:

.... We believe that the Programme adopted at our founding convention, with its pioneering conception of cooperative federalism, presents such a new approach. ¹

By April the party had moved into a fuller campaign order and, in May, Michael Oliver came to Ottawa as Campaign Director. In that month Douglas travelled backwards and forwards across the country. The points he stressed adhered closely to the platform drawn up at the

¹ T.C. Douglas. Text of a speech and press release delivered at the Mount Royal Hotel, Montreal, on February 20th, 1962.
Cf. Quotation on P. 94.

1961 Convention. That is to say economic planning, the development of social capital, medicare, improved welfare services and labour standards, co-operative federalism, control of American capital and subsidiaries, and a defence policy rejecting nuclear weapons at home and abroad. On May 20th, Douglas visited Quebec city, his trip including a short meeting with Monseigneur Roy. His speeches in Quebec stressed the fact that the N.D.P. was a party recognizing two nations and advocating co-operative federalism. On June 11th, Douglas was back in Montreal again where he outlined a four point programme within the N.D.P.'s policy of co-operative federalism; namely measures to ensure linguistic equality in the Civil Service, a new department of federal-provincial affairs, a new tax deal and freely negotiated joint programmes. An interesting point was that most appreciation was given by the Montreal audience to his pronouncements on medicare and nuclear arms.

For the greater part of the campaign the two major parties paid more attention to the N.D.P. than the Social Credit whose upsurge in Quebec was to be the upset of the 1962 election.

When the ballots were counted it was seen that the N.D.P. had won nineteen seats.¹ The party secured ten

¹ Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Ottawa, 1962.

in British Columbia, two in Manitoba, six in Ontario and one in Nova Scotia, accounting for fourteen percent of the popular vote. The failure of the party to gain a single seat in Quebec was as great a surprise to the N.D.P. as was the Cr ditiste breakthrough with twenty-six seats.

As far as campaigning by the Quebec N.D.P. was concerned, operations were instigated by the federal campaign committee which held a meeting¹ in January in order to help mobilize organizers for the various ridings in Quebec. By February the Quebec campaign committee was moving, albeit slowly.

Jean-Claude Lebel, as Quebec organizer, bore the brunt of the campaign work while other part-time workers² were appointed as organizers and co-ordinators in the Quebec ridings. The campaign organization was strengthened in March by Andr  L'Heureux's transfer from his position as

¹ Michael Oliver, Jean-Claude Lebel, Michel Forest, Rom o Mathieu, Jean Philip, Andr  L'Heureux, Julien Major and Carl Hamilton were present at the first meeting.

² Julien Major (FTQ) was appointed co-ordinator of the twenty-one ridings in the Montreal region, while Fernand Daoust was responsible for activities in the ridings of Mercier and Maisonneuve, while Charles Taylor and G. Gifford ran operations in N.D.P. St. Antoine - Westmount and Mount Royal. Jean-Claude Lebel was also responsible for activities in Lac St. Jean - Saguenay and Rimouski. Harry Pope undertook co-ordination work in Hull, Gatineau, Labelle and Pontiac-Temiskaming. Jean Philip and Bob Dean were appointed organizers in Sherbrooke, Stanstead and Drummond - Arthabaska, while Ren  Rondou and Rom o Mathieu were appointed to supervise electioneering in Joliette - l'Assomption - Montcalm.

Associate-Secretary in Ottawa to the Quebec group. Notwithstanding this attempt to alleviate the critical shortage of organizers, both Jean-Claude Lebel and André L'Heureux were to be completely overworked.

Nonetheless, the provisional N.D.P. accomplished the task of fielding forty-one candidates, but campaign activity was mainly concentrated on the island of Montreal with some work being done in the Lac St. Jean and Quebec city areas. On the island of Montreal, particularly, the party was to encounter heavy Liberal opposition. Organizational weakness, too little time, too small a staff and too little money prevented an effective campaign.

The Quebec provisional N.D.P. was also unable to draw support from the activities of a usually inspiring leader. The 'Douglas dynamism' was particularly low in Quebec, mainly as a result of the language difficulty. His emphasis on pointing out that the Social Credit Party's answers to current problems were merely facile solutions, at the same time inadvertently gave the impression that the N.D.P. platform was both difficult and complicated. This was accentuated by the fact that the implications of co-operative federalism required the understanding of an intellectual concept that was difficult to put into popular campaign terms. As a leader, Douglas had not evolved his own particular vocabulary for this aspect of the N.D.P.

platform and it is not surprising that he tended to gain more audience appreciation with medicare and nuclear arms issues.

The N.D.P. campaign on the island of Montreal was outmatched by the size and affluence¹ of the Liberal party organization. In greater Quebec, the astonishing effectiveness of the Social Credit party² was the triumph of not months but years of preparation, coupled with the dynamic leadership of Real Caouette who struck fire in certain places.

As far as advertising was concerned the N.D.P. spread its notices thinly in the Montreal press. Although André Laurendeau in his 'Chronique d'une campagne' in Le Devoir gave the N.D.P. good coverage, the press scarcely

¹ The number of full page advertisements placed by the Liberals in the Montreal press was formidable. Advertising techniques were most sophisticated. An advertisement that was repeated frequently depicted two hands clasped in a handshake above the caption -- 'Partenaires Egaux'. A subtle Madison Avenue touch provided the two business partners with oversized cufflinks, the one a lion rampant, the other a fleur-de-lis. The inference was clear, the technique extraordinarily clever. With one stroke the Liberal party became a party of two nations and a party of co-operative federalism.

² In contrast to the N.D.P. campaign, the Social Credit party concentrated in the Quebec city area, Lac St. Jean, Saguenay, Côte-Nord, New Quebec, Abitibi - Temiskaming and the Eastern townships. Advertising was concentrated in Le Soleil and L'Action and full advantage was taken of the less expensive television time in these areas.

mentioned N.D.P. candidates. On the whole the Quebec N.D.P. conducted neither a dynamic nor a complete campaign which prejudiced their chances of even limited success in the election.

Professor Léon Dion in his treatment¹ of election themes in the province of Quebec suggested that the N.D.P. felt beaten from the start, giving as evidence the fact that the party did not stress its capacity for government. Professor Dion further elaborated:

... it may express a kind of inferiority complex which seems to have been characteristic of this party.²

With the Quebec N.D.P.'s small organizational forces mainly concentrated on the island of Montreal and its resources extended to their limit there was little opportunity for ideological differences. If the Quebec N.D.P. did not suffer from some feelings of inferiority at the outset, there certainly was some cause for pessimism when the election results were in. The failure to gain a single seat in Quebec was a demoralizing blow that shook

¹ Léon Dion. 'The Election in the Province of Quebec', in John Meisel (edit.), 'Papers on the 1962 Election', The University of Toronto Press, 1964.

² Ibid. P. 113.

the N.D.P. Provisional Council. It was in the nature of those nationalists, who were to break away from the party later, not to look for the cause of failure in the organization of the campaign but to redouble their questioning of the direction and policy of the party. Again, it was a matter of renewing the search for the right formula.

Summary

From the fall of 1961 to the summer of 1962, the Quebec N.D.P. operated on a provisional basis. In this period the party slowly began to divide into two groups;- on the one hand the 'nationalists' on the other the 'federalists'.

The demoralizing results of the 1962 federal election campaign helped widen the breach and set the stage for what was to develop into an internecine dispute.

CHAPTER VI
THE LINES OF DIVISION HARDEN --
THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN QUEBEC
(1962-1963)

Operations of the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council

Throughout the latter part of 1962 and into 1963 the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council was beset by practically the same problems that the party had encountered the year before. These were problems caused by the Quebec N.D.P.'s provisional status, its inability to found itself in convention and the hardening lines of division within the Council. A series of obstacles caused deferment of the founding convention and the delay in reaching a settlement gave further time for dispute.

This was to be a critical year of frustrations for the N.D.P. The party did not participate in the Quebec provincial elections in November 1962 because, it was announced, it was too occupied in preparing for the much delayed founding convention, now set for March 1963. The founding convention for March 1963 was then postponed because of the decision to participate in the federal elections in April 1963.

The two major tasks then, that occupied the Provisional Council, were organizing for the abortive Quebec N.D.P. founding convention and running an election campaign

in the early months of 1963.

The provincial founding convention sub-committee had been in existence for some time¹ and during the months of October and November 1962, its work was paralleled by various study groups. These groups were responsible for preparing the study papers on planning, policies towards Confederation, as well as selecting the constitution and structural forms for the party shortly, as it was thought, to be founded. The papers prepared by the study groups were intended to comprise the agenda of the founding convention committees. The study groups² themselves largely remained intact until the party split later in 1963.

With many of the Provisional N.D.P. Council members involved in planning and policy making, financial and membership drives did not receive concerted attention.

¹ One of the first things that the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council did, in the fall of 1961, was to set up the provincial founding convention organization committee.

² As of December 15th, 1962, these study groups were made up of the following persons:- Planning in a Socialist State; Jack Weldon, Jacques Dofny, Jacques Henripin, Pierre Harvey, Jean Gérin-Lajoie, André L'Heureux and Jean Luc Migué. Confederation; Marcel Rioux, Jacques-Yvan Morin, Guy Dozois, Michel Forest, Michel Chartrand, Jean-Claude Lebel and Philippe Vaillancourt; Constitution of the Party; Réginald Boisvert and Jacques-Victor Morin. Minutes of the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council Meeting, December 15th, 1962.

The lack of a sustained effort to broaden support and attract members and the desultory nature of this operation did little to enhance the influence of the party. An important building block in increasing membership would have been the official support of the CSN.¹ Success in securing this was to escape the party in spite of the personal efforts of Gérard Picard who worked consistently in the higher echelons of the CSN to secure an official link with the N.D.P. However, it was not until the fall of 1962, with the approach of the Quebec elections which focussed public attention on the nationalization of hydro-electric power, that the executive of the CSN was ready to make some sort of decision regarding a policy towards parties and politics. The annual CSN convention, held on the weekend of October 13th, 1962, brought matters to a head.

In preparation for the convention, the central council of the CSN, of which Picard was a member, drew up a resolution consisting of four options². It was intended that the CSN should consider each of the four alternatives at the convention itself. The first posed

¹ The FTQ had officially announced its support of the Quebec N.D.P. in September 1961.

² Le Devoir, September 19th, 1962. P. 1.

the question whether the CSN should support a political party at all. The second asked whether the CSN should support nationalization and other socialist policies within Quebec, while the third asked whether the CSN should opt for a policy opposed to both Capitalism and Communism alike but supporting a policy of religious freedoms. The last and fourth option asked whether the CSN should express a preference for social democracy and support the N.D.P.

The CSN at its annual convention came under the personal influence of Jean Marchand who recommended that official support should not be given to any party; rather, the CSN should develop its own political action committees at most levels of organization. Marchand pointed out¹ that this stand would give the executive of the CSN flexibility in a range of political situations. Preference for political parties or particular policies could then be given without the CSN having to commit itself to an official link with any party. Picard had tried to secure an official declaration of support vital for the Quebec N.D.P., but failed. Jean Marchand was subsequently re-elected leader of the CSN by acclamation and the door to the unified support of the Quebec Labour movement was finally closed to the party.

¹ Le Devoir, October 18th, 1962. P. 1.

In a way the reasons for Marchand's decision were not hard to discover. The N.D.P. in the province was neither a cohesive nor an established force. Its reliability as a political instrument was further brought into question by its failure to contest the Quebec provincial elections of that November.

The decision of the party to stay out of the elections was made public by Roméo Mathieu at a press conference held in Montreal on October 26th. Mathieu was reported¹ as saying that the Quebec N.D.P. was unable to conduct a serious campaign because of the party's involvement in preparations for its forthcoming founding convention. Mathieu explained that the draft programme of the Quebec N.D.P. was nearly complete but adjustments had to be made to take into consideration the growing nationalistic pressures within the party.

He was quoted as saying:

Il est fort possible que le congrès (de fondation) donne naissance à un parti autonome... Mais cela n'implique pas que le parti provincial ne collaborera pas avec le N.P.D. fédéral. ²

¹ Le Devoir, October 26th, 1962.

² Ibid.

By not contesting the provincial election, the central issue of which involved an important piece of social legislation, the Quebec N.D.P. publicly advertised its disorganized condition.

As the party moved into 1963, differences within the Provisional Council placed even the protracted task of organizing for a founding convention in jeopardy. The paralysis of endless debates and questioning caused further delay and the March founding convention was again postponed. In April 1963, the federal election was held and the demands of the campaign added a more explicit rationale for the inability to hold a convention.

It was not until a little after the April election that the Provisional Council was able to bring its operations to a close when an orientation convention was finally held at the end of June in order to decide the fate of the party.

Ideological Division within the
Provisional N.D.P. Council (1962-1963)

The gradually widening division within the Quebec Provisional Council during this period was both a cause of immobility and an obstacle to effective political action by the N.D.P.

A particular characteristic of the division was the comparative equality of both sides. These were recognized as the nationalists on the one hand and what was later termed the orthodox or federalists on the other. The evenness of numbers was in itself a cause of indecisiveness because of the democratic framework that had been adopted by the N.D.P. in Quebec since its inception.

In the fall of 1962 the two sides were not clearly separated. The study groups¹ preparing documents for the founding convention had just been set up in the late fall of 1962. It was in the early months of 1963 when some of the more radical formulas of the study groups were discussed at meetings of the Provisional Council that sides were taken and the division became pronounced.

The list on the following page indicates the bi-polarisation of the party as the division deepened.

¹ See footnote, P. 103.

FIGURE III
N.D.P. PROVISIONAL COUNCIL
IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS

| <u>Nationalists</u> | <u>Federalists</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Michel Chartrand* | Jean Robert Ouellet |
| Philippe Vaillancourt (LAS)* | Jean Philip (LAS) |
| Jacques-Victor Morin (LAS)* | Roméo Mathieu (F.S.) (LAS) |
| Jean Gérin-Lajoie | Roger Provost (F.S.) |
| Raymond Legendre* | Louis Laberge |
| Jean Dufresne | Gérard Picard (F.S.) |
| Jean-Claude Lebel* | René Rondou |
| Réginald Boisvert | Noël Perusse |
| Marcel Rioux* | Michael Oliver (F.S.) |
| Jacques Dofny* | Charles Taylor (F.S.) |
| Pierre Vadboncoeur* | Jack Weldon (F.S.)* |
| Jean Couvrette* | John Purdy |
| Emile Boudreau* | Julien Major |
| Gilles Rochette | André Thibodeau |
| Gilles Duguay | |

Fernand Daoust¹ (LAS)*
André L'Heureux¹*

Notes: 1 - At first these were federalist supporters
but increasingly came under the influence
of the nationalists.

(F.S.) - Federal spokesmen at different times.

(LAS) - Past members of the defunct 'Ligue d'Action
Socialiste'.

* - Future members of the 'Conseil Provisoire
du Parti Socialiste du Québec'.

A closer examination of both sides will show that the federalists were either unable or unwilling to coerce dissident nationalist members into an early settlement. On the other hand, the provisional nature of the N.D.P. formation in Quebec favoured the nationalists who were able to consolidate and increase their number in the time available.

The Federalists.

The 1962-1963 period was an exasperating one for the federalists. In other provinces¹ the N.D.P. parties had successfully held founding conventions and particularly in British Columbia and Ontario were playing active roles in provincial legislatures. Much had been done by Quebec federal spokesmen to secure favourable policies towards French Canada while in contrast little had been accomplished by the party in Quebec. The exasperation of the federalists lay in the fact that they were willing to come to terms with the nationalists. However, the nationalist argument was one that developed slowly relying on long, indecisive debate -- until in early 1963 they were in sufficient strength to effect the outcome of a founding convention.

¹ The position of the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan where the party had formed the government excepted.

As far as the federalists were concerned, there was little reason for them to believe, in the fall of 1962, that the party could not be successfully founded the following March. It was true that there had been difficulties but at that time the division of the provisional council was not marked. Furthermore, the federalists could draw on men of influence and standing which was not always the case with the nationalists.

Roméo Mathieu, who was president of the N.D.P. provisional council, was also a N.D.P. federal vice-president apart from holding an important labour post.¹ Roger Provost, President of the FTQ, had also represented Quebec on the national Committee for the New Party and had considerable influence with other members of the N.D.P. from the FTQ. Gérard Picard was federal associate-president of the N.D.P. apart from his senior position in the labour movement.² These were men of experience who held important posts in labour organizations and who had developed a firm connection with the federal party.

An equally important group among the federalists consisted of McGill University professors. Michael Oliver, Federal President of the N.D.P., Jack Weldon, a

¹ Roméo Mathieu was president of the Montreal Labour Council.

² Member of the Central Council of the CSN.

noted economist, as well as Charles Taylor, who was to play a particularly significant role later, all had close contacts with the federal party. They continued a tradition of participation in the Quebec Left that had existed since Professor Frank Scott's first association with the C.C.F. in the thirties. In no sense were the McGill professors merely an intellectual appendage to the Quebec N.D.P. but played an intimate role in the party's affairs.¹

In the fall of 1962 the existence of an ideological division was not viewed as a force that would necessarily split the party. Individuals like Michel Chartrand and Philippe Vaillancourt had a reputation for contrariness and both of them had been put to work to study the prospective party's attitude towards confederation. Others like Pierre Vadboncoeur, Jacques Dofny and Marcel Rioux were able to provide more sophisticated rationales for a radical party. The federalists, however, considered their position flexible enough to contain these demands and believed that there was always a possibility that special

¹ Later, it was a frequent charge of the nationalists that the McGill group was not close enough to issues to understand either the basic problems the party faced or the necessity for a completely separate Quebec party. This view was expressed in a series of interviews conducted with Michel Chartrand, Jacques-Victor Morin and Jean Couvrette in Montreal, February, 1965.

arrangements could be made if agreement could not be reached at the Quebec N.D.P. founding convention.

As the party moved into 1963 the federalists lost their influence over the administrative officers in the Quebec party. Jean-Claude Lebel, as Quebec organizer, had long favoured a nationalist party. Then, André L'Heureux slowly became convinced of the necessity for a separate Quebec party. With the replacement of Roméo Mathieu by Fernand Daoust, as president of the Provisional Council, the complexion of things changed rapidly. The federalists found themselves in a provisional party that was not only presided over by an indecisive leader but staffed by nationalist supporters.

A marked characteristic of the dialogue between the two groups was that their differences were not so great as to provoke a clean break. The French Canadian trade unionists who supported the federalist stand had either developed their position through direct experience with the federal party or through their participation in pan-Canadian labour organizations. The latter was particularly true of those trade union officials from working-class backgrounds whose contact with Canada wide organizations developed a particularly real sense of

pan-Canadianism.¹ However, they also sympathized with the nationalist view. Roméo Mathieu, particularly, had argued forcefully at the federal N.D.P. founding convention in 1961 for full recognition of the French Canadian fact in the federal party's programme and constitution. However, unlike the nationalists, the French Canadian federalists still believed that the 1961 constitution provided the degree of autonomy necessary for the founding of a viable party in Quebec.

It was this position which the nationalists finally would not accept. The federalists, especially the McGill group, pointed out that the N.D.P. provided a suitable instrument for anyone who wished to support an autonomous Quebec social democratic party with structures capable of engendering a truly federal mass party. But rational arguments were not enough to counter what eventually amounted, on the part of the nationalists, to an emotional and individually felt imperative to separate from the N.D.P.

It was this rational response of the federalists which the nationalists termed 'orthodox' that tended to rob their proposals of dynamism.

¹ This view was repeated frequently in this writer's interview with Jean-Robert Ouellet, Montreal, February, 1965.

By the early months of 1963, the federalists were on the defensive. The prestige and influence of their members were in fact turned against them. The following analysis of the nationalist tendency will show how position and influence in the old order were construed by the nationalists as obstacles in the path of a new socialist Quebec.

The Nationalists

A characteristic that had been consistently present with the C.C.F./PSD in Quebec and that was particularly true of the nationalists in the Quebec N.D.P. was their social marginality. The perennial problem of the Left in Quebec was its inability to attract in sufficient numbers the kind of members who would be really useful to it, members who could bring in both money and votes. As it was, the nationalists tended to be individualists without a wide range of contacts. They consisted mainly of trade union officials, two University of Montreal professors¹, a journalist, a printer and a producer for Radio Canada.

¹ Marcel Rioux and Jacques Dofny. Jacques-Yvan Morin, Professor of constitutional law at the University of Montreal, also served on the study group discussing Confederation but he did not attend meetings of the Provisional Council on a regular basis.

In so far as it is possible to estimate the cohesiveness of the nationalists in early 1963, it should be stressed that their position was developed from the union of three complementary groups within the tendency. The first group comprised the radicals from the old C.C.F./PSD of which something has already been said. The second group consisted of the Quebec N.D.P. staff members, like Jean-Claude Lebel and André L'Heureux whose contact with Quebec students was to provide the nationalists with a progressive and dynamic spirit. The third group comprised university professors and independent thinkers, like Pierre Vadboncoeur, who were to articulate both the philosophies and formulas advocating an autonomous Quebec socialist party. It is proposed to examine the contribution of each group in turn.

Philippe Vaillancourt, Jacques-Victor Morin and Michel Chartrand, although individualists, were typical representatives of the radicals from the old C.C.F./PSD days. All of them tended to conceive political action in the terms of a struggle for the right formulas. Both Vaillancourt and Morin had participated in the Ligue d'Action Socialiste and saw in the founding of the N.D.P. in Quebec a perfect opportunity to press for the type of socialist party they had long advocated. Michel Chartrand,

a fiery orator, had supported the federal idea up until 1959 when he underwent a kind of metamorphosis. In the early sixties he became a staunch and vocal advocate of the nationalists, at one time holding a membership in the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN). Chartrand was impressed by the vitality of student movements and some of his speeches before audiences at the University of Montreal in early 1963 gave the federalists special cause for concern.

His interest in the nationalist student movements was shared by Jean-Claude Lebel who, as Quebec organizer, saw in the turbulent French-Canadian youth a tremendous potential for support. Both Lebel and André L'Heureux¹ became embroiled in the politics of the University of Montreal milieu which lent a particular urgency to their views. The switch of André L'Heureux to the nationalist camp in the early months of 1963 represented a turning point in the dialogue with the federalists. The sense of dynamism that the Lebel-L'Heureux group contributed to meetings of the Provisional Council appealed to other nationalists who thought of themselves at the forefront of radical socialist thinking in Quebec. The University

¹ André L'Heureux was transferred from the Ottawa staff to the Quebec N.D.P. He had at one time worked with the National Federation of Canadian University Students. (N.F.C.U.S.).

of Montreal environment was in a sense a meeting point between the third group, comprised of professors and other intellectuals, and the younger staff members of the Provisional Council. For this reason alone brief mention of political activity at the University during this period should be made.

Few disagree that the University was a centre of revolutionary and nationalist activity during the 1962-1963 academic session. Most party members took pride in the fact that the N.D.P. comprised the government in the University of Montreal model parliament, others were not so pleased when the first pronouncement of this body called for a separate Quebec party. During this period pamphlets and papers circulated among the students went in and out of vogue on a weekly basis while the atmosphere was charged with questioning relating to the viability of the Canadian Confederation.

At a higher level Marcel Rioux, Jacques Dofny and Jacques-Yvan Morin were faculty members at the University of Montreal and also members of the Socialist 'Club Jacques Perreault'¹. Almost certainly they must

¹ A university club named in memory of Jacques Perreault, who was a French Canadian Socialist and a past president of the PSD.

have been in close contact with what was going on among the student body at large and this obviously influenced their thinking. However, as a group within the nationalist wing, they were responsible for articulating the ideas of the whole camp. Jacques-Yvan Morin, through his work on the study group on Confederation, gave a legal and constitutional framework to the study paper on forms for associated states. Pierre Vadboncoeur developed an ideological basis for the nationalist tendency in a document entitled, 'Le Rendez-vous historique entre le nationalisme et le socialisme'. Through this text both a sense of mission and particularism was imparted. The paper expounded the thesis that socialism could only hope to succeed in Quebec because it was in French Canada that it was able to join forces with nationalism. The fact that this union was to take place at a particular point in time was an important one. All the members of the group, early in 1963, paid close attention to nationalist activity in Quebec, especially in Montreal, attempting to judge the critical moment in the nationalist upsurge to make their bid for a separate socialist party.

Consequently, nationalist activity, criticism of the party by journalists and the general tenor of the Montreal scene were subjects of daily discussion and debate by the nationalists within the Provisional Council of the N.D.P.

Criticism of the N.D.P. in Montreal
(1962-1963)

The fall of 1962 until the summer of 1963 was a period of vocal, urgent and also revolutionary nationalist activity in Montreal. November saw the Donald Gordon affair, April the bombing of the Sherbrooke Street army recruitment centre and May the Westmount mail box bombings. At the same time the academic session (1962-1963) at the University of Montreal was one of increased student activity with more intense questioning of the direction in which the new Quebec was developing.

Although these events received much publicity in the press, an examination of a selection of Montreal newspapers during the period reveals little comment on the N.D.P. in Quebec. Criticism that did appear in the late summer of 1962 was mainly circuitous. Much was made of the medicare situation in Saskatchewan. Articles¹ that appeared in Le Devoir and La Presse during the week of July 12th generally pointed out the necessity for maintaining individual rights in the face of centralized socialism.

Throughout the fall the N.D.P. seemingly lay low, grappling with its own difficulties. The decision

¹ Le Devoir, La Presse, July 12th, 13th and 20th, 1962.

of the party not to contest the provincial elections in November further removed it from journalistic comment.

Early in 1963, as the division in the party widened, there was a curious repeat performance of the sending of an open letter by the nationalists within the Quebec N.D.P. to the Montreal press.¹ This letter², like its predecessor, criticized an editorial by Noël Perusse in the FTQ organ, Le Monde Ouvrier, for making public the existence of a division within the provisional N.D.P. and for taking the liberty in calling upon union members to band together to prevent a split in the party. The letter stated:

L'article pressait des ouvriers syndiqués
d'adhérer en masse au N.P.D. et d'y peser
de toute leur influence pour ne pas engendrer
'un monstre' dans lequel ils ne se reconnaîtront
plus ... Noël Perusse, faisait vraisemblablement
allusion à tendance très forte au sein du parti
N.P.D. québécois, qui veut détacher entièrement
du N.P.D. fédéral. ³

¹ On June 6th, 1961, an open letter had appeared in Le Devoir by nearly the same signatories criticizing an editorial of Noël Perusse in Le Monde Ouvrier. The letter objected to the liberties taken by Perusse in stating that all Union Leaders were diametrically opposed to separatism. See P. 55.

² Le Devoir, January 7th, 1963. Included among the signatories were Réginald Boisvert, Michel Chartrand, Michel Forest, Jacques-Victor Morin, Jacques-Yvan Morin, Marcel Rioux, Gilles Rochette and Pierre Vadboncoeur.

³ Ibid.

The nationalists in sending the letter, were anxious to crush any counter attacks that might weaken their position.

The approach of the federal election and the opening of the campaign in early 1963 led to speeches by N.D.P. party spokesmen. These were generally well received in Le Devoir continuing a trend that had been started in 1962. A particular speech given by Mr. Douglas in Toronto, calling for a Confederation Council to examine Canada's constitutional problems did not go unnoticed in Montreal, even though it was delivered in Toronto. In fact André Laurendeau commended it to the public's attention for careful study. He wrote:

Saluons au départ ce conseil de la confédération que projette le N.P.D., M. Douglas a eu la coquetterie d'en lancer l'idée en plein Toronto, c'est-à-dire au coeur du Canada anglophone. Cette idée mérite un examen attentif... ¹

Three days later in another editorial² Mr. Laurendeau appraised the electoral prospects of the N.D.P. pointing out the narrowness of its base and the lack of cohesion in the Quebec party.

¹ Le Devoir, March 2nd, 1963. (Editorial).

² Le Devoir, March 5th, 1963. (Editorial).

Federal N.D.P. spokesmen in this period now appreciated the ease with which ideas and statements could be distorted in certain quarters of the Montreal Press. They were therefore careful not to present anything that could be misinterpreted. The Montreal press at large, having little to seize upon, gave the N.D.P. the normal factual coverage commensurate with the party's standing. In addition, there was the fact that the N.D.P. had been planning a founding convention for the Quebec party for such a long while that interest in this particular eventuality had waned. The more nationalistic elements in the press had witnessed the opening of the ideological division within the provisional party and for them it was still a matter of waiting for the nationalist party which they advocated to be founded.

In spite of increased nationalistic activity on the Montreal scene in the 1962-1963 period, there was not the same critical relationship with certain elements of the Montreal press that had been a characteristic of the previous year. The Quebec N.D.P. was neither new enough to the scene nor close enough to the mainstream of politics to be of great news value. It was not until after the 1963 federal election, when the party split that the story of the inner turmoil within the N.D.P. appeared in print.

Synopsis of the N.D.P.
1963 Federal Election Campaign

Having to face a second federal election after a breathing space of just under a year was one of the more debilitating occupational hazards to confront the N.D.P. It was an event for which the Quebec N.D.P. especially did not have adequate resources.

The federal party had emerged from the 1962 campaign with an empty treasury and was to come out of the 1963 campaign in debt.

Aware that it had not contested the 1962 general election with full operational efficiency, the federal party began an early review of its condition. Questions relating to federal party organization and finances received a candid examination during the summer of 1962. On the weekend of July 21st to 22nd a special sub-committee on organization met in Kingston. The federal executives and representatives from the C.L.C. gathered to discuss party organization and the question of union affiliations.

In the fall of 1962 a major council meeting was held from September 29th to 30th in Ottawa and reports on provincial regrouping were heard. In October Mr. T.C. Douglas was elected in Burnaby-Coquitlam, Erhart Regier

having been appointed Western Organizer in August after he had vacated his seat. As the year ended the prospect of an April election became a reality and the party set about launching its campaign even though funds were extremely low.

On February 7th an important campaign meeting was held in Ottawa and the federal party completed its election plans. As in 1962, Tommy Douglas travelled prodigiously concentrating in his speeches on medicare, family allowances, education, pensions and economic growth. The N.D.P. naturally tended to place more emphasis on its platform than any other party, generally concentrating its efforts on fighting the Liberals and winning over the urban voter.

A particularly significant speech relating to Quebec was given by Mr. Douglas during the campaign, surprisingly enough in Toronto, in the heart of English Canada. On February 28th, 1963, Mr. Douglas called for a 'Confederation Council' to study questions which threatened to divide the country. Although the speech was a continuation of the N.D.P.'s approach to co-operative federalism, it tended to confuse English Canadians. The Liberal party had finally adopted the idea of a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in December 1962 and Douglas' new proposal for a more permanent body forced the pace considerably.

In his speech Douglas stressed the following points:

... The separatist movements of Quebec are the peaks of an iceberg of discontent. The part of the iceberg that floats above the water catches our attention; but the great mass below the surface must be our real concern ... I believe we need an additional agency at the federal level - one which is made up of equal numbers of French and English-speaking Canadians; a Confederation Council, as it might be called, which would study and discuss those questions which, if allowed to remain unanswered, can divide Canada ... ¹

Spokesmen for the Quebec N.D.P. like Michael Oliver, Gérard Picard and Charles Taylor had given detailed reports of the situation in their province at federal council meetings. The proposal for a 'Confederation Council' represented a continued attempt to put life into the N.D.P.'s policy of co-operative federalism.

On April 1st in Montreal, Douglas made another speech calculated to appeal to those who supported a strong independent provincial role in government. He said that the N.D.P., if elected, would immediately institute a forty to sixty percent sharing of direct taxes with the provinces to move to fifty percent at the rate of one percent a year.

¹ Extract from an address by T.C. Douglas, Malvern Collegiate, Toronto, February 28th, 1963.

In spite of the complete extension of the N.D.P.'s financial and organizational resources the election results were not particularly dramatic. The Liberals gained 129 seats the Progressive Conservatives 95, the Social Credit 24 and the N.D.P. 17 seats.¹ In terms of the popular vote the Liberals obtained 42 percent, the Conservatives 33, the Social Credit 12 and the N.D.P. 13 percent.

As far as the election in Quebec was concerned the campaign conducted by the provisional N.D.P. was a more energetic repetition of the previous 1962 campaign. However, administrative weakness¹ still plagued the party and although Jean-Claude Lebel and André L'Heureux accomplished the task of fielding sixty candidates these were generally

¹ Reports of Chief Electoral Officer, Ottawa, 1963.

² During the 1962-1963 period there was an inefficient working relationship between Michel Forest, Gilles Rochette and André L'Heureux, who all assisted in the paper work. Members were intended to be organized in geographical clubs, non-geographical clubs and constituency associations. An informed source has stated that at this time and at an earlier period, newly enrolled members frequently did not receive their membership cards etc..., after they had mailed in completed application forms. A follow up function seemed totally lacking. The price for this was paid during the campaign when the Quebec N.D.P. was unable to draw on a large pool of volunteer workers.

not supported by adequate teams of volunteer workers. The same key factors of lack of time, money and organizers came into play again in this election.

The financial situation was especially critical because of the pressure on the federal party. It was hoped that the Quebec party would have been able to become financially independent of the federal party but this never occurred. Financial support was expected from the FTQ but this failed to materialize in spite of the fact that Roger Provost of the FTQ emphasized in his contacts with the press that the federation was behind the Quebec N.D.P. As has already been pointed out, the Quebec party was also unable to raise funds through the means of an official link with the CSN. It was the federal party then which provided the funds for the campaign in Quebec, in the end contributing substantially more than in 1962.¹

Generally, a more extensive and energetic campaign was launched by the Quebec N.D.P. in 1963, although in comparison with the other parties electioneering was conducted on a shoestring budget. It was realized in some circles within the Provisional Council that there

¹ Apart from direct grants and providing the salaries of the key staff members, the federal party instigated a Canada wide drive to raise funds from constituency associations for the campaign in Quebec.

was an acute shortage of both personalities¹ and leaders. To help meet this need Gérard Picard was appointed associate N.D.P. leader and head of the provisional party on February 25th². However, Picard lacked the exceptional fire³ and appeal that was necessary to carry the party and draw support in Quebec. With the campaign centered on the island of Montreal the Quebec party ran directly against the well organized Liberal party and failed to win a seat in the province. In other areas there was again still competition from the Créditistes.

The reasons for lack of support for the N.D.P. in Quebec stemmed from a chronic shortage of funds, weakness in organization, the absence of a dynamic leader and lack of time. To this list should be added the internal ideological division which the demands of campaigning barely managed to smooth over. It was highly questionable whether a party that could not even support itself could hope to gain popular support.

¹ It was hoped that P.E. Trudeau would accept the candidacy in the riding of Papineau but after some consideration he declined.

² Le Devoir, February 26th, 1963. Michael Oliver in a burst of enthusiasm was also reported as saying in the same edition that Gérard Picard would be to Tommy Douglas what Georges-Etienne Cartier and Ernest Lapointe were to Sir John A. MacDonald and Mackenzie King.

³ The state of Gérard Picard's health was a considerable handicap to him.

The efforts made by federal spokesmen from Quebec to continue to work out a basic and realistic policy towards French Canada, as part of the N.D.P. election platform, did not stop the endless and time consuming ideological discussions within the Quebec party. Nonetheless such spokesmen were still anxious to adopt a position in the election campaign which would have the backing of the whole Provisional Council. In this regard it is a debatable point whether the attempt to strike the right chords in Quebec contributed more to internal ideological crises than to the gaining of the commonplace vote.

Summary.

The Quebec N.D.P. in the weakness of its operations, its internal discord and its ineffectiveness at the polls had reached an impasse.

The failure to gain a single seat in Quebec after contesting both federal elections was a crushing rejection that required detailed self-examination. A confrontation between the nationalists and the federalists within the party was inevitable, the chance of a reconciliation still seemed attainable, although the possibility of a split was more likely.

CHAPTER VII

THE SPLIT OF THE QUEBEC N.D.P. AT THE ORIENTATION CONVENTION.

Preparations and Papers.

Once the election campaign was over, the degree of working cohesion which the event had provided disappeared. The nationalists pressed for and federalists accepted the fact that some kind of orientation convention had to be held before the party could be successfully founded.

The study groups that had been set up in the fall of 1962 took advantage of the lull after the 1963 election to revise¹ their papers before submitting them to what were to be the three main convention sub-committees; namely Committee 'A' - Socialism and Planning; Committee 'B' - Federalism and the State of Quebec; Committee 'C' - Structure, Organization, Strategy and Finances of the party to be founded.

¹ Minutes of the meeting of the N.D.P. Provisional Council held at the Association of Machinists, Montreal, May 9th, 1963. Fernand Daoust, Emile Boudreau and André L'Heureux undertook the organization of the convention. Certain administrative changes were also made. Gilles Rochette was appointed secretary, Jean-Claude Lebel was admitted to the executive committee and André L'Heureux was given the title of 'Organizer'. At this time Robert Cliche, prospective N.D.P. leader, became associated with the N.D.P. and began attending meetings. Shortly after, on his own initiative, he joined the party.

On June 3rd, 1963, the congrès d'orientation was announced and all party members and members affiliated through unions were invited to attend as delegates. The official announcement explained the purpose of the convention like this:

The Provisional Council convenes the members in order to orientate the policy of the Party in accordance with the opinion of the militants. Since the party confronts basic problems, it is necessary before the Founding Convention, to consult the membership. ... 1

It was also announced that the general subject of party orientation would be divided into three separate areas as delineated by the three convention committees. The working papers for the convention would be categorized under the headings of "Socialism and Planning", "Federalism and the State of Quebec" and "Structure, Organization and Financing of the Party".

The content of these working papers was the clearest indication to the federalists that a hard struggle was ahead. There were exceptions. Among the documents under "Socialism and Planning" a technical and objective paper² on "Economic Planning" was clearly

¹ Quebec N.D.P. Convention Call, June 3rd, 1963.

² This paper was the result of work by professors Jack Weldon, Pierre Harvey, Jacques Dofny and Jacques Henripin. "Planification économique" became document no. A-1 at the orientation convention.

different from those papers which embodied the ideas of the nationalists. Another paper for consideration by the same sub-committee was entitled, "Que veut le socialisme?"¹ This document generally denigrated foreign ownership and control of industry and stressed the importance of building a socialist society in Quebec.

The papers on "Federalism and the State of Quebec" provided a good opportunity for the expression of the ideas of the nationalists. The first more moderate paper² on the Canadian Confederation put forward twenty propositions that the N.D.P. should support. Based on the premise that a "Nouveau pacte fédératif" could be negotiated in 1967 the text recommended that the preamble to the new settlement should refer to two nations and recognize their right to self-determination. Other propositions included the rejection of the Fulton amendment formula, the establishment of provincial banks, complete provincial jurisdiction over education as well as provincial control over the law courts. This document also called

¹ "Que veut le socialisme?", document no. A-2.

² "La confédération," document no. B-1.

for equal recognition of both languages across the country and a reworking of federal-provincial tax arrangements. The paper still placed its faith in co-operative federalism and included proposals with which the majority of party members would probably have been expected to agree. As far as the nationalists were concerned it was less than a minimum.

The second document¹ entitled "Confédération et état du Québec" was more extreme. It contained some nineteen proposals set within professor Jacques-Yvan Morin's scheme for an associated state. The paper called for a separate constitution for the state of Quebec. It stipulated that the federal governmental institutions should reflect the two nations comprising the new federation with the State of Quebec having an equal say in determining both the form and the representation of these bodies. Another radical proposal suggested the abolition of the post of Lieutenant-Governor through the creation of the post of President who would be appointed by the Quebec government. Legal innovations called for a new federal court to handle litigation between the English provinces and the State

¹ "Confédération et état du Québec", document no. B-2, prepared by Michel Chartrand, Jacques-Yvan Morin and André L'Heureux.

of Quebec. Characteristically, the court would be staffed by three judges from the State of Quebec and three other judges. From here it was a short step to advocating jurisdiction by the State of Quebec over criminal as well as civil law and all matters relating to the administration of justice. Culture, the arts, radio and television, social security, transport and communications as well as control over financial affairs were to be ceded to the State of Quebec. In sum, this paper on 'Confédération et état du Québec' was completely unacceptable for the federalists within the party.

Working papers gathered together under the category of the "Structure, Organization and Financing of the Party" were to give the federalists special cause for exasperation. The first paper entitled "Parti à fonder" supposedly represented the three fundamental choices that confronted the N.D.P. regarding its structure. The sub-committee on "Structures, Organization and Financing of the Party" was asked to choose between the following options:

1. Le statu quo: Section provinciale du Nouveau parti démocratique du Canada (avec ou sans modifications).
2. Deux partis: 2.1) Aile québécoise du NPD responsable exclusivement de la politique fédérale.

2.2) Parti indépendant avec
juridiction provinciale.

3. Parti Socialiste québécois responsable des
affaires fédérales et provinciales. ¹

The same document stated that the first option was opposed by a majority within the Provisional N.D.P. Council although there were some, (i.e. the federalists), who felt the first option was workable if amendments to the federal N.D.P. constitution were made.

Evidence of nationalist bias in the compilation of this document was clear. Those on the N.D.P. administrative staff and those who were making the preparations for the orientation convention were invariably members of the nationalist camp. The reference to the 'Section provinciale du Nouveau Parti Démocratique' in the first option of the document and the mention of 'Aile québécoise du NPD'² in the second option, represented an attempt to discredit the federalist argument before it was launched. The mere fact that the federalist position was regarded as the status quo, which by this time had reduced practically everybody to despair, seemed to pin the blame for the party's paralysis on the federalists.

¹ "Parti à fonder", document no. C-1.

² Ibid.

There is little doubt that the presentation of these three options for structures for the prospective party excluded an accurate statement of the federalists' recommendations. What the nationalists had done of course was to equate the first option with the unfavourable view that everyone held of the old centralist C.C.F./PSD structure.

The second document in this area was entitled the "Rapport Perusse-Legault au comité des statuts et des structures du parti".¹ This paper attempted in a highly impressionistic and not unamusing way to calculate the disadvantages and advantages of the previous structural options. Written from the point of view of the FTQ, the paper had a strong federal bias.

The third paper by Pierre Vadboncoeur expounded his earlier thesis concerning the complementary nature of socialism and nationalism in Quebec. In this text, "Dix-sept propositions sur un problème crucial de la gauche québécoise"², Vadboncoeur stressed that the founding of a Quebec N.D.P. would kill socialism in Quebec and prejudice the chances of socialism in

¹ Listed as document C-2.

² Listed as document C-4.

Canada. It was perhaps the most forceful statement of aims put forward by the nationalist tendency based on the convergence of nationalism and socialism in Quebec. Members of the nationalist tendency were attracted by the bold, vigorous generalizations which argued the necessity for an autonomous Quebec socialist party. The appeal was direct. It admitted no compromise, it united nationalism and socialism, it was a formula for action and it was just what the nationalists had been endlessly searching for.

The other papers in this section rather paled beside this document. The fourth paper,¹ prepared by the nationalists outlined a fairly traditional constitution for a new socialist party. The fifth,² entitled "Orientation du parti" described the general attitude which an independent Quebec socialist party should adopt towards federalism. Both these documents referred to an autonomous Parti Socialiste du Québec as if it was the only and inevitable solution to the present difficulties.

¹ "Proposition relative à la constitution d'un conseil provisoire du Parti Socialiste du Québec", document no. C-4. This was prepared by the nationalists.

² "Orientation du parti", document no. C-5, this also was prepared by the nationalists.

It was perhaps unavoidable that the working papers drawn up for the orientation convention should reflect the thinking of the nationalist group. The nationalists were not only drawn towards the preparation of political formulas by predilection but it was they who had pressed for a complete and detailed revamping of the party's orientation. With the N.D.P. staff in the nationalist camp, it was no accident that some of the members whom they had recently recruited, and who were to be present at the orientation convention as delegates, should share their nationalist views. It was not that the orientation convention was 'packed' rather that the balance between the two tendencies in the N.D.P. Provisional Council had been upset. The federalists had allowed the administration of the party to drift almost unchecked.

Both the preparations and papers made and compiled for the orientation conference generally reflected nationalist bias. However, it was difficult to calculate whether the nationalists were more concerned with redirecting the N.D.P. or forming a separate Quebec socialist party. Many were probably drawn by the prospect of one great argument to end all the smaller debates.

Nationalist Journalists and
the Orientation Convention.

Journalists like Jean-Marc Léger and Jean Fournier had closely followed the widening rift in the Quebec N.D.P. and the arrangements that were being made for the congrès d'orientation. Their almost personal involvement followed a tradition that Norman Webster summed up in the following way:

Journalists in Quebec, to be more precise the French-language ones, are more than mere recorders of facts. Their coverage of events contains more comment, opinion and personal selection than is common in English-language reporting.¹

It should also be pointed out that editorial writers for Le Devoir enjoyed a long tradition of independence. Thus the views and interpretations of more nationalistic writers could take virtually equal place with more moderate opinions.

In the week leading up to the orientation convention a number of interviews were conducted by Jean-Marc Léger and were printed in Le Devoir. Léger in an interesting dialectical fashion held three separate conversations; first with Marcel Rioux, second with Gérard Picard and third with André L'Heureux.

¹ The Globe and Mail, May 1st, 1965. (Editorial).

Rioux put the case for the nationalists, Picard presented the federalists argument, while L'Heureux supposedly represented the synthesis, reaffirming the nationalists case after a long personal struggle with federalist contradictions.

The prospect of the founding of both a socialist and nationalist party in Quebec was something in which Léger took a keen interest. The interview with Marcel Rioux was published on Wednesday, June 26th. Rioux described the development of the nationalist tendency within the Quebec N.D.P. and listed the three fundamental choices¹ that the convention would have to make. However, Rioux was prepared to admit that the new Quebec socialist party which would have to be founded would still be close to the N.D.P. He was reported as saying:

Nous de la gauche nationale posons au départ que de tous les partis fédéraux, le NPD, est celui avec lequel nous avons les meilleures chances de nous entendre et de coopérer parce qu'il a été le premier à admettre au moins en théorie l'existence au Canada de deux nations distinctes et égales et parce qu'ils s'alimentent à des conceptions non pas réellement socialistes mais relativement socialisantes. ²

¹ These appeared in document C-1.

² Le Devoir, Wednesday, June 26th, 1963.

It appeared that from what Marcel Rioux had said in the interview there was little doubt as to the outcome of the orientation convention.

Gérard Picard in his interview the following day was quick to react to Léger's accusation that he was the puppet of the federal N.D.P. He reportedly said:

Je suis de ceux que nos camarades de la 'gauche nationale' qualifient 'd'orthodoxes' mais ils tendent à caricaturer notre position. Il est absolument faux de dire que nous souhaitons simplement former une section québécoise provinciale du NPD ou que nous acceptons de soumettre le programme du parti québécois au parti fédéral.¹

Picard went on to say that the federalists realized that important changes were necessary but there was no reason why these could not be obtained by a few amendments in the federal N.D.P. constitution. He pointed out that the N.D.P. conception of forms for provincial parties was flexible enough to contain an autonomous Quebec party with a distinctive programme and constitution. He added that continued co-operation with the federal party was vital if it were hoped to develop a new and meaningful form of federalism. As far as the name that the new Quebec party should adopt,

¹ Le Devoir, Thursday, June 27th, 1963.

Picard was not particular. He was reported as saying:

Je n'ai pas d'objection à ce que le parti
choisisse un autre nom que celui du NPD
à ce qu'il se nomme par exemple 'Parti
Socialiste du Québec'.¹

In the interviewing of André L'Heureux, Jean-Marc Léger was quick to point out the difficulties experienced by L'Heureux who had had the task of arranging the orientation convention, which would presumably lead to the split of the party, while he was still on the federal N.D.P. payroll. Jean-Marc Léger appraised the position of the associate-secretary in the following way:

André L'Heureux remplit avec courage et
un certain bonheur cette tâche délicate,
en conservant son franc parler et en ne
faisant pas mystère de son option
personnelle dans les vifs débats au cours.²

At this time, on the eve of the orientation convention, L'Heureux was fully behind the nationalists although his statement of his position never seemed to be particularly clear. He was reported as saying:

Le parti doit faire les options décisives
et trouver un langage s'il veut compter
dans le Québec. ³

¹ Ibid

² Le Devoir, Friday, June 28th, 1963.

³ Ibid.

L'Heureux's handling of this 'tâche délicate'¹ as described by Jean-Marc Léger, contributed to the ambiguity of his position. For quite a time both the nationalists and the federalists within the N.D.P. Provisional Council had believed him to be within their ranks. Then the federalists slowly became aware that André L'Heureux had drifted into the nationalist camp while at the same time they woke up to the fact that the administrative and organizational machinery of the Quebec N.D.P. was under the control of the nationalists. By then effective remedial action was impossible.

Jean-Marc Léger in summarizing these interviews emphasized a point concerning the nationalists that had already occurred to others. He showed that people like L'Heureux, whose father had been editor of Le Droit, came from essentially 'middle class' backgrounds. Examining the whole nationalist group, it was seen that a goodly number could not be generally labelled as 'working class'. Léger speculated that the middle class backgrounds of most of the nationalists

¹ Op. cit.

was a healthy sign for the likelihood of future widespread appeal for the new socialist party.

Reviewing the work of the two nationalist journalists it is no exaggeration to say that they had effectively set the scene for the congrès d'orientation scheduled to take place that weekend. Both Jean-Marc Léger and Jean-Pierre Fournier were to follow this up by comprising the journalistic team from Le Devoir assigned to cover the orientation convention.

From the tone of the week's press interviews there was every indication that a split would take place. It seemed that all had been arranged in advance.

The Split at the Orientation Convention June 29th - 30th, 1963

About a hundred delegates gathered in the Plateau Auditorium in Montreal on Saturday, June 29th, to decide the fate of the N.D.P. in Quebec.

The opening plenary session began with procedural, routine work as the three convention sub-committees were established. As described earlier the committees

consisted of the following:

Committee 'A' - Socialism and Economic Planning

Committee 'B' - Federalism and the State of Quebec

Committee 'C' - Structure, Organization, Strategy
and Finances of the party to be
founded.

The first plenary session on Saturday morning was concluded by Fernand Daoust, President of the N.D.P. Provisional Council, with a short address. Daoust described the ideological difficulties that the party had experienced in the previous year and the sundry postponements of the Quebec N.D.P. founding convention.

In the afternoon the various sub-committees met. The most heated discussions took place in sub-committee 'C', where the party's orientation was being discussed and this was probably to be expected. It has already been stressed that the working papers for this sub-committee were more radical and embodied more nationalist bias than the agendas of the other sub-committees. Jean-Claude Lebel acted as secretary for this sub-committee and about a hundred delegates were present.

Those present were first asked to consider the three options confronting the party.¹ At the same time

¹ Document no. C-1.

Pierre Vadboncoeur made a lengthy statement, ostensibly to make the options clear to the committee, but also embodying most of the ideas contained in his "Dix-sept propositions sur un problème crucial de la gauche québécoise"¹. Vadboncoeur, by combining socialism and nationalism made the option for a separate Quebec socialist party an emotional imperative.

Next, Emile Boudreau acting out of turn submitted a motion from the floor, the principles of which were embodied in the fifth document² for consideration by the committee, entitled "Orientation du parti". After calling for a new Confederation that would recognize the right of Canada's two nations to self-determination, the document contained the following resolution:

En conséquence, le présent Congrès déclare solennellement que le Parti Socialiste du Québec est libre de tout assujettissement à quelque parti politique que ce soit, tant sur la scène provinciale que sur la scène fédérale. Il préconisera, par son programme et par ses candidats, une politique de

¹ Document no. C-3.

² Document no. C-5. (This document has already been described. See P. 138).

socialisme démocratique. Il tentera de former le gouvernement de l'Etat du Québec et il présentera des candidats aux élections fédérales, tant sous la présente Constitution que sous une constitution rénovée ou re-négociée. ¹

In other words the Boudreau resolution, which was to occupy much convention time, was a clear call for a separate Quebec social-democratic party that would occupy both federal and provincial fields. This position represented the third, and in the eyes of the federalists, the most radical of the three options² before the committee.

By this time the federalists had full cause for annoyance. Their position was completely misrepresented by the first option entitled the 'status quo' which was nothing less than the old C.C.F./PSD position. Jean-Robert Ouellet entered the fray and secured the passage of a motion which would delay a vote on the Boudreau resolution. Ouellet was followed by Roméo Mathieu who tried to distribute and introduce as a motion a paper entitled, "Structures du Nouveau Parti Démocratique du Québec et amendements à la

¹ Ibid.

² Document no. C-1.

constitution fédérale du NPD"¹. The order of the agenda was actually on Mathieu's side but this document, clearly in opposition to the Boudreau resolution, was shelved for later consideration.

Debate now became passionate and explosive. Ouellet attempted to secure drastic amendments to the Boudreau motion in order to change the name of the new Quebec Socialist Party to the "N.D.P. of Quebec". This was ruled out of order and the subsequent vote on the Ouellet amendment was defeated shortly after the appearance of some younger delegates who came in from another committee.

After the vote against the Ouellet amendment Professor Michael Oliver demanded to know the actual numbers. The margin was a narrow one. Forty-nine voted against any amendment to the Boudreau motion, forty-seven voted in favour of amendment. It was a nervous moment for the nationalists and a reflection on their powers of organization that after months of agitation they could only produce a majority of two. For the federalists there was only exasperation. Led by Michael Oliver, the federal spokesmen including Mathieu, Laberge

¹ This document was actually intended as an appendix to document no. C-1.

and Ouellet walked out. Committee 'C' shortly after adjourned its work having accepted the Boudreau resolution for submission to the convention by a hair's breadth.

That evening Jean-Claude Lebel chaired the plenary session. In front of the delegates was a document¹ relating to the constitution of a provisional council for the new Parti Socialiste du Québec. The paper was a straight forward recommendation for a routine structure and passed easily. By this time few people openly objected to the name 'PSQ' but the federalists must have had to exercise much self-control under this sort of pressure.

Michel Chartrand then took the chair for the remainder of Saturday evening's plenary session reading a document on "The Aims of Socialism"² and another entitled "Manifesto for a Quebec Socialist Party". The second paper had been slipped in at the last moment but both were shunted through the plenary session by an exhuberant Chartrand.

At this stage Chartrand found himself under attack by both Vadboncoeur and Ouellet. Pierre Vadboncoeur

¹ In fact, document no. C-4 which was not discussed by Committee 'C'.

² Document A-2.

attacked the 'high flown' language of the manifesto which he may or may not have construed as bourgeois presumption. When Vadboncoeur moved that the manifesto be submitted to the new Provisional Council of the PSQ, Chartrand ruled him out of order. Ouellet attacked both Chartrand and Vadboncoeur for their nationalism and procedural quibblings. By all accounts¹ the evening's plenary session was heated, confused and for the federalists demoralizing.

Writing in the next edition of Le Devoir Jean-Marc Léger almost relished the heated pattern of events of that Saturday. He wrote:

Ferveur, passion et confusion, voilà sans
doute les mots qui résument le mieux
l'atmosphère de ces jours de débats ...
Samedi, ce fut, dans les commissions, la
victoire de la gauche nationale. 2

If the nationalists felt elated at the start of the Sunday morning plenary session their feelings were certainly not shared by the federalists. With Jean-Claude Lebel again in the chair sundry amendments were proposed to the Boudreau resolution. Arguments then

¹ This section is based on interviews with Michel Chartrand, Jean Couvrette and Jean-Robert Ouellet, (Montreal, February, 1965) and conversations with Michael Oliver and Charles Taylor; also Cf. The eyewitness account of Mel Doig whose article "The N.D.P. Congress of Orientation in Quebec", appeared in The Marxist Quarterly. No. 7. Fall, 1963.

² Le Devoir, Tuesday, July 2nd, 1963.

raged back and forth. Lebel attacked the hypocrisy of anti-nationalists and centralists. Ouellet criticized those separatists who were breaking up the N.D.P. Picard expressed his pan-Canadianism when he was reported as declaring, 'Mon pays, c'est le Canada'.¹ Chartrand hit back, attacking the traditional centralism of the C.C.F. and N.D.P.

The contortions of the morning's plenary session involving amendment and counter amendment are best left unravelled. What was significant was that the nationalists later adopted a Boudreau resolution so amended that it really conformed to the second option in the paper "Parti à fonder", document no. C-1.² André Thibodeau had managed to have an amendment tacked on to the already amended resolution which stipulated that the proposed PSQ would leave the federal field in Quebec open to the N.D.P.

Jean-Pierre Fournier in the next edition of Le Devoir put the acceptance of the Thibodeau amendment down to a change of heart among the nationalists.

¹ Op. cit. P. 57.

² In other words the N.D.P. would contest the federal field in Quebec and the PSQ, the provincial field. See Pp. 135-136.

He wrote:

En comité plénier, le lendemain matin (Sunday) la fraction 'nationaliste' appréhendant une scission, a subitement retraité... Quelques instants plus tard le congrès s'est rallié à fort majorité à la solution médiane. ¹

In contrast, Jean-Marc Léger in his coverage of the events of the same day would not subscribe to a nationalist concession and instead depicted a federalist counter offensive. He wrote:

Mais dimanche, la tendance conservatrice ou fédéraliste NPD, ayant reçu le renfort de quelques tenors et battu le rappel de ses troupes, passait à la contre offensive et la menait habilement. ²

The afternoon plenary session saw both long and fruitless attempts at refining sections of the already completely changed Boudreau resolution, now a resolution which more accurately represented the second fundamental option. But these were passing details and a settlement had in fact already been tacitly reached. It was understood that, for the time being, the N.D.P. would continue to represent Quebec federally, while the PSQ would operate as the provincial party.

¹ Le Devoir, Tuesday, July 2nd, 1963.

² Ibid.

As the afternoon wore on lethargy over the endless details was suddenly dispelled by the prospect of nominations for the provisional councils of the N.D.P. and the new PSQ. When the realities of the split became apparent tempers flared again. The nationalists left the main auditorium en masse. The federalists and other remaining N.D.P. members now gathered at the back of the Plateau Hall and viewed for the first time the nucleus of a Quebec social democratic party without the radical element.

When the nominating began both Thérèse Casgrain and Michael Oliver declined. Jean-Robert Ouellet, Gérard Picard, Robert Cliche, Roméo Mathieu, Charles Taylor, Roger Provost, André Thibodeau and others¹ were elected to the new N.D.P. Provisional Council.

In another part of the building the nationalists were busy electing their PSQ Provisional Council. Fernand Daoust, Jean-Claude Lebel and Jack Weldon² were elected vice presidents of this body. André L'Heureux

¹ Also included were Mrs. Jean Chapman, Julien Major, L. Chateaufneuf, E. Noreck, H. Krashinsky and R. Maione.

² Professor Jack Weldon's position constitutes an amusing anomaly. Some sources report that he arrived late and walked through the wrong door. Others say that he joined the PSQ so that a friendly link could be maintained with the N.D.P.

and Jean Couvrette constituted the PSQ administrative staff while Pierre Vadboncoeur, J.P. Gagnon, Michel Forest, Emile Boudreau, Marcel Rioux¹ and Raymond Legendre were elected PSQ council members. The split was complete. Two parallel parties had been formed. The N.D.P. would occupy the federal field in Quebec, the PSQ the provincial.

Aftermath of the Orientation Convention

Flushed with a sense of victory, the members of the PSQ now had to face the consequences of their recent actions. Over the summer months the PSQ acted as a pressure group, marginal not only to Quebec politics but to the nationalist movements themselves. November was to see the PSQ founding convention in Quebec city and the following year the demise of the party.

The federalists, on the other hand, mostly felt a profound sense of relief that the nationalists had departed. However, there was still an element among them that refused to accept the finality of the split

¹ Marcel Rioux stepped down. Jacques-Victor Morin was later elected to the PSQ Provisional Council.

and held out the hope for some kind of reconciliation with the PSQ in the future. In all events the whole fracas had left the N.D.P. prostrate.

The scars of the conflict, both emotional and operational, were to stay with the Quebec N.D.P. for at least a year. The remaining summer months were ones in which just a minimal holding operation was conducted. The Quebec N.D.P. lived from day to day under what was termed the 'interim operation of the provisional office'.¹

The administrative staff of the N.D.P. Provisional Council, which had entirely gone over to the PSQ, was replaced with what volunteer help was available. The affairs of the party had to be put in order² and the heavy debts cleared before both confidence and strength could be restored through a membership and financial drive later in the fall. Most pressing of all, the desperately weakened Quebec N.D.P. had to prepare to face the rest of the party at the second federal convention at Regina in August. Delegates, explanations and prescriptions all had to be provided.

¹ Minutes of a meeting of the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council, July 8th, 1963.

² The stress on ideology rather than administration, on the part of Lebel, L'Heureux and Rochette had left the party files, finances and papers in chaos.

Summary.

As far as the members of the Provisional Council of the new PSQ were concerned, a victory had been won. The old C.C.F. and N.D.P. centralists had been ambushed, a new, truly nationalist, radical socialist party had been formed. As the nationalists stepped out of the Plateau auditorium they were never to be so close again. Dissent was their major unifying force.

For the federalists, once the split had taken place, there was mainly a profound sense of relief. However, what remained of the Quebec N.D.P. was severely crippled and faced an extended period of recuperation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SECOND N.D.P. CONVENTION IN REGINA

August 6th - August 9th, 1963

Background to the Convention

A little over four weeks passed between the end of the 'congrès d'orientation' and the Regina convention. As far as the federal party was concerned preparations for the convention had to be hurriedly made¹ while there was a marked tendency among the provincial parties to think that events at the convention would take care of themselves.

However, in spite of a certain lag in the formal organization for the convention, there was a general recognition of the fact that the delegates would have to review candidly the record of the party in two federal elections. Not unnaturally some of the questions to which the delegates at the Regina convention would require answers involved the fate of the party in French Canada.

With the focus of this study mainly on the Quebec N.D.P., it is easy to overlook the fact that the semi-autonomous structures prescribed for provincial

¹ This point was made several times during conversations with Terry Grier, Secretary of the N.D.P., Ottawa, February, 1965.

N.D.P.'s had encouraged the growth of provincial parties with characteristics of their own.

Approaching the convention, the British Columbia N.D.P. was to make a specific plea¹ in the convention resolutions for a return to position closer to that of the old C.C.F. The B.C. party sent nine members to the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus, comprised the official opposition in the provincial legislature and was both well organized and effective. The turbulent early history of socialist parties in British Columbia had contributed a legacy to both the C.C.F. and N.D.P. provincial parties which included a working class identification and consciousness among its members. This history of working class party struggles was totally lacking in Quebec. For many members² of the British Columbia party the adoption of a position further to the Right by the federal N.D.P. was not wholly desirable. Measures that would tend to weaken the federal government

¹ Resolutions submitted to the New Democratic Party Second Federal Convention, 1963. Resolution no. 88, which was submitted by the Vancouver-Centre Constituency Association reflected much of the B.C. party's sentiment when it called for a new 'Regina Manifesto', reaffirming the fundamental socialist principles that should guide the party.

² Conversations with Robert Prittie, N.D.P. member for Burnaby-Richmond (B.C.), Ottawa, March, 1965.

and thus prejudice future socialist policies were viewed unfavourably. Policies favouring French Canada tended to be received in this way by the delegates from the British Columbia party who were generally against measures that would weaken either the federal government or the federal N.D.P. structure.

The Saskatchewan C.C.F./N.D.P. party was unique in the movement in the fact that it had formed a provincial government for the previous twenty years. Although well disciplined and organized provincially, the party did not contribute a single seat to the federal party caucus. There was some awareness in the federal party of the unfortunate timing and location of the Convention. It had been decided, shortly after the founding convention in 1961, to hold the 1963 gathering in Saskatchewan since Woodrow Lloyd, Premier of the Saskatchewan and the successor to Mr. Douglas, would be on the threshold of a provincial election and the boost of a federal N.D.P. convention might prove useful. However, Mr. Douglas had been defeated as a federal candidate in Saskatchewan in the 1962 election and there was a certain apprehension concerning the fate of the provincial government in the forthcoming election.

Delegates from the East were aware that the complexion of the convention membership was likely to be much affected by where and when the convention took place and it was feared that issues like NATO and Quebec, which occupied everyones' minds, would fare badly in a predominantly Western atmosphere. However, the western presence¹ could not be ignored and it was not surprising, its position in the province considered, that the Saskatchewan C.C.F./N.D.P. should concern itself almost entirely with provincial affairs, little interest being shown in French Canada.

Of the provincial parties, the Ontario N.D.P. was perhaps both the most articulate and sophisticated. The party members in the provincial legislature had established a reputation for themselves out of all proportion to their number. While not considered as the official opposition, the volatile Ontario N.D.P. caucus was able to draw attention to controversial issues in a way that embarrassed the Conservative government and Liberal opposition alike. As far as problems of bilingualism and biculturalism were concerned the Ontario party had shown interest and concern by the setting up of a Bicultural Committee not long after the party's founding convention.

¹ Although Manitoba had provided two members for the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus, the provincial party was by no means strong. The Alberta N.D.P. suffered from the same weakness, as did the N.D.P. in the Maritimes.

Approaching the Regina Convention, the Ontario Provincial Council submitted a detailed resolution which reflected the work of its Bicultural Committee. The resolution¹ called for a re-affirmation of the two nation concept in the N.D.P.'s policy of co-operative federalism and stressed the necessity of national symbols that would reflect the bi-national character of Canada. Furthermore, it emphasized the necessity for an adequately bilingual Civil Service with maximum consideration given to the appointment and promotion of bilingual applicants. In addition it was suggested that the party in each province establish special committees to study and advance bilingualism and biculturalism.

To a large extent, this constructive approach of the Ontario N.D.P. was shared by the delegates it sent to the Regina Convention and reflected an attitude² that was to be maintained in the provincial party.

¹ Resolutions submitted to the New Democratic Party Second Federal Convention, 1963. Resolution No. 117, submitted by the Ontario Provincial Council.

² It was an interest that was to be maintained by the party's later submission of a brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The Ontario N.D.P. was the only provincial N.D.P. to submit such a brief. Desmond Morton, Assistant-Secretary of the Ontario N.D.P., was interviewed in connection with the provincial party's bilingual and bicultural activities, Toronto, July, 1965.

As far as the attitudes of provincial parties in the Maritimes were concerned, the Nova Scotia N.D.P. was the only one to submit a resolution to the Regina Convention in the area of federalism and biculturalism. Of the several points made in the lengthy resolution the following were the most interesting:

BE IT RESOLVED (1) that this Convention expresses its strong approval and support of the efforts of the people of Quebec to gain control over their provincial economy...
(3) That this Convention instructs the federal council to appoint a committee of qualified persons, French and English in equal numbers, to prepare a statement of political philosophy acceptable to the Party both in Quebec and in other provinces. ¹

The former point endorsed the nationalization measures of the Lesage government while the latter was a proposal that found fruition in the setting up of the federal N.D.P. Bicultural Council.

In spite of regional differences, there were a number of sentiments concerning the Quebec situation that were shared by most of the provincial parties. Two years before, in the enthusiasm of the founding convention, the delegates, without time for lengthy consideration, had agreed to a number of measures that

¹ Resolutions submitted to the N.D.P. Second Federal Convention, 1963, Resolution No. 111.

they were assured would help the party in Quebec. They had agreed to the recognition of French Canada in the formal N.D.P. policies not because they necessarily believed in it but because they were told it was necessary. In those two years they had been further asked to contribute substantial funds to the Quebec party and to support additional N.D.P. federal policies favouring French Canada. During two federal elections enthusiastic reports had been received about advances by the N.D.P. in Quebec. In the cold light of political reality those in the N.D.P. outside Quebec discovered total electoral failure and finally were to find that the N.D.P. in Quebec had split in two. Things had gone from bad to worse.

After consideration of the facts most people in the N.D.P. were generally ready to agree to a continuation of policies and measures that might redeem the situation in French Canada. A few felt that they had been deceived by the 'eastern intellectuals' and the spokesmen¹ from Quebec who supposedly were the experts who alone could deal with the situation. Many felt profoundly disappointed, rather in the manner of a benefactor who finds the blank cheque he had sent to a difficult but needy relative returned, defaced and torn in two pieces.

¹ These included Gérard Picard, Roméo Mathieu, Jean-Robert Ouellet, Michael Oliver and Charles Taylor.

As far as the Quebec delegates were concerned the Regina convention was no time for apologies. Spearheaded by Roméo Mathieu, Gérard Picard, Roger Provost and Jean-Robert Ouellet, the Quebec delegation was aware that this convention was critical to the future of N.D.P. in Quebec. For this reason they were determined to press for measures that would clear away any ambiguities in the N.D.P. programme and constitution and so attempt to eliminate future difficulties which the party might encounter.

Whatever doubts party spokesmen may have had about the PSQ's chances of success, the federal executive, incredibly enough, had made a point of keeping the bargaining table open. Uncertainty was caused by the fact that the PSQ had not planned its founding convention until November but Michael Oliver, for one, still held out hope for some official link with this dissident group.

Accordingly, André L'Heureux, now secretary of the PSQ was informed that the president of the PSQ could be a member of the N.D.P. council.¹ It was explained that

¹ The N.D.P. Council consisted of the Officers, (the Leader, the President, the Associate-President, the five Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer, the Secretary and Associate Secretary), fifteen other members elected by the convention, two members elected by the parliamentary caucus, a leader, president and secretary from each provincial party, two additional members from each provincial party elected by the provincial convention and five members representing the Young People's Section of the party.

any accredited delegate sympathetic to the PSQ could outline the party's position from the convention floor during the debate on the degree of autonomy to be enjoyed by provincial parties. Considering the type of settlement reached at the orientation convention it should have come as no surprise that the PSQ did not care to act on this offer.

The Convention

When the Second Federal Convention was formally opened by the President of the N.D.P. on Tuesday, August 6th, in Regina's Exhibition Stadium, there was not the same atmosphere of spirited enthusiasm among the delegates that had prevailed at the party's founding in Ottawa during the Summer of 1961. This time the mood was quieter and more businesslike.

In his address, speaking both in English and French, Michael Oliver outlined the achievements of the N.D.P. in its first two years of existence and described the nature of the party's response to the French Canadian awakening. The President warned that the greatest danger to the unity and integrity of Canada was



a refusal to face facts. He said:

The New Democratic party was the first party to face facts, and take the necessary steps to dispel the clouds of suspicion which hide the path to a constructive relationship. At our founding convention we had the courage to speak of two nations, and we laid down the principle of equal partnership between them, in one State: Canada. ¹

The President, in urging the party to continue this approach, added:

... I am convinced that the common planning for new levels of Canadian well-being, which the New Democratic Party proposes, can revitalize our national partnership. ²

Ending on a personal note, Michael Oliver indicated that he would not be a candidate for the presidency of the party in the elections that were to be held later in the week.

In the following days, delegates to the Convention were asked to consider eighteen major resolutions calling for amendments to the party's constitution and programme as well as to nominate and elect the party's Officers, Executive and ten Council members at large.

¹ President's Report, Second Federal Convention, New Democratic Party, Regina, August 6th, 1963. Pp 3-4.

² Ibid. P. 4.

Of the amendments to the constitution adopted by the convention, two have significance for this study. The first brought about a rewording of Article X dealing with the status of provincial parties. The 1961 N.D.P. Constitution had read:

Each province of Canada shall have a provincial party, fully autonomous as to its constitution and programme, provided that the said constitution and programme are not in conflict with the principles of the federal party or this constitution. ¹

The amended Article X in the 1963 Constitution read:

Each province of Canada shall have a fully autonomous provincial party, provided its constitution is not in conflict with the constitution of the federal party. ²

At first sight the two versions seemed indistinguishable until it was discovered that the amendment freed the provincial parties' programmes from compatibility with that of the federal N.D.P. It was to this especially that the delegates from British Columbia strenuously objected, since they were alarmed at further extending the already broad limits of the federal constitution.

¹ The Federal Constitution of the N.D.P., adopted by its Founding Convention, Ottawa, July 31 - August 4, 1961. P. 12.

² The Federal Constitution of the N.D.P. as amended by the Federal Convention, Regina, August 1963. P. 12.

As far as the delegates and federal spokesmen from Quebec were concerned, it was necessary to press for the amendment, to remove ambiguities and to make explicit the autonomous status of provincial parties, a status that they maintained had existed from the outset. One might well ask why this was required now that the nationalists of the PSQ had left. The answer lay in the fact that the entire Quebec delegation recognized that the mood of their province was overwhelmingly nationalist and that no hope for electoral success could be maintained if the party did not express an understanding of French Canada's aspirations.

The second relevant constitutional amendment introduced at the Regina Convention called for the setting up of an N.D.P. 'Bicultural Council' as part of the formal federal party structure. This new body, in the words of Article VII of the revised N.D.P. constitution, was to be formed in the following way:

The Council shall name five members to sit on the Bicultural Council of the New Democratic Party and shall invite the New Democratic Party in the Province of Quebec to name five other members. ¹

¹ Ibid. Article VII, P. 10.

It was intended that the Bicultural Council, embodying the principle of equal partnership, should meet regularly not only to discuss immediate problems in the area but to draw up plans for the proposed 'Confederation Council'.¹ The object of the second longer range plan was to assure that the N.D.P. could participate with 'originality and farsightedness' in renewing the Canadian Constitution by 1967. In this venture it was hoped that the plans for a Canadian Confederation Council would be underpinned by the operations of the N.D.P. Bicultural Council. However, the Bicultural Council was to get off to a very slow start.

Proposed amendments to the N.D.P. programme had been gathered together by the Resolutions Committee under various policy headings. These included agriculture, economic planning and trade, resources, housing and transportation, labour, health and social security, education and the arts, justice and civil rights, parliament and government, international affairs and defence and federalism and biculturalism.

¹ A project announced by T.C. Douglas in a campaign speech on February 28th, 1963. See P.

Some of the measures approved for the revised party programme included proposals for a full-time planning board directly responsible to the federal cabinet, a federal-provincial planning and development council and a Canadian development fund to mobilize public and private investment. The NATO question reappeared and here the composition of the convention raised fear among the delegates from Eastern Canada that the 'Western presence' might involve the N.D.P. in a pacifist stand, advocating withdrawal from NATO. As it was, the delegates endorsed a foreign policy statement which aligned the N.D.P. with the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats in their attempts to reduce NATO's nuclear capability.

Regarding federalism and biculturalism, several important additions were made to the N.D.P. programme at the Regina Convention. The following point was made in the preamble to the list of propositions put forward:

We can be satisfied with nothing short of a complete rethinking of our federal system and of the relations between the two major national communities which constitute Canada. ¹

¹ The Paper on "Federalism and Biculturalism" containing resolutions submitted to the N.D.P. Regina Convention, August 1963, was the work of the Policy Committee of which Michael Oliver, Charles Taylor and Jean-Robert Ouellet were members. Andrew Brewin (M.P.) chaired this Committee.

The first proposition put forward on biculturalism read as follows:

Our constitution must recognize the equal status of the French Canadian nation and the English Canadian nation. These are terms which are often misunderstood and we must be clear as to what we mean by them. The English Canadian nation is composed of all Canadian citizens whose mother tongue or adopted language is English. The French Canadian nation is composed of all Canadian citizens whose mother tongue or adopted language is French. ¹

The resolutions presented in the paper "Federalism and Biculturalism", later incorporated into the 1963 programme, went on to call for the recognition of the equality of both cultures and languages in the Civil Service and outlined provisions to assist this. A Bill of Rights was called for that would guarantee certain national rights. In the words of the 1963 programme these were extended to cover language rights:

The New Democratic government will seek the collaboration of the provinces to provide within the modified constitution to French Canadians in other provinces the same language rights as are provided in Quebec for English-speaking Canadians. ²

¹ Ibid. Section A. Proposition No. 1.

² The Federal Programme of the N.D.P. as amended by the Second Federal Convention, Regina, August 1963. Cf. Appendix D.

The text of the 1961 programme contained two sections under the heading 'A more Complete Democracy'. These sections on 'Co-operative Federalism' and 'Canada as a Nation' did not recognize a special status for Quebec as such employing the term French Canada instead. Particularly important, however, was the fact that clauses in the 1961 programme did withhold equivalent funds from provinces opting out of joint welfare programmes except in areas affecting education, language and similar rights. The 1961 programme stated:

... a province should be free to remain outside such programmes (welfare), but in doing so it would not delay other provinces and the federal government in proceeding with their plans. However, in areas affecting education, language and similar rights now in the B.N.A. Act, where a province does not participate in a joint programme it will not forego its right to equivalent funds. ¹

The text of the 1963 programme contained, in all, three such sections on 'Federalism and Biculturalism', on 'Biculturalism' and on 'Co-operative Federalism and Constitutional Change'. The most salient amendment introduced was a recognition of a 'Special Status' for Quebec in the third section on 'Co-operative Federalism

¹ The Federal Programme of the N.D.P. adopted by its Founding Convention, Ottawa, July 31 - August 4, 1961. P. 21. Cf. Appendix D.

and Constitutional Change'. Subsection 'C' stated:

It may be foreseen that the Province of Quebec, by reason of its special character, may not wish to participate in joint programmes desired by other provinces. It should be free to remain outside them without delaying their application by other provinces and the federal government. The right to remain outside such joint programmes should be exercised without financial loss.¹

The most noteworthy aspects of this measure were first, that the N.D.P. was the earliest federal party to explicitly recognize a principle which is still regarded as an informal procedure; and secondly, that the right to financial compensation for opting out was restricted to Quebec.

Particular interest was generated by the election of party officers and it came as no surprise that Tommy Douglas was unanimously re-elected as Leader. It was rumoured that Charles Taylor might be elected on Michael Oliver's resignation from the presidency of the party. However, the position was filled by Mervin Johnson, a Saskatchewan farmer and for a long time a member of the C.C.F. Although there was some suspicion of 'Eastern intellectuals' the continued readiness of delegates to support measures favouring Quebec indicated that regional or anti-intellectual bias was not general.

¹ The Federal Programme of the N.D.P. as amended by its Second Federal Convention, Regina, August 6-9, 1963. P. 22. Cf. Appendix D.

Mervin Johnson's election owed something to the 'Western presence' but he was widely regarded as a good prospect. Gérard Picard was re-elected Associate-President, while ten trade unionists were also elected to a new N.D.P. federal council that now included Erhart Régier, Douglas Fisher and W.H. Herridge.

Summary

Reviewing the events of the two previous years the delegates could not have helped but ponder the fate of the party in French Canada and the apparent ineffectiveness of federal party policies designed to assist in Quebec. Delegates from British Columbia, however, objected to measures that would cause further decentralization but Roméo Mathieu and Roger Provost, in particular, pleaded the Quebec cause forcefully. On balance, convention observers¹ state that delegates were generally too ready to accept policies and measures related to French Canada when in the light of past events resistance would have been expected.

¹ Mrs. Joan Oliver's account of the Regina convention prepared for the Quebec N.D.P., September, 1963.

Generally, there was not a sufficient level of interest in the Quebec situation to stimulate either strongly positive or negative attitudes. The N.D.P./PSQ split was not fully explained to the convention. The 'Western Complexion' of the event and the presence of only a small contingent of Quebec delegates conspired to keep this matter from being discussed.

However, the Regina convention had achieved advances in the official N.D.P. policy towards French Canada. The autonomy of the provincial parties had been recognized more explicitly, policies towards bilingualism and biculturalism had been extended, a new formula for federalism had been adopted, involving a special status for Quebec, and a federal N.D.P. Bicultural Council instituted.

CHAPTER IX

PERSPECTIVES: FALL 1963 - SPRING 1965

The PSQ: decline to a discussion group

The summer of 1963 was a bad time to launch a new socialist party in Quebec, especially one that owed much of its dynamism to a university milieu. Unavoidably, support was dispersed over the summer university vacation.

To show that the PSQ was still alive and in order to announce the holding of a November founding¹ convention, the Provisional Council of the Parti Socialiste du Québec published the first and the penultimate edition of its paper, Le Peuple. This edition appeared in September and was both skilfully designed and well laid out. The plans, formulas and policies put forward in Le Peuple did not stray far from the more radical propositions put forward by the nationalists at the orientation convention.

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In late July 1963, this body consisted of:- Jean-Marie Bédard, Emile Boudreau, Anita Charest, Michel Chartrand, Jean Couvrette, Fernand Daoust, Jean-Paul Gagnon, Martial Laforest, Jean-Claude Lebel, Raymond Legendre, André L'Heureux, Robert Millet, Pierre Vadboncoeur and Jack Weldon. Marcel Rioux and Jacques Dofny were not listed as serving on the Council at this time.



Among the twenty major proposals contained in the draft PSQ programme, for this is what the newspaper was intended to be, were measures calling for virtually all powers to be vested in the government of the state of Quebec. Fiscal and monetary policy would be taken from the federal government preserve while a President would replace the Lieutenant Governor in the State of Quebec. The drafters of the programme stopped at the edge of separatism by still acknowledging a loose but relatively powerless confederation made up of ten sovereign states.

The programme and constitution, outlined in this edition of Le Peuple, remained almost unchanged at the founding convention of the PSQ held in Quebec City on the weekend of November 16th - 17th. At that time some 150 delegates gathered to officially found the party.¹

From the fall of 1963 onwards little was heard of the PSQ. However, in late 1964 rumours were spread that the twenty-seven member executive had divided into three groups. Certainly a number² left the executive but there were no dramatic splits, rather a gentle fading into political obscurity.

¹ Le Devoir, Monday, November 18th, 1963.

² Five members resigned in late 1964. Among them were Jacques-Victor Morin, Jean Couvrette and Roger Nantel.



The reasons for the demise of the PSQ are not difficult to discover. Composed mainly of 'ideologues', the group was highly susceptible to internal discord. There were those universitaires, such as Marcel Rioux and Jacques Dofny, mainly socialists first and nationalists second, who viewed the courting of nationalist movements for support as secondary in importance to such matters as economic planning and welfare policies. Others, particularly the younger members like Jean-Claude Lebel and André L'Heureux, often nationalists first and socialists second, saw in these movements the only possible basis for support for the PSQ. There were others, like Jacques-Victor Morin and Jean Couvrette, both nationalists and socialists, who saw the role of PSQ in a different light. They proposed that the party should head an anti-Colonial crusade¹ against the federal government and allied business interests that controlled Quebec. These conflicting approaches existing among people who were more prone to talk rather than to act, soon reduced the PSQ to so many disorganized voices.

What had started as a nationalist group within the N.D.P. Provisional Council and had grown in strength

¹ Cf. 'Une lutte réelle de décolonisation', editorial, La Revue Socialiste, No. 7, Winter 1963-1964.

as a university phenomenon, suffered the same fate as that splinter group from the Quebec C.C.F. of the 1950's, the Ligue d'Action Socialiste¹. Both the LAS and the PSQ faded from the political scene. Initially the PSQ had shown more promise, expecting the support of nationalist movements but failed even to capture these. Political formulas proved no substitute for membership and financial drives backed up by a competent organizational machine. Within a short time the PSQ became little more than a discussion group, marginal not only to Quebec society but to the nationalist movements themselves.

The Federal N.D.P.: Operations, 1963 - 1965

Apart from a series of provincial elections in Ontario, British Columbia and Nova Scotia, no major event disturbed the N.D.P. until the re-organization of the federal party in 1964.

Early in the new year, party organization from coast to coast was reviewed at special council

¹ Cf. Chapter I. 'The Legacy of the C.C.F. in Quebec' P. 17.

meetings in Ottawa. Party leaders were concerned over the apparent immobility of the party and saw in a critical evaluation of organization a way to a possible antidote. The leaders were also worried by the nagging thought that the N.D.P. had been relegated to the same position that the C.C.F. had occupied on the political scene as merely a voice, not an instrument, for social reform. A brand new Committee on Organization was therefore formed and Russ Brown was later appointed its Director.

In April 1964 the federal party was shaken by the defeat of Woodrow S. Lloyd and the Saskatchewan C.C.F. party after it had formed the provincial government for twenty years. Confidence was only partially restored through a provincial by-election victory in Riverdale, Ontario, in September, which was won by a substantial margin. A federal by-election victory in November saw the addition of Max Saltzman to the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus and further boosted morale.

With regard to bilingual and bicultural affairs, this period had witnessed a perceptible growth in understanding among the eighteen member N.D.P. parlia-

mentary caucus.¹ During the critical years of struggle within the Quebec N.D.P., the parliamentary caucus had very much lived a life of its own. The lack of one single member from Quebec in the caucus had caused an imbalance that was partly responsible for both the contradictory and often inflammatory statements regarding French Canada, directly or indirectly, that were sometimes made by N.D.P. members in the house. In any event, the absence of a French Canadian M.P. in the caucus who could have otherwise attempted to give both expression and meaning in the Commons to the carefully reasoned federal and bicultural policies of the N.D.P. was a critical defect.

However, with the onslaught of the interminable flag debate, the greater part of the N.D.P. caucus turned their minds more deeply to the wide range of problems which this particular issue raised. Caucus members became more aware of the fact that the N.D.P. had settled its position vis-à-vis the question of Canada's unity, a full three years before. The section in the 1961 programme, entitled, "Canada as a Nation", now seemed to have direct consequence for what was being so hotly debated in the House. The caucus, in

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See Appendix C.

effect, became closely involved in the problem instead of viewing it from afar.

The N.D.P. Bicultural Council represented a further attempt to obtain both the interest and participation of more members in bicultural affairs. It was appreciated that N.D.P. policy formulation in the area of federalism and biculturalism had rested in the hands of a few specialists and that it was vital to achieve a greater depth of understanding and interest in the N.D.P. However, the Bicultural Council was slow to organize and never functioned until the fall of 1964, when it met for the first time. The N.D.P. parliamentary caucus was represented on the Council by Robert Prittie who acted as chairman. William Dodge, David Lewis, Allan O'Brien and Olaf Turnbull comprised the remaining members nominated by the federal Council. George Cadbury and Desmond Morton, the President and Assistant Secretary of the Ontario party, acted as alternates. Both of these members had shown a keen and sustained interest in the Ontario N.D.P. Bicultural Committee, a body that was probably more active than its federal counterpart. Robert Cliche, as the co-chairman led the members from Quebec, who nominally¹

¹ Not all the members from Quebec attended.

included Roland Morin, Yvan Legault, Pierre Lambert and Paul Massé. Charles Taylor and Noel Perusse acted as alternates.

Documents on federal planning were mainly discussed at the fall 1964 meeting of the Bicultural Council, but it was apparent to the members that the council would very much be an ad hoc body, probably meeting infrequently.

In the new year the interest of the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus in the area of cooperative federalism finally asserted itself. In February 1965, Mr. T.C. Douglas held a press conference in which he called for the establishment of an all party parliamentary committee to:

Study and recommend to parliament specific proposals in respect to (I) the distribution of federal and provincial powers; (II) a special status for Quebec; (III) a revised constitution and a workable amendment formula.¹

Mr. Douglas explained that the statement was drafted by the parliamentary caucus in consultation with the party's federal council and its special Bicultural Council. At the same time Mr. Douglas

¹

Text of a speech by T.C. Douglas, Thursday, February 11, 1965. Ottawa.

stressed that it was necessary to put the complex question of confederation back into the hands of the "elected representatives of the people"¹. He went on to say that while Royal Commissions were useful sources of information, they were no substitute for parliament.

In the light of these statements, it finally appeared that the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus was at last willing to take the lead for the party in the field of co-operative federalism.

During the early summer months of 1965, the federal N.D.P. organized for its third convention to be held in Toronto from July 12th to the 15th. At that time the convention was to meet a delegation from French Canada, led by Robert Cliche, which represented a revitalized and reconstituted Quebec N.D.P.

The Quebec N.D.P.: The Slow Recovery, 1963 - 1965

The split with the PSQ left the N.D.P. seriously weakened and disorganized. The new N.D.P. Provisional Council during the summer and fall of 1963 was confronted by two main tasks. The first was to send a delegation to the Regina convention, the second was to retire the substantial debt that the movement in Quebec had incurred.

¹
Ibid.

The party conducted the leanest of holding operations during the latter months of 1963 and the early months of 1964, barely living from day to day. Two by-elections in early 1964 in the Montreal ridings of Laurier and Saint-Denis resulted in an humiliating defeat for the N.D.P. candidates Gérard Picard and Réjeanne Dinelle. The party hardly launched any sort of campaign and to all outward intents and purposes had reached the nadir of its existence.

However, behind the scenes, the money raised for the campaign was used to retire debt. A financial drive was launched and the new Quebec N.D.P. newspaper, Le Démocrate, began to be published regularly.

By the summer the Quebec N.D.P. found itself strong enough to fight the apathy which had also struck federal politics generally within the province during 1964. However, through the efforts of Charles Taylor and Robert Cliche a new strategy was adopted. Following the successful pattern of the Social Credit Party, the N.D.P. concentrated its efforts in gaining support off the island of Montreal. In a double edged approach Robert Cliche emphasized badly needed agricultural politics for rural Quebec while in November 1964 a special television campaign was launched in the developing

industrial area of Lac St. Jean. The television campaign was especially valuable since it demonstrated to the public that the Quebec N.D.P. had survived and was growing in strength. Robert Cliche took full advantage of the programmes to assert both his personality and powers of leadership.

By the new year the approach of the Quebec N.D.P. founding Convention acted as a rallying point for both financial and membership drives. On the weekend of 19th - 21st March 1965, at the Mount Royal Hotel, the founding convention of the Quebec N.D.P. was finally held. Given the perpetual optimism of the N.D.P. concerning its happy future, the well run and efficiently organized convention was still a healthy indication that things had changed within the party and that its continued growth was assured.

The 'new' Quebec N.D.P. now possessed a leader who demonstrated both a strong personality and oratorical skills, organizers with administrative rather than ideological leanings and a treasurer who was more concerned with finances than with political formulas. This furnished the party with the minimum equipment necessary to set out on the long road to political power

in the federal field in Quebec. However, it was only a minimum and the party still lacked both the substantial funds required, and a sufficient number of the 'right' type of person necessary, to really compete politically in French Canada.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

Most N.D.P. members possess a healthy streak of optimism, not only about the future of the party in Canada generally but also about its prospects in Quebec. Cynics might say that this was just as well after examining the dealings of the N.D.P. with French Canada in this period but they would be discounting both the solid achievements of the party as well as the close working relationships that existed between English and French members.

In the introduction to this study it was explained that the nature of the response of the N.D.P., as an ideological, social democratic third party, in a federal parliamentary system, to the nationalist challenge from French Canada constituted the general focus of the study. Right from the Founding Convention of the N.D.P. there developed a steady and continuous stream of policies dealing with federal and bicultural issues. The recognition of the bi-national fact in the 1961 programme and the special status for Quebec in the 1963 N.D.P. formula on federalism, represented an early and realistic appreciation of what is now the status quo. In these N.D.P. policies there exists a mine of useful ideas and approaches that have direct relevance for the current situation.

It is easy to criticize the work of federal spokesmen from Quebec who, to a large measure, were responsible for introducing these policies. It has been pointed out, and is still felt by certain members of the N.D.P. parliamentary caucus, that the influence exerted by Gérard Picard, Roméo Mathieu, Jean-Robert Ouellet and particularly the 'McGill group', consisting of Michael Oliver, Charles Taylor and Frank Scott, was unsupported and unsanctioned by popular vote or territorial representation. In the introduction to this study a list of the characteristics of social democratic parties included; - the active role of intellectuals within the movement; - the stress on democratic organization and the place of the parliamentary caucus in a complementary rather than a dictatorial relationship with the rest of the party. These too were actualities in the N.D.P. Certainly, the taking of the initiative in the field of federalism and biculturalism by the spokesmen from Quebec was not part of a power play within the N.D.P., these spokesmen filled a vacuum in an area of policy making to which their position in the federal party probably entitled them.

More serious a criticism was the apparent ineffectiveness of these policies either to advance the party in French

Canada or to close the division within the Quebec N.D.P. On the first count, the Quebec N.D.P. from 1961 until the split, lacked a leader of the calibre of Réal Caouette or Robert Cliche in their ranks to give either strong voice or conviction to these federal policies. Mr. Douglas in the 1962 and 1963 election campaigns did what he could to put these measures across to the Quebec public but he lacked the vital requirement of fluency in French. To this should be added the inability of the N.D.P. to capture a single seat in Quebec in the 1962 and 1963 elections which robbed the N.D.P. of meaning as a federal party. One might ask what else the federal spokesmen could have done to gain acceptance for their policies and this leads to a reconsideration of the nature of the division within the Quebec party.

A valid criticism against the federal spokesmen was their unwillingness to exert their influence to close off debate in the Quebec party in the fall of 1961 and by decisive action hold a founding convention and make the party politically operational. At that time the federalists commanded a majority in the Quebec N.D.P. Provisional Council and could easily have done this. Again, in the fall of 1962 the federalists could have pressed for a founding convention

with enough votes to win most of the issues -- but they still held back. Many felt that the nationalist question would shortly talk itself out without undue harm and would even benefit the party by having a range of issues fully aired. The fact that debates tended to recede into the background during the 1962 and even the 1963 election campaigns, when the party acted as a team, reinforced the belief of the federalists that they could turn off the debate at any time. What was not fully appreciated was that the vital task of building up a sound political machine could not be accomplished while the party was divided.

Some of the reasons why the federalists underestimated the nationalists lay in the fact that the latter were not a cohesive group. Individualists all, the nationalists, at the start, just did not seem capable of either gaining control of the party or forming a separate one. Few people took the precedent of the 'Ligue d'Action Socialiste', the nationalist splinter group that broke away from the C.C.F./PSD in the mid-fifties, seriously -- even though some of the same nationalists were now in the N.D.P. The mere fact that there were nationalists in the party who had shown a propensity for such dissent should have been warning enough. The ultimate responsibility for lack of

leadership, organization and discipline in the Quebec party must rest squarely with the federalists.

Ironically, much of the weight of this accusation is dispelled by the fact that the chain of events described in this study would probably not have been significantly different had the federalists exercised tighter control. If the Quebec N.D.P. founding convention had been 'pressed' in the fall of 1961 the more radical nationalists would have left the party and probably formed a splinter group similar to the LAS, while the elaborate formulas of the PSQ would have come later. The peak period of nationalist and revolutionary activity from the fall of 1962 until spring 1963 would, most likely, have seen the defection of the remaining nationalists to the PSQ which in turn would have more closely paralleled the nationalist upsurge prescribed in their paper, 'Le rendez-vous historique entre le nationalisme et le socialisme'.

The fact remains that the split was inevitable whatever policy the federalists adopted. It was in the nature of those who comprised the nationalist group within the Quebec N.D.P. to search for electoral success in formulas alone. Each one of them was his own intellectual and through his own reading and thinking had been drawn to Socialism. More inclined to develop their own line of

thought than to gather mass support to an idea, the nationalists only acted when they considered that the right political prescriptions had finally been compiled. The imperatives of their philosophy, coupled with their feelings about the destiny of Quebec, led to the formation of the PSQ, a party whose subsequent demise is not difficult to understand.

In the balance, the PSQ should have had as good a chance of survival after the congrès d'orientation in June 1963 as the N.D.P. Theoretically, the prevailing political climate in Quebec would certainly have seemed to be in favour of the PSQ but in reality this was not the case.

A characteristic of the Left generally in Quebec was the social marginality of its members. This was particularly true of those in the PSQ, few of whom had a wide range of contacts that could be useful in either attracting votes or mobilizing volunteer workers. The PSQ pictured itself on the crest of a nationalist and socialist wave but when it attempted to gain the support of the nationalist movements it met with little success. It seemed to the younger generation of Quebec student-activists that the PSQ had little to offer which their own organizations could not already

provide. By the fall of 1964, with members resigning from its Provisional Council, the PSQ was very much on the wane. It was even rumored that a certain nostalgia existed among some of its members for a return to the N.D.P.

While there was no minimizing the crippling effects of the split on the N.D.P., the party managed to stay alive, sort out its tangled administrative situation and gradually retire the substantial debts that had accumulated. From June 1963 to the early summer of 1964 the party was pathetically weak. For many the whole question of the survival of a Social Democratic party in French Canada must have been brought into sharp focus.

The C.C.F./PSD had existed under very different circumstances. The ultra conservatism of Quebec society had been a spur to the C.C.F. party's sense of mission. Those who ran the party always seemed to have a cause to support and injustices to publicize through the use of the pamphlet and the radio broadcast. The C.C.F./PSD however, never ceased to give the impression of being a narrow English Canadian enclave despite the fact that French was increasingly used as a working language in the fifties. Even the changing of the party's name to the Parti Social

Démocratique could not alter the legacy of the C.C.F./PSD. It was a legacy of an alien group.

The New Party movement came to a Quebec that was in flux. The initial efforts made to root the movement in the province met with limited success. There existed a sufficient number of interested French Canadian 'reformists' from labour, the FTQ and the CSN, from the Cité Libre group, past members of Le Rassemblement, journalists and academics, who were willing to discuss the New Party idea. When it came to actually building a political party their support was not sustained. By the end of 1962 the provincial Liberal party under Mr. Lesage had nationalized hydro-electric power and had been taking positive steps towards a wide programme of reforms that embraced education and welfare services. In addition, the Liberal party had become widely regarded as the acceptable agent capable of developing the 'new' Quebec. Quebec had its social reformist party.

The reasons for lack of support for the Quebec N.D.P., a party which was virtually immobilized by internal dissension, have been examined in detail. The single key factor responsible was the inability of the N.D.P. to secure the united support of Quebec labour. Jean Marchand's decision of only selective involvement in politics was an embellishment of the "Gompers'" tradition that owed more to labour experience

in the United States than in English Canada. Without the united support of labour and without the consciousness and acceptance of 'picket line' politics, that existed both in British Columbia and Ontario, there was no real organizational base for the Quebec N.D.P. This base, as in some other provinces, would have provided the foothold for future expansion. The N.D.P., however, did have the official support of the FTQ but the party's internal struggles and the decentralized structure of the FTQ were obstacles to the speedy mobilization of both funds, volunteer workers and votes from the union locals.

While the policies of the federal party towards French Canada can be counted as a positive reaction to a changing situation, critics might argue that the experience of the party in Quebec itself only had negative aspects. The unwillingness of the federalists to close off debate, coupled with the provisional status of the Quebec N.D.P. tended to negate the idea of the organized political party and instead provided an almost perfect platform for the discussion of nationalist ideas. These ideas culminated in the series of papers prepared for the congrès d'orientation. As has been described, the papers varied from Pierre Vadboncoeur's more philosophical ideas expressed in 'Le rendez-vous historique entre le nationalisme et le socialisme', which were put in the

form of a manifesto in the paper, 'Dix-sept propositions sur un problème crucial de la gauche Québécoise', to Jacques-Yvan Morin's legalistic treatment of the associate state concept in the paper, 'Confédération et état du Québec'. These papers came at the end of almost two years of discussions in which the federalists could not but help gain a first hand understanding and appreciation of the nationalist question.

Recognizing the comparatively healthy condition of the N.D.P. in Quebec to-day, the most positive thing that could be said about the party's experience in the province, from the fall of 1961 until its official founding in March 1965, was that this experience represented a necessary evolutionary stage in its development. The period of struggle was at the same time the period of adjustment, of implantation.

On the other hand, bearing in mind the lack of success of the Quebec N.D.P. at the polls, its rejection by the PSQ and its limited support by Quebec labour, the 1961 to 1965 experience could be seen in a different light. The endless struggles of the Quebec N.D.P. appear as a fruitless attempt to build a social democratic party in a province whose history, religion, culture, language and traditions were inhospitable to the N.D.P. style.

Confusingly, the Quebec N.D.P. managed to survive the split with PSQ and grew when the other withered. It found a leader, established a team of organizers as well as volunteer workers and reconstituted itself. In its relations with the federal party the Quebec N.D.P. became more conscious of its full autonomy.

After the 1961 Founding Convention, Jean-Marc Léger, on learning about the N.D.P.'s acceptance of the two nation thesis, had written:

... il y a deux nations, il doit y avoir deux partis, coopérant dans un conseil fédéral.¹

By 1965, the relationship between the federal and Quebec N.D.P. more closely reflected this position. This perhaps, coupled with the revitalized condition of the party in Quebec, is a hopeful sign for the continuance of the N.D.P. as a federal party in French Canada. However, these are but portents and the whole weight of the N.D.P. experience from 1961 to 1965 belies little more than limited success in the future.

1. Le Devoir, August 8, 1961.
Cf. p. 71.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY

The main events in the N.D.P.'s career.

C.C.F./PSD Background

1932

- January : League for Social Reconstruction formed by university groups from McGill and Toronto.
- May : Ginger group of M.P.'s under the leadership of J.S. Woodsworth meets in Ottawa to plan the formation of a new party.
- August : Decision to form C.C.F. taken at the Western Labour Conference in Calgary.

1933

- July : First C.C.F. National Convention adopts Regina Manifesto.

1943

- August : C.C.F. wins 34 seats in Ontario provincial election; none held in preceding legislature.
- September : Canadian Congress of Labour endorses C.C.F. "as the political arm of labour". Gallup polls indicate popular support for C.C.F. at high point.

1944

- June : C.C.F. comes to power in Saskatchewan, winning 47 of 52 seats in the provincial election.

1956

- July : C.C.F. National Convention adopts Winnipeg Declaration.

1958

- March : C.C.F. representation in Parliament reduced from 25 seats to 8 in the General Election.
- April : Canadian Labour Congress passes resolution to create new political force with the C.C.F. Provisional Joint C.L.C.-C.C.F. Committee thus established to examine the question.
- July : C.C.F. National convention held in Montreal gives permission to the C.C.F. National Council to proceed with the Joint C.L.C.-C.C.F. Committee. Both the C.L.C. and the C.C.F. fully behind new movement.
- November : Joint C.L.C.-C.C.F. Committee publishes a pamphlet entitled, "A New Political Party for Canada". Discussion and study groups organized within the C.C.F. and C.L.C. at most levels. Joint C.L.C.-C.C.F. Committee becomes known as the National Committee for the New Party.

1959

- August : Winnipeg Seminar held on the proposed constitution and programme. Attended by some 300 delegates.
- September : Desmond Sparham appointed organizer of the New Party Clubs. Plans laid for the publication of a New Party Newsletter to start in January 1960.

1960

- January : National Committee for the New Party publishes study papers and two further pamphlets.
- April : C.L.C. National Convention held in Montreal endorses the New Party.
- July : Saskatchewan C.C.F. Convention.

August : C.C.F. National Convention held in Regina, emphatically endorses New Party. Convention marked by a C.C.F. leadership struggle. The Founding Convention for the New Party set for July, 1961.

October : "Professors Conference" held in Toronto at the King Edward Hotel. Attended by professors who contributed to the Boag Foundation enterprise, Social Purpose for Canada.

Federal by-elections. In Peterborough Walter Pitman gains a surprising New Party victory. In Niagara Falls the New Party candidate doubles the 1958 C.C.F. vote. C.C.F. caucus changes its name to the C.C.F. -- New Party Caucus.

December : National Seminar in Montreal. (Dec. 3rd-4th). National Seminar held in Calgary. (Dec. 10th-11th).

1961

April : Programme sub-committee under the aegis of the National Committee for the New Party publishes draft programme.

July : N.C.N.P. appoints delegation to meet with the Quebec Committee for the New Party to speed Quebec submissions to the founding Convention. Provincial Seminar for the Quebec New Party held in Montreal at the University of Montreal Social Centre. (July 17th).

Quebec Committee for the New Party presented its resolutions to the respective committees of the New Party Founding Convention. (July 24th).

The Early Years of the N.D.P.
During the Crisis in French Canada. (1961-1963).

1961

- August : Founding Convention of the New Party
held at the Coliseum, Ottawa. N.D.P.
officially formed. Federal Officers
and Executive elected.
- September : The first meeting of the Provisional
Council of the Quebec N.D.P.
(Sept. 14th).
Important Federal Executive meeting.
(Sept. 16th).
- October : Some Provincial N.D.P. Founding
Conventions. E.g. Ontario N.D.P. at
Niagara.
- December : Important Federal Executive Meeting.
(Dec. 15, 16 and 17th).

1962

- January : André L'Heureux appointed Associate
Secretary in Ottawa.
- February : Federal Council Meeting. Stephen Lewis
appointed Director of Organization.
First Official N.D.P. statement on
Federalism and Biculturalism Commission
made by T.C. Douglas, Montreal, Mount
Royal Hotel. (Feb. 20th).
- March : Federal Executive Meeting. Associate
Secretary moved to Quebec Party.
- April : General Election called for June 19.
- May : Important Federal Officers Meeting.
M.K. Oliver moved to Ottawa as Campaign
Director.

- June : General Election.
Carl Hamilton resigned as Federal Party Secretary.
- July : Important sub-Committee Meeting on Organization held in Kingston.
- August : Federal Executive Meeting.
Erhart Regier appointed as Western Organizer.
- September : Major Council Meeting.
- October : Tommy Douglas elected in Burnaby-Coquitlam.

1963

- January : Important Federal Executive Meeting.
General Election called.
- February : Campaign Committee Meeting.
Official Statement on Confederation Council made by T.C. Douglas, Malvern Collegiate, Toronto. (Feb. 28th).
- April : General Election.
- May : Important Federal Executive Meeting.
- June : 'Congrès d'Orientation' for the Quebec N.D.P. Held at the Plateau Auditorium, Montreal, Quebec. Party divided, emergence of the PSQ.
- August : Major Council Meeting. (Aug. 4th-5th).
Second N.D.P. Federal Convention, Regina (Aug. 6, 7, 8 and 9th). M.K. Oliver resigns as Federal President.
Bicultural Council Formed.
- September : First of the two editions of 'Le Peuple' - official PSQ newspaper published.
- November : Founding Convention of the PSQ in Quebec City.

The Later Years of the N.D.P.

1964

- January : Revision of the N.D.P. organization started.
- September : Strengthening of the Quebec N.D.P. Television appearances by Robert Cliche.
- November : Major N.D.P. Council Meeting.

1965

- February : Recommendation by Mr. T.C. Douglas for an all party parliamentary Committee to examine Dominion-provincial relations.
- March : Founding Convention of the Quebec New Democratic Party.
- July : Third N.D.P. Federal Convention. Royal York Hotel. Toronto.

APPENDIX B

THE N.D.P. PARLIAMENTARY CAUCUS
26th Parliament 3rd Session, 1963.

| <u>MEMBER</u> | <u>RESIDENCE</u> |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. BARNETT, T.S. | Comox-Alberni, B.C. |
| 2. BREWIN, Andrew | Greenwood, Toronto. |
| 3. CAMERON, Colin | Nanaimo Cowichan-The Islands, B.C. |
| 4. DOUGLAS, T.C. | Burnaby Coquitlam, B.C. |
| 5. FISHER, D.M. | Port Arthur, Ontario. |
| 6. HERRIDGE, H.W. | Kootenay West, B.C. |
| 7. HOWARD, Frank | Skeena, B.C. |
| 8. HOWE, William Dean | Hamilton South, Ontario. |
| 9. KNOWLES, Stanley | Winnipeg North Centre, Man. |
| 10. MARTIN, M.W. | Timmins, Ontario. |
| 11. MATHER, Barry | New Westminster, B.C. |
| 12. ORLIKOW, David | Winnipeg North, Man. |
| 13. PETERS, Arnold | Temiskaming, Ontario. |
| 14. PRITTIE, R.W. | Burnaby-Richmond, B.C. |
| 15. SCOTT, Reid | Danforth, Toronto. |
| 16. WEBSTER, Arnold | Vancouver-Kingsway, B.C. |
| 17. WINCH, Harold E. | Vancouver-East, B.C. |
| 18. SALTSMAN*, Max. | Waterloo South, Ontario. |

* Elected in the fall of 1964 in a by-election.

APPENDIX C

The N.D.P. Bilingual and Bicultural Policies

Since the formation of the New Democratic Party in late August 1961, there has emerged a continuous development of formal policies in this area, pre-empting the adoption of similar policies by any other federal party.

Practices

Apart from simultaneous translation services at every federal convention, both languages have received equal respect in the federal party's pamphlets, circulars and press releases. All these documents are made available in both languages.

Policies

At the Founding Convention in August, 1961, the N.D.P. formally adopted 'Co-operative Federalism' as a broad policy advocating economic and social planning at all levels of government and calling for extensive consultation between federal and provincial governments. Particularly significant, at this time, was the recognition of French Canada as a nation. The 1961

programme reads:

The New Democratic Party strongly affirms its belief in a federal system which alone insures the united development of the two nations which originally associated to form the Canadian partnership. ¹...

And again:

Our pride in Canada as a nation is enhanced by our consciousness of the two national cultures which form the basis of Canadian life. ²

In early 1962, after Prime Minister Diefenbaker had bluntly rejected André Laurendeau's proposal for a Royal Commission on Bilingualism, Mr. Douglas called³ for a fuller examination of the problem on a federal-provincial basis. Tommy Douglas pointed out that the need for this commission on federalism and biculturalism was just one necessary aspect of a general need for a new approach to the problem of Canada's unity. He said:

... We believe that the Programme adopted at our founding convention, with its pioneering conception of co-operative federalism, presents such a new approach. ⁴

¹ The New Democratic Party Programme. Adopted by the Founding Convention. Ottawa, July 31 - August 4, 1961. P. 20.

² Ibid. P. 22.

³ T.C. Douglas. Text of a speech delivered at the Mount Royal Hotel, Montreal, February 20th, 1962.

⁴ Ibid.

In February 1963, after the Liberal Party had adopted the idea of a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the N.D.P. was thinking in terms of something more permanent. Tommy Douglas proposed an additional agency at the federal level to examine problems in this area. Describing this 'Confederation Council', he said:

I believe ... we need an additional agency which is made up of an equal number of French and English-speaking Canadians; a Confederation Council, as it might be called which would study and discuss those questions which, if allowed to remain unanswered, can divide Canada. ¹...

At the second federal N.D.P. convention in Regina in August, 1963, bilingual and bicultural problems received attention. It became clear that the party required some permanent body, as part of the federal party structure, to study these problems. A resolution was therefore passed advocating the setting up of the N.D.P.'s own 'Bicultural Council'. The N.D.P. constitution was revised so that the new body would be formed in the following way:

The council shall name five members to sit on the Bicultural Council of the New Democratic Party and shall invite the New Democratic Party in the Province of Quebec to name five other members. ²

¹ Extract from an address by T.C. Douglas. Malvern Collegiate, Toronto, February 28th, 1963.

² The Federal Constitution of the New Democratic Party as amended by the Federal Convention, August 1963. Article VII. Section 4.

Particularly important at the Regina Convention, was the revision of the N.D.P.'s policy of 'Co-operative Federalism' which was amended by the inclusion of a paragraph declaring a 'special status for Quebec'. In cases of joint agreements between the federal government and the provinces, the N.D.P. stated that the province of Quebec could exercise its full autonomy without financial loss when opting out of the original plan. Also noteworthy were sections¹ in the revised programme dealing with extending the French language coverage of the CBC and the recommendation for a language school for the Civil Service.

In February 1965, Mr. T.C. Douglas came forward with a new proposal which he pointed out was the result of consultations between the N.D.P.'s federal council and the Bicultural Council. The statement called for the establishment of an all party parliamentary committee to:

Study and recommend to parliament specific proposals in respect to (I) the distribution of federal and provincial powers; (II) a special status for Quebec; (III) a revised constitution and a workable amendment formula. ²

¹ Revised N.D.P. Programme. Regina Convention. August, 1963. P. 21.

² Text of a speech made by T.C. Douglas, Thursday, February 11th, 1965, Ottawa.

Mr. Douglas went on to stress that it was necessary to put the complex question of Confederation back into the hands of the 'elected representatives of the people'. He went on to say that while Royal Commissions were useful sources of information, they were no substitute for parliament.

APPENDIX D

Extracts from the
Federal Programme of the New Democratic Party
as Adopted by its Founding Convention
Ottawa, July, 1961.

A MORE COMPLETE DEMOCRACY

Co-operative Federalism

This program is a statement of the federal aims of the New Democratic party and is therefore concerned with the exercise of federal powers. In each province, a program fitted to their particular needs and aspirations will be democratically prepared and presented to provincial electors by a provincial New Democratic party. However, the federal party is vitally concerned with relations between the federal and provincial governments.

The New Democratic party strongly affirms its belief in a federal system which alone insures the united development of the two nations which originally associated to form the Canadian partnership, as well as that of other ethnic groups which later made Canada their home. Canada's constitution particularly guarantees the national identity of French Canadians and the development of their culture. The New Democratic party will fully maintain

and respect these guarantees. Canadian federalism must provide for the protection of cultural, religious and other democratic rights, permit the vigorous and balanced growth of the country as a whole, and assure provincial autonomy.

The New Democratic party believes that social and economic planning must take place at all levels of government. It therefore looks to close collaboration amongst responsible governments to coordinate plans and administration and to set Canadian minimum standards.

Immediately following Confederation, a federal minister was given special responsibility for relations with the provinces. It is time to revive this post. The New Democratic government will create a department of Federal-Provincial Relations to maintain and extend co-operation with the provinces, to co-ordinate and act as a special secretariat for joint committees and councils.

The New Democratic party believes that consultation at the highest level is necessary for the smooth working of our federal institutions. The New Democratic government will therefore establish a regular Prime Ministers' Conference, to be attended by the prime minister of Canada and the premiers of the provinces.

If federalism is to be a reality as well as a legal principle, each government must control sufficient funds to carry out its constitutional responsibilities. It is, indeed, one of the federal government's basic functions to redistribute wealth and income, in collaboration with the provinces, so that the provinces will have at their disposal comparable means for fulfilling their constitutional obligations. The New Democratic party believes that in a federal system equalization grants are the best method of achieving this objective. Unconditional grants of this sort must therefore be used more frequently and should eventually replace conditional grants.

The New Democratic government will constantly seek the joint participation of the federal government and the provinces in financing programs for the general welfare of Canadians, but it will ensure that this participation is the result of free negotiation and consultation between governments and not the product of unilateral federal decision. It believes, furthermore, that a province should be free to remain outside such programmes, but in doing so it would not delay other provinces and the federal government in proceeding with their plans. However, in areas affecting education, language and similar rights now in the British North

America Act, where a province does not participate in a joint program it will not forego its right to equivalent funds.

Canadians still do not have complete control of their constitution. The British Parliament reluctantly retains an amending power because we have not been able to agree on purely domestic procedures for changing the terms of the BNA Act. The federal New Democratic government will pledge itself to work out a reasonable method of amendment with the provinces. This method must be flexible enough to meet modern needs but must also entrench basic education, language and similar rights now in the BNA Act, as well as the political rights essential to a parliamentary democracy.

Since the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in London, the Supreme Court of Canada has become the final court of appeal in constitutional cases. It acts as an arbiter in conflicts of jurisdiction between governments. At present this constitutional court suffers the disability of being based only on a federal statute. The New Democratic party believes that the organization and jurisdiction of our Supreme Court should be defined in the constitution itself.

Canada as a Nation

Since 1867, Canada has gradually built an enviable reputation in the world of nations. Our pride in Canada as a nation is enhanced by our consciousness of the two national cultures which form the basis of Canadian life. We are indeed aware that those who have their roots in the French-speaking community frequently and legitimately use the word "nation" to describe French Canada itself. The New Democratic party believes that true Canadian unity depends upon equal recognition and respect for both the main cultures of our country.

Canada has been further enriched by the infusion of many other national, cultural and linguistic strains. True Canadian identity lies in honouring these traditions and weaving them into the texture of Canada. The New Democratic party fully respects and will protect the traditions and cultures of Canadians of all ethnic backgrounds.

It recognizes the special economic needs and problems of the original inhabitants of Canada, the Indians and Eskimos, whose traditional modes of living have been disrupted by modern civilization. The New Democratic government will accord them full political and social rights as Canadian citizens.

The New Democratic party believes that the full expression of Canadian nationhood requires a distinctive Canadian flag and anthem.

Extracts from the
Federal Programme of the New Democratic Party
As Amended by its Second Federal Convention
Regina, August, 1963.

FEDERALISM AND BICULTURALISM

The New Democratic party reaffirms its conviction that the welfare of Canada as a whole and of the two nations which created it lies within a federal system renewed and reformed in the spirit of co-operative federalism.

But we must face the fact that, with the 100th anniversary of Confederation only four years away, we are in danger of stumbling into 1967 in an atmosphere of confusion, irresolution and dissatisfaction.

The New Democratic party at its Founding Convention greeted with respect the proud confidence with which French Canada asserted its role in Canada. It recognized the fact of a French Canadian nation, and outlined a new theory of co-operative federalism.

The New Democratic party welcomes enthusiastically the formation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which it has demanded since February, 1962. However, the Commission cannot perform miracles. All

Canadians must take part in the search for a solution.

Canada faces a challenge which daily grows more serious. Too often the English Canadian, fearing the fragmentation of our country, tends to look with suspicion upon the demands of his fellows in Quebec for greater autonomy. Too often the French Canadian, fearing the assimilation of his language and culture, has seen in the cry for national unity a disguised attempt at assimilation. If we attempt to evade the challenge thus presented, a deepening crisis will follow. If, on the other hand, the challenge is accepted with imagination and enthusiasm, it presents an opportunity for the mutual enrichment of both cultures.

We can be satisfied with nothing short of a complete rethinking of our federal system and of the relations between the two nations which established Canada. We must modify our constitution, our legislation and political practices, in the light of present day Canadian realities.

BICULTURALISM

Our constitution must recognize the equal status of the French Canadian nation and the English Canadian nation. These are terms which are often misunderstood and we must be clear as to what we mean by them.

By the English Canadian nation we mean all Canadian citizens whose mother tongue or adopted language in Canada is English. By French Canadian nation we mean all Canadian citizens whose mother tongue or adopted language in Canada is French. Within these nations, there must be full respect for the traditions and characteristics of other groups which have enriched our society.

It is the right of every Canadian to have access to the language and culture of his nation.

We therefore recommend to each of our provincial parties that they adopt a policy of providing improved facilities for children and adults to learn both languages.

The New Democratic government will seek the collaboration of the provinces to provide within the modified constitution to French-speaking Canadians in

other provinces the same language rights as are provided in Quebec for English-speaking Canadians.

The CBC should be directed to expand its French and English coverage throughout Canada and be supplied with the necessary funds to do so.

Within the Federal Civil Service the equality of both cultures should be established and the following steps taken to that end:

- (a) after a reasonable period of transition, bilingualism would be a qualification of appointment or promotion to higher posts of the federal civil service;
- (b) a language school would be set up for federal civil servants wishing to become bilingual which could be attended during working hours;
- (c) both French and English would be recognized as working languages of the federal civil service; files would be kept in either language; all public documents would be issued simultaneously in both languages and all communications replied to in the official language used by the correspondent.

A federal agency should be established to provide simultaneous and written translation services at low cost.

CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

We have already stated the need for a thorough-going review of the Canadian constitution. We do not attempt to state in this document the details of the changes required. We believe that the following principles should be observed:

- (a) national and minority rights including rights related to religion, language and education, should be stated explicitly and be capable of being changed only by the unanimous consent of the legislatures of Canada;
- (b) the rights of individuals such as the rights of freedom of speech, religion, association, assembly and freedom from discrimination in employment, housing and service should also be capable of being changed only by the unanimous consent of the legislatures of Canada;
- (c) among the pressing tasks which Canada is facing are the provision of housing, recreational and cultural facilities, urban renewal, expanded education and social services. These matters are of provincial jurisdiction and

the provinces should have the revenues required to deal with them. However, the federal government will participate in meeting these needs in accordance with the principles of co-operative federalism, and in some instances joint action will be necessary. It may be foreseen that the Province of Quebec, by reason of its special character, may not wish to participate in joint programmes desired by other provinces. It should be free to remain outside them without delaying their application by other provinces and the federal government. Its right to remain outside such joint programmes should be exercised without financial loss;

- (d) the responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments will have to be clarified, as well as the allocation of powers of taxation. Both levels of government will have responsibility for economic planning. The federal government has ultimate responsibility to ensure economic growth and full employment. However, it will consult fully with the provinces in respect to their plans and seek to co-ordinate federal plans with plans for development which the provinces have the right to initiate;

- (e) provisions must also be made for economic assistance for the provinces which require it, based upon an equalization formula designed to raise living standards equitably throughout Canada and seeking to enable each province independently to carry out its legislative responsibility.

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